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NATO Secretary General Woerner Presents Views

AU1309083690 Prague ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY in Czech 7 Sep 90 p 5

[Unattributed CTK report on NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner's lecture at the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Prague on 7 September: "Our Former Adversaries Are Now our Friends"]

[Text] "The time of confrontation has come to an end. Now we need to cooperate," stressed Manfred Woerner, NATO secretary general, in his lecture delivered yesterday in the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs building in Prague.

Among those invited to the lecture were members of the Federal Assembly Defense and Security Committees and Foreign Affairs Committees, members of the Prague diplomatic corps, and leading Czechoslovak political scientists, journalists, and experts on international relations.

In his speech M. Woerner appreciated the faith placed in the traditions of T.G. Masaryk, a faith which our nation held onto in the past. "In 1968 the Prague Spring demonstrated that not even the subsequent years of darkness could temper your people's love of freedom," said M. Woerner. "Charter 77 and other courageous groups continuously invoked the principles contained in the CSCE Final Act and in their measures for the protection of human rights, and managed to surround themselves with a circle of freedom even during the worst periods of state repression."

M. Woerner also appraised the courage with which Czechoslovakia has become involved in the process of democratic and economic renewal. He highlighted the role of our country's leading representatives who have shown by their energy and foresight that Czechoslovakia is likewise resolved to play a key role in establishing a new arrangement in Europe.

Then our guest dealt with NATO's resolutions for the future. He stated that it is possible to overcome old fears and suspicions. "We now have an opportunity to utilize our energy, imagination, and money to build democratic free market communities which we know will be peace loving and will be the very best guarantee of lasting stability, security, and well-being," stated M. Woerner. "I have come to Prague with the same simple message I took to Moscow in June and which I will take to Warsaw next week. It is a message appealing with the same conviction to all our former adversaries who today are our friends and partners."

M. Woerner said that the creation of new structures for cooperation, the construction of a new Europe, arms control negotiations leading to a reduction in arms to the minimum number necessary and to an increase in stability and certainty, as well as mutual cooperation in all spheres—political, economic, scientific, and cultural—have forged a path from confrontation to a whole and free Europe. NATO, whose military might already has a less important role, must also play a new role in these processes.

In this connection, M. Woerner mentioned the specific steps taken by NATO toward the new arrangement in Europe:

"We are reducing defense budgets and withdrawing our units;

"We are reviewing the organization of our units and we are changing our military strategy;

"We are lowering the readiness level of our active units, reducing the demands for their training, and the number of their exercises;

"We are relying less on nuclear forces in Europe; we have proposed to the Soviet Union that all nuclear artillery warheads be withdrawn from Europe;

"We have suggested that talks be initiated on short range nuclear weapons in Europe following the signing of the treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe. We have already agreed to set up a meeting involving our alliance's special consultative groups which will draw up the complete jurisdiction for these talks;

"We have also suggested that immediately following the signing of the treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe, other negotiations proceeding from this treaty and dealing with measures for reducing the number of our units in Europe be initiated."

Our guest emphasized that these changes will, of course, be implemented as soon as Soviet forces withdraw from the CSFR and Hungary and, as has already been agreed, from the GDR. They will also be conditional on the implementation of the treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe, which will provide all participants with firm guarantees against military aggression or intimidation.

The NATO secretary general also spoke about the crisis in the Persian Gulf. This is proof of the fact that we live in an uncertain world with many risks and great instability. Therefore, neither NATO nor any European state can afford to remain defenseless. The issue in the Persian Gulf does not only involve oil, but it involves ensuring that the attempt to establish a longer lasting and more just international order following the cold war is a successful one. In this connection, M. Woerner appraised the stance adopted by Czechoslovakia on this issue.

"Our goal is a Europe in which military aggression or threats will be materially impossible and politically pointless," stated M. Woerner further. "We adopted decisive steps at the NATO summit meeting in order to create the structure of such a safe Europe." M. Woerner also mentioned the start of a new dialogue between NATO and members of the Warsaw Pact, the energetic implementation of a process for arms control, and a

proposal for new institutional forms for CSCE as proposed by the NATO organization. "Our aim is a CSCE which will allow all countries in Central and East Europe to fully participate in shaping the future European order with us," said M. Woerner.

Of course, he also stated that CSCE cannot replace the North Atlantic Alliance because it does not have sufficient resources to adopt sanctions or to ensure that they are implemented. According to M. Woerner, the CSCE can only fulfill its promise if "it supplements a strong Atlantic Alliance on which it can rely. It is clear from this that CSCE will be more successful if we do not burden it from the very beginning with unrealistic expectations."

At the end of his lecture M. Woerner outlined the two key tasks in today's Europe:

—to bring about constructive changes;
—to guarantee stability so that the changes can be implemented under the optimum conditions for reducing the risk of failure and reversal.

Czechoslovakia, which has contributed so much to European political and intellectual culture, is a key partner for the construction of a new Europe, stated M. Woerner. "Let us initiate these new changes today and let us work with trust and imaginativeness to the benefit of a better future," said our guest in concluding his speech.

At the end of the meeting M. Woerner replied to questions from the auditorium.

Woerner on Importance of Sanctions Against Iraq

AU1309154890 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 8 Sep 90 pp 1, 2

[Interview with NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner by Jiri Forejt in Prague on 7 September: "Principles Are Applicable to Everyone"; first paragraph is LIDOVE NOVINY introduction]

[Excerpts] "An unusually warm and cordial reception" was how Manfred Woerner, NATO secretary general, summed up the course of his visit to Czechoslovakia at a news conference held on Friday [7 September] in the Great Hall of the Czernin Palace in Prague. [passage omitted]

[Forejt] Do you see the possibility of a conclusion to the world-Iraq conflict without a military struggle?

[Woerner] Whoever is interested in a peaceful solution should adhere to and assert the sanctions. We want to achieve our aims without a military conflict. A condition is that the UN community remains as united as it has been so far.

[Forejt] The military Warsaw Pact has come to an end. Joyous heirs normally like quiet funerals. What do you think about the Warsaw Pact's proclaimed future political role?

[Woerner] We want to negotiate with whatever kind of partners they themselves freely decide to be.

[Forejt] There are people—many of them in the FRG—who claim that NATO and the West in general would not have intervened so decisively in the Persian Gulf if the issue had not involved oil.

[Woerner] These people are wrong. Oil plays a role, but it is much more important for those countries which are in a state of economic reconstruction—such as Czechoslovakia, Poland, and so on—than it is for our countries which are in an economically stable condition. This applies even more to the countries of the Third World. However, a fundamental reason is a principle which the United Nations also honors: We cannot permit larger countries to swallow smaller ones. Since we have begun a new era with an East-West settlement, we cannot allow this settlement to be undermined anywhere in the world. Without this there would be no guarantee of peace for anyone.

Principles are applicable to everyone.

9 Sep Soviet-U.S. Helsinki Summit Analyzed

AU1409091090 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 11 Sep 90 p 5

[Pal Bokor commentary: "The Eighteenth"]

[Text] The new Soviet-U.S. summit on 3 October will be the 19th meeting in the series (or the one before the 20th), but perhaps that is not so important, because that will be Germany's day. However, the 18th summit, held on Sunday, 9 September, will be remembered for a long time as the first manifestation of superpower solidarity—albeit perhaps not a festive one—the consequences of which may be just as determining for the state of the world in the year 2000 and thereafter as the new Germany itself.

Of course, one can argue this point. The London newspaper THE INDEPENDENT, which has acquired considerable prestige in the international political press within a relatively short period of time, wrote on Monday, 10 September, that in Helsinki, George Bush shared his Middle East problems with the representative of a "former superpower." From an economic and political point of view, this statement is by no means unfounded, but at the time of the Kuwaiti crisis, it seems a little bit too rash. Precisely at this time, it has become clear that, from a military-strategic point of view, the Soviet Union (or its possible successor state) cannot be written off, and neither can we do without the Soviet Union for the time being; we probably cannot do without her for a long time to come.

George Bush invited Mikhail Gorbachev with the definite knowledge that a military intervention in the Middle East would be no picnic; moreover, it could not be successful unless Moscow used at least its enormous

political influence on the Palestine movement to neutralize this most belligerent Arab movement; nor would it be successful unless the Soviet Union joined in the crusade against Iraq.

During the course of previous East-West summits, such complete interdependency between a U.S. president and a Soviet leader was never felt as clearly as it was in Helsinki on Sunday, 9 September. In the evening, in the conference room of the Finlandia Palace, Bush and Gorbachev not only sat together, facing the 2000 journalists, feeding public opinion with their common thoughts, and sending the same messages to Saddam Husayn, they also breathed with one breath. The human warmth, which replaced shared diplomatic interests this time, very probably emerged the same way that love does: Everybody knows that weaknesses make partners grow closer.

In any case, this political friendship, based on the unusual combination of military strength and economic weakness, has emerged; and we can assume that it will have a noticeable effect on both parties, as well as on the international situation.

The observers present had come to Helsinki with a purpose, but they received the least valuable information about the issues they had been sent for. At the news conference on Sunday, as well as in his other statements, Gorbachev himself repeatedly and consistently stressed that no joint military action had been agreed upon should Iraq refuse to withdraw its troops from Kuwait, despite the two leaders' highly dignified and firm appeal to do so. Obviously, Gorbachev told the truth. However, an extremely well-informed U.S. colleague probably also told the truth when he said that Bush had been able to meet a group of Soviet military experts during his 30-hour stay in Helsinki. In other words, Moscow is very concerned about formalities and about the reputation it enjoys in the Arab world, but agreements that have not yet been reached could be reached quite quickly once the peaceful possibilities of calling the Baghdad country snatcher to account are exhausted.

In Helsinki, further deductions could be made about U.S.-Soviet relations, and particularly about Gorbachev. Vladimir Pozner—who is called the "mouthpiece" of the Kremlin in the United States because of his almost daily appearances on television—recently published a book in English, in which he wrote: "Gorbachev is an excellent politician, probably one of the most important of this century, but, under the circumstances, perhaps he is a little bit too compromising." A completely noteworthy remark. For years now, the Soviet leader has been looking for a compromise between bureaucracy and perestroyka, between planned economy and free enterprise, between Ligachev and Yeltsin, and between Ryzhkov and the real reformers. He does not find this compromise, because experience has often shown that there is no middle way between the market and nonmarket, for example.

One may have the impression that the Soviet leader is walking on a razor's edge even in foreign policy if he tries to find a balance in this sensitive decisionmaking situation, with many millions of Soviet Moslems behind him and the United States on his side. However, in Helsinki, the way in which the U.S. side behaved toward Gorbachev could definitely not be called uncertain. They behaved like people who know that discretion and a thorough evaluation of forces do not constitute uncertainty, but virtue. As for the solitary hero, it has to be said that he enjoys great popularity among the people of the United States.

Which leads us to the fact that the first man of the crumbling Soviet empire meets with more empathy and understanding in the West, and particularly across the Atlantic, than at home, or rather, in what used to be the fief of the empire. One of the most gripping enigmas of the coming decade will be the actual value of this empathy in terms of economic and political support.

The first elements of a large-scale strategic deal came to the fore in Helsinki. Gorbachev "told a secret" to the world, in the hope that Bush would not hold it against him: From now on, the United States sees Moscow as an equal power in the Middle East. Although previous U.S. policy definitely opposed this, President Bush did not take umbrage because of this revelation. However, he did talk in detail and with sincerity about the reasons why his country is limited in the immediate financial support it can offer the Soviet Union, and about the steps he could take toward further constructive economic aid at a time when the U.S. economy itself is facing a recession.

The 18th summit brought a new tone, new emotions, and new obligations into the relationship between the superpowers. At the moment, it seems that this development does not diminish the probability of a Gulf war in the least. However, it enormously limits the danger of this conflict—or any conflict of the coming years—leading to an apocalypse.

Lilov Addresses BSP Council on Party Renewal

AU1709101890 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian
13 Sep 90 p 4

[Article by Aleksandur Lilov, chairman of the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) Supreme Council: "Congress of Transforming BSP Into New Party"]

[Text] The 39th Congress of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] is around the corner. Sharp and important questions are voiced within the party and they await answers. Each of them becomes the subject of a stormy debate and often of contradicting opinions. This is completely natural and should be positively assessed. It is only in an all-party discussion that we can find the correct answers. Thus, it is only the congress that can adopt decisions related to those questions.

The pre-congressional discussion, as never before, must be active, democratic, critical, and uncomfortable. Everything must be said in a clear and honest manner. However, all this must take place while we look forward and make efforts to renew the party. Now we must construct rather than destroy our party. We need masons rather than sappers.

The time requires people with new thinking and pure intentions. They must be brought forward. The road must be cleared for them.

Every attempt to dispense "truth from the highest instance" is a faint echo of yesterday's totalitarian system. Every intolerance toward those who think differently is impermissible. It is also impermissible to silently neglect tendencies which could have dangerous consequences for the party.

We need an open and well-founded discussion.

The discussion also represents action. We must understand what party we want to be and what the roads are that lead to its creation.

Every Socialist and every party organization must answer this question. They must clearly assess the pre-congressional draft Platform. They must give a clear mandate to their congress delegates to vote "for" or "against" the platform.

The reply to the question what party the BSP must be in the future must be produced by the all-party discussion and confirmed by the congress decisions.

Nobody else is competent enough to resolve this issue and the tutor's or prosecutor's tone of certain publications is inappropriate. While there can be differences of opinion and discussion, there should not be any judges or monopoly on the truth.

The conclusion: Socialists, determine your attitude toward the platform and send to the 39th BSP Congress representatives who support the reform in the party and defend not only their own opinion, but our common opinion about the party's future.

The party is experiencing a difficult period. We must free ourselves of wishful thinking and illusions and obsolete stereotypes. We must look the truth in the eye and see reality as it is. The party is in the midst a crisis, but also in the midst a process of renewal.

This is the most important in its present state—a crisis and a process of renewal. The fact that it is in a crisis is not terrible in itself. This is normal and inevitable. This is a phenomenon that is connected with the crisis of totalitarian socialism in Eastern Europe and in our country. It is dangerous to underestimate the serious character of the crisis and delay the process of overcoming it.

How can we overcome the crisis? There is only one way—a radical change in society, accompanied by a radical change in the party itself. Perhaps this sounds too strong, but it is absolutely true. There should either be a radical and rapid change that stays one step ahead of the changes in society, or an ideological and political collapse of the party. This was confirmed by the harsh lesson about the fate of the parties in the other Eastern European countries.

The processes of crisis and renewal do not take place smoothly and easily. They include zigzags, descents, ascents, significant successes, and shocks. Let us recall the shock of the party in February and March, and the road it traveled to the political upsurge in May and June, which culminated in the victory in the free elections with a majority of almost 53 percent. Let us recall the slump in our political initiative after the elections, when we almost lost this initiative. Let us note the new animation that emerges now.

All this creates various moods and tendencies in the party from one pole to another, and confusion in some people. Tension emerges. Accusations and accusers, depressions and depressed, believers and disappointed ones emerge.

We need composure and stamina. Politics, especially in difficult times, is not an occupation for people with weak nerves. There is no reason to dramatize the situation in the party. It continues to exist as the basic political force, continues to be the leading party on the basis of its convincing election victory, and continues to be strong and united.

Realism is needed. We must neither simplify the processes that are taking place in the party, nor underestimate the dangers that threaten it. Politics, especially in complex and quickly changing periods, is not an occupation for people who cannot distinguish between wishful thinking and possibilities. Under the conditions of the new reality there are things that are possible for the party, as well as things that are impossible. However, there are circles and people in the party who forget that the party works today and will work in the future under conditions of democracy and political pluralism.

The split and self-destruction, rather than the opposition's fire against the party and the difficulty of the forthcoming tasks, are now the greatest danger for the party. The split is the greatest danger. It could be the greatest misfortune for the party.

The conclusion: A split of the party must not be allowed. A change—yes! Ideological currents within the party—yes! Leaving the party because of disagreement with its renewal and platform—yes! However, a split—categorically, no! The party must be preserved as a mass, political, authoritative, and influential force.

Only if the party renews itself could it be preserved as an influential political force. The 39th BSP Congress could play an historical role only if it becomes a reforming congress.

What does a reforming congress mean? This is not a theoretical phrase that has been produced in the offices. This is the road indicated by our own and foreign practice. This is our only chance.

It was mentioned that if the BSP is to become the party that the modern democratic society needs, a qualitative change of the party must take place at the congress. Thus the BSP will acquire the ideological, political, and organizational characteristics which will enable her to play an important role in the social processes that are taking place in our country, and will keep abreast with time.

The parties do not exist for their own sake only, outside the needs of society and time, and outside the movement of history. If we do not transform ourselves into a new party that corresponds to the new time, we have no future.

More specifically, the 39th BSP Congress must be:

A congress of turning the BSP into a modern leftist party of democratic socialism. This is by no means a vague concept, as some people are trying to prove. This means a modern leftist party that aims at implementing the values of democratic socialism in Bulgarian society. Do not be afraid, comrade Socialists, of the scarecrows certain comrades are producing to shock you. Do not believe that the "democratic socialism" concept has a social-democratic origin. As pointed out in our platform, this concept means the striving toward peace, freedom, democracy, equality, justice, mutual assistance, and material prosperity for all in the present society, rather than in the "bright future," which is a vague utopia. Peace, freedom, democracy, and the other socialist assets either exist or do not exist in a society. This cannot be concealed.

Our party must change its notion of and "point of view" vis-a-vis socialism. We reject the totalitarian deformation of socialism and head along a new road—the road of achieving the assets of democratic socialism.

This will be a congress that will arm the party with a new policy and program of action in the further democratization, strengthening civic peace, and conducting radical economic reform. It is necessary to really construct the new democratic structures of a new market economy and new relations with the other political forces. We must put an end to the contradiction between what the party says and what it does. We must fully and irrevocably say "good-bye" to the past totalitarian habits, stereotypes, and actions.

This must be a congress which will adopt a new political platform, upon which we shall transform the BSP into a modern leftist party of democratic socialism.

This must be a congress which will conduct a radical organizational reform in the party. The goal is to create a modern well-running functional vertical and horizontal party structure, expand democracy, and simultaneously enhance the ability of the BSP to act both as a mass political party and a parliamentary party.

This must be a congress which will open the road to youth in the party. This must be a process which must begin with the admission of young Socialists, and end with the promotion of young party leaders at all levels.

The conclusion: The most convinced and energetic champions of the radical reform in the party must be elected as delegates to the 39th BSP Congress. The Congress will not be able to play its reformist role if the reformers are not elected delegates. It would be a dramatic mistake if the party failed to acknowledge the pressing need of its own reform and did not send to the congress those representatives who are capable of effecting this pressing reform.

The renewal of the BSP acquired proportions of a global all-party process. Now is the moment when the renewal must grow into transformation. This is a decisive phase in changing the party—its transformation into a new party.

What are the main dangers which have already clearly emerged in the real development of this process?

As practice shows, there are four dangers of most essential importance:

Conservatism is the first danger. This is the unwillingness and inability to change. Conservatism is not a mass phenomenon in the party. The prevailing section of the Socialists understand the need to change. They support the change, and they strive toward and struggle for a change in the party.

However, now conservatism is the main danger because **it holds the party back, and threatens it with fatally lagging behind the development of social processes in our country and abroad.**

We must not be afraid when we encounter conservatism in the pages of the newspapers, and see that it is expressed in the well-known style of the past anathemas against everything new. This speaks of the personal theoretical and political drama of the party members, some of whom are honest people who have great past

merits but do not understand the new realities. Therefore, they cannot do what Lenin himself did toward the end of his life—to analyze the new reality from a new point of view.

We, their comrades in the party, can understand them, however, we cannot agree that their personal drama become the party drama. The party cannot afford to lag behind the movement of life. This would be fatal for it.

The excesses of **pseudoradicalism** represent the second danger. The radical change of the party is a vital necessity. The radicals now are very valuable because they are the champions of change. However, those are the real rather than the pseudoradicals, who think that the reform can be effected within 24 hours. Their trouble is that they are detached from reality. The danger of pseudoradicalism lies in underestimating the mass character of the party (and thus the difficulty to change), something that could evoke endless inner-party conflicts and struggles.

The radicals must be supported. In most cases, those are the young Socialists. We must not be afraid of radicalism—it is a positive phenomenon. However, it is necessary to oppose pseudoradicalism, because its champions most often are interested not in the change of the party but in their place within this change.

Delaying the process of seeking responsibility from the specific persons guilty of violating the law and the party morals is the third danger. This delay undermines the people's faith. It puts a question mark over our sincerity to really change. Every crime, every violation of the law, every moral violation are specific actions performed by specific people. Those specific people must bear the specific responsibility and penalty. Of course, this must take place only after the guilt has been proven. We cannot use the methods of totalitarianism in the struggle against totalitarianism.

The party assumes the political responsibility for the period of its leadership, however, it cannot accept the collective responsibility for the illegal acts of its members and leaders. The party consists of hundreds of thousands of honest and worthy citizens and constructors of Bulgaria.

The appearance of a **unique Robespierrism** among certain Socialists, is the fourth danger. They are prepared to condemn and reject everyone and everything. Everything should pass under the guillotine of the radical assessment and epithets. Everything that does nor correspond to their assessment must be purged from the party. This includes everybody—the confused ones, those who are afraid, the traditionalists, the radicals, and those who are full of doubts. They insist on turning the party organizations into court rooms. They strive to expel everything that in their eyes is unworthy of the party.

It is clear what kind of self-destructive struggle will develop within the party if god forbid we head along this road. Self-hatred and mudslinging will prevail. Suspicion will reign. We know this from the execution of Dalton, the millions of victims of Stalinism, the horrors of the "cultural revolution," and the search for the "enemy with the party membership card."

If the party does not want to self-destroy itself, it must reject this road.

The issue of what forces should conduct the restructuring of the BSP emerges when we analyze the aforementioned dangers.

The formula "leftist, rightist, and center," or "conservative, radical, and center," does not function under our conditions. The issue is not to unite the party around some center that should balance the extremes. The party's renewal progressed beyond this point. The issue now is **to unite all reformist forces and the majority of the Socialists upon the platform of transforming the BSP into a modern leftist party of democratic socialism.** This does not mean a center, but rather a unity of the reformers' ideas and of all those who adhere to the radical change in the BSP. This is what we need now.

In every generation there are conservatists and reformers.

Without hesitating or doubting we must give a green light to the young generations, including the youngest—those aged 30 to 35. Youth must prevail in the activities, in the leaderships, and in the party congress.

This does not mean at all that the older generation, including the party veterans, must be isolated or restricted. They are needed in the reform and they must participate in the change.

When we say that it is necessary to accelerate the prosecution of the specific culprits for the deformations allowed during the years of totalitarianism it does not mean that all those who have had a leading position in the last 45 years must be branded. The formula of the "total guilt" and the name "nomenklaturchik" are deeply erroneous and unjust, even more so when deliberately used. Not all of those who worked until 10 November 1989 have been compromised and tarnished. Among them there are thousands of honest and capable people. The party will commit a cardinal mistake if it allows to slander those people, let alone those who dared to oppose the authoritarian regime and paid for this with verdicts, prisons, prison camps, and other repressions.

The conclusion: All reformers in the party are needed for the renewal and transformation of the BSP, regardless of the generation to which they belong. The main thing now is to assess those forces and simultaneously, to advance toward the decisive rejuvenation of the party and its leadership—from the top to the bottom.

The issue of the ideological and political basis of the reform in the party is no less important than the issue of the forces of the reform.

There must be total clarity on this matter.

Such a basis can and must be the subject of the all-party discussion, and of the **platform** that will eventually adopted by the congress on transforming the BSP into a modern leftist party of democratic socialism. I am deeply convinced that the discussion and the congress will improve and enrich the draft platform, and then approve and adopt it. This is so because the platform gives the party a chance. It incorporates it in the processes of profound transformations that are taking place now in our country and in the world.

If a party does not have a clear political platform it cannot be a strong one. A multitude of differences and ideological currents can exist in the party, however, there cannot be a multitude of political platforms. The party's essence and basis as a political formation and force are lost.

Consequently:

The **self-determination** of the party as a new party, and of every party member must be done on the basis of the Platform.

The **rallying** of the party as a political force must be done around the platform.

A party **program for action** for resolving the social problems and its own problems must be created on the basis of the platform.

The conclusion: There is a merit in discussing various drafts for a BSP political platform in the all-party pre-congressional discussion. However, a uniform platform must be adopted at the congress, and it must be the foundation of the party's change and development.

Last but not least there is the matter of the trust among the Socialists. I do not only mean the moral purification. This is a process that must take place in the party as a whole and in each of us.

I mean the atmosphere in the party organizations and relations among party members. This is a difficult time. The problems are unprecedented and the changes—difficult. The responsibility is great. An intensive political campaign is conducted against the party. This campaign, precisely as the pogrom against and the burning down of the BSP headquarters, develops into political extremism.

We need a high spirit, strong character, stamina, and will power to struggle.

However, it also is necessary to feel the support and trust of your party comrades.

It is necessary to believe each other, to be sincere with each other, to help each other in our work, and to not give in to intrigues and behind-the-scene-machinations.

"We Are Many"—this wonderful slogan was born in our preelection rallies. It spread across the entire country and to a large degree helped us to win the elections, because it united us, encouraged us, and gave us strength.

The same must happen now on the eve of the congress. We must be rallied not by the big words about moral, but by the small moral steps and deeds. Develop trust among yourselves. We are many, we believe in the party change, and we believe each other—this is the faith that we need now.

Keep your heads up, comrade Socialists! We are a strong party and will become even stronger when we transform ourselves into a modern party of democratic socialism.

We have come a long way and we look at the future and we change ourselves to participate in the construction of modern and democratic Bulgaria and prepare for the 21st century.

The 39th BSP Congress will be a congress of the BSP transformation!

SDS News Conference Discusses Future Government

AU1709194690 Sofia BTA in English 1539 GMT 17 Sep 90

[Text] Sofia, 17 Sep (BTA)—We could support a new cabinet if its program is based on the election platform of the Union of Democratic Forces (SDS) and if we have a guarantee that its members would be able to implement it within the time limit that will be set by the Grand National Assembly. This is the stand of the SDS Coordinating Council on the "program government" proposed by the president stated at a news conference today. The leadership of the SDS considers that it is necessary to make clear all problems which the future cabinet will have to solve and to fix the time limit for their solution.

Obviously the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) is not in position to fulfill its election program and it cannot administer the country, the opposition stated. The SDS expressed readiness to assume responsibility in the administration of the country and concertized the conditions in which it would back up a program government formed in compliance with the correlation of the forces represented in the Grand National Assembly.

SDS spokesman Mikhayl Nedelchev did not rule out the possibility of a split in the parliamentary group of the BSP after September 22, when the congress of the Socialists is to opened. He hinted that should it really happen, the SDS may change its position as to the new cabinet.

Lyuben Bozhilov, spokesman of the Nikola Petkov Bulgarian Agrarian Party (a member of the SDS), underlined that his party would participate in a government formed with the BSP only if the Socialists officially state that they are not able to carry out their election platform and that they give it up. "Then it would be possible to

think of forming a provisional government and prepare for new parliamentary elections," Mr. Bozhilov said.

SDS Rally in Sofia Denounces 'Communists'

AU1709192890 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 1730 GMT 17 Sep 90

[Text] The first nationwide rally of the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] since the Grand National Assembly elections took place on Sofia's Aleksandur Nevski Square today.

The rally was held under the chief slogan: In defense of parliamentary democracy. The people attending the meeting categorically declared themselves against all manifestations transgressing the law, regardless of the political forces from which they stem.

The speakers stated the views of the SDS on all major, crucial problems of the country and pointed out the guilt of certain political forces and individuals who are directly responsible for the national disaster.

The rally could be described as a peculiar assessment of the successes and failures in the work of the Grand National Assembly for which the deputies of the 16 parties and movements belonging to the SDS are also responsible.

At the opening of the rally, the first speaker Georgi Spasov stated that the deputies of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] group are serving as a cover up for the culprits of the national disaster. The subject was pursued by Petko Simeonov, who stressed that a hard winter is awaiting us. There is no gasoline, there is no electric power, and the stores are empty, he said. The slogan of the BSP, success for Bulgaria, was a one of many lies, he declared. We insist that the former Bulgarian Communist Party should be subject to trial, Simeonov added. We support the draft law on the depolitization of the Army, of the security forces, the Public Prosecutor's office, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the speaker further said. We demand urgent measures for ensuring the people's survival during the winter season. We demand an urgent law on the struggle against black marketering. It is necessary to speed the work in connection with amending the law on minimum pensions. It is necessary to change the national symbols, as soon as possible, and to rename villages, streets, and towns with non-Bulgarian names, and we also insist that the law on temporary [word indistinct] should be strictly observed.

Every Bulgarian settlement should be administered with the participation of the SDS, the speaker said.

Georgi Markov, deputy from the Democratic Party, declared on behalf of his party that it will never participate in a coalition government with communists. As to the local government elections, Georgi Markov stated that the SDS will struggle for a full victory in local elections and he raised the slogan: We should not allow a communist to become Mayor of Sofia.

Oleg Chulev, vice president of the Podkrepa Labor Confederation, and Konstantin Trenchev, president of the Confederation, also took the floor at the meeting.

Oleg Chulev called for protecting Doctor Konstantin Trenchev from legal action.

Doctor Trenchev declared as follows in his address: You see me standing here. I am neither in California, nor in Paris. I am here, because I am a Bulgarian. The Communists are planning a preventive coup against democracy. Trenchev further asked: Who benefits from the arson?

In ending his speech, Trenchev stated: Gentlemen communists, if you are incapable of fulfilling your election platform, you should leave the political scene. Unless urgent measures are taken, the events of the night between 26 and 27 August 1990 in Sofia's central square, will be a pale prelude to more serious events.

Nikolay Vasilev, chairman of the Alternative Socialist Party [ASP] called for a trial against those responsible for the national disaster.

National Assembly Deputy Dimitur Ludzhev spoke toward the end of the rally, stating as follows: Our goal is clear. We want to introduce democracy in this long-suffering country. We shall not resign ourselves as long as the last remnants of communism have left. We are familiar with statesmanship and are ready to assume all responsibility. We are ready to rescue our country, but this means the end of communism, and this is what the gentlemen from the BSP do not want.

The rally ended with a brief musical program.

[Paris AFP in English at 1709 on 17 September 1990 carries a report on the same event, mentioning that "about 30,000 people took part in an anti-government demonstration in the center of the Bulgarian capital." It also mentions that speakers chanted slogans as "Chase the communists out of power," "We don't want communism," and "down with the BSP."]

Ministers Recommend Dual Citizenship Rights

AU1709194990 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 1730 GMT 17 Sep 90

[Text] The Council of Ministers proposed to the Grand National Assembly that conventions, treaties, and agreements with the GDR, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Hungaria, and the CSFR, which do not admit dual citizenship, should be revoked.

Such international agreements were signed during the totalitarian regime and oblige citizens with dual citizenship, namely Bulgarian citizenship and the citizenship of one of the aforementioned countries, to select only one citizenship.

By revoking the agreements in question, the aforementioned individuals are placed on an equal legal basis with

Bulgarian citizens who are residing abroad permanently. In addition to this, the contradiction between the aforementioned agreements and our new legislation, which already allows dual citizenship, is thus eliminated.

Nationals Allowed To Depart Baghdad After Delay

AU1809094190 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 0900 GMT 18 Sep 90

[Text] A short while ago we contacted the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Mr. Zdravko Velev, head of the Arab Countries Department, informed us about the evacuation of Bulgarian citizens from Baghdad.

[Begin Velev recording] As we reported yesterday, we expected a group of 10 Bulgarian citizens, among them seven women and one child from the Transimpex enterprise in Iraq, to leave Baghdad aboard an Aeroflot airplane for Sofia via Moscow. It appears that the Iraqi authorities have delayed issuing the permit for the Aeroflot airplane to land in Baghdad, and as a result, the group could not depart.

We just received a new report from the Bulgarian Embassy in Baghdad, according to which today, at 0600 [0300 GMT] the group had departed Baghdad aboard that Aeroflot airplane.

At present, through the Balkan representative in Moscow, we are trying to arrange a flight to Sofia on the first available airplane.

The relatives can obtain information through the Balkan Air Bureau. After completing the formalities, the names of the Bulgarian citizens who have left Iraq, will be included in the passenger list. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs continues its effort to facilitate the evacuation of all other Bulgarian citizens in Iraq, who want to leave the country. As soon as the appropriate permit is obtained we shall report again. [end recording]

Zhelev Assured of Romania's Desire To Aid Ruse

AU1709142990 Sofia BTA in English 1329 GMT 17 Sep 90

[Text] Sofia, 17 Sep (BTA)—President Zhelyu Zhelev has been assured by the Romanian head of state, Mr. Ion Iliescu, that Romania will do everything in her power for the quick settlement of the ecological problem of the Bulgarian town of Ruse.

The above announcement is made in President Zhelev's message addressed to the children of Ruse, who for long years have been breathing chlorine-saturated air, a "present" from the chemical works in the Romanian town of Giurgiu situated on the opposite bank of the Danube.

Today the children of Ruse began their school year with an open lesson in ecology. It took place in the central square of the Danubian town, the population of which is 200 thousand. It was attended by a lot of children and their parents. With black banners and posters they protested against the pollution of the air in Ruse which is defined as "ecocide" by its inhabitants.

We should not let this town whose history is 19 centuries old die, because it would be the most sinister lesson in ecology for the future inhabitants of the planet, it is said in the address sent to the presidents of Bulgaria and Romania and to the United Nations Security Council.

EC Official Assesses Aid, 'Critical' Situation

AU1709194890 Sofia BTA in English 1715 GMT 17 Sep 90

[Text] Sofia, 17 Sep (BTA)—A high-ranking representative of the European Community assessed the situation in Bulgaria as critical and pointed out it would take the country a long time to overcome its difficulties. Before his departure from the country, after the talks he had with Bulgaria's state leadership, Mr. Henning Christophersen, vice president of the Commission of the European Community, hinted that besides under the Phare program Bulgaria might receive some other help too and specified that the Phare aid amounts to 35 million ECU [European Currency Unit] and not 25 million.

Asked to comment on some statements that the EC aid for Bulgaria is delayed, the guest said, "We are facing complicated processes. An attempt is being made to change a whole system. It is impossible for the system to get transformed overnight. What we need is a well-planned strategy".

According to Mr. Henning Christophersen the new possibilities for activating the country's exports should be sought in the growth of agriculture, all the more than only until few years ago Bulgaria was an important exporter of agricultural products. [sentence as received]

The readiness was confirmed for more widely opening the EC market to the Bulgarian exporters and to the private business in particular.

The vice president of the commission said that the 12 EC member-nations should familiarize themselves with all facts related to Bulgaria's losses arising from the crisis in the Persian Gulf and that there is a chance for the country's receiving some aid to make up for them.

Havel on Nation's Response to Gulf Crisis

PM1709114090 Paris LIBERATION in French 13 Sep 90 pp 33-34

[Interview with President Vaclav Havel by Micha Pridel in Prague—date not given]

[Text] Prague—[Pridel] How can Czechoslovakia respond to the Gulf crisis?

[Havel] We have very strongly condemned Iraq's aggression against Kuwait. We were the first in this part of Europe to join the embargo although we have given large amounts of credit to that area which could have been repaid in oil. We supported the various UN resolutions. I even expressed strong criticism of Saddam Husayn before he attacked Kuwait. It is, of course, difficult to expect Czechoslovakia to send a fleet of ships to the area. However, we are envisaging giving some aid both to Saudi Arabia and to Egypt to support their defenses against Saddam Husayn's expansion.

[Pridel] What is your analysis of events in the Middle East?

[Havel] Saddam Husayn may soon be gone. But I see a greater danger than his regime's expansionism, and that lies in the fundamentalism which is spreading in the Arab world. That is the foundation on which Saddam Husayn is trying to build. Without that atmosphere and those fundamentalist leanings, Saddam Husayn would find it difficult to do what he is doing. I think that this can be handled by the establishment of a security system in the Near East. The United States and the Western powers cannot permanently safeguard peace there and play the role of gendarme. We must create a system which will tackle the extremes which might stem from the rise of this intransigent fundamentalism.

[Pridel] In what way is Czechoslovakia envisaging supporting the forces opposed to Saddam Husayn?

[Havel] The aid we want to supply would be a combination of humanitarian aid in the form of donations and advantageous commercial offers.

[Pridel] Is Czechoslovakia envisaging any military participation, even if only symbolic?

[Havel] We do not want to make a pointless gesture. Czechoslovak armaments are essentially Soviet-made and that would probably not suit Saudi Arabia. The situation is different in Egypt's case, because real aid could be given. However, I think it would be a little excessive to make a symbolic gesture in the form of a company from the palace guard.

[Pridel] With regard to the events in the Gulf, what role can Central Europe play on the international political scene?

[Havel] Central Europe has liberated itself from totalitarian systems. The bipolar division of the world in which only the superpowers decide is collapsing. The admirable agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States would be impossible if it had not been preceded by this liberation process and, consequently, by the end of Soviet expansionism. For the time being, there is an impression that there is a vacuum in that part of Europe because the old order in which we formed an element of the monolithic Soviet empire has disappeared and the new structures have not yet been formed. This is a temporary situation but it influences events in the world.

[Pridel] Will you continue your struggle against Pact politics?

[Havel] It seems to me that our foreign policy is meeting with success. Czechoslovakia has drafted its own proposal for a final document for the CSCE summit which will be held in Paris in November. Czechoslovakia is taking the initiative in abolishing the Warsaw Pact's military structure and the other Pact countries have joined it. We have never said that NATO should be abolished, at least not in the immediate future. Unlike the Warsaw Pact, it is a community which has a meaning, a justification, which has traditions, and which could provide one of the pillars for new structures.

Britain's Thatcher Continues Talks With Leaders

Holds News Conference With Havel

LD1709161990

[Editorial Report] Prague Domestic Service in Czech at 1408 GMT on 17 September carries a 45-minute live broadcast of a press conference held in Prague Castle by Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.

President Havel first summarizes his talks with Margaret Thatcher and briefly outlines her agenda for 18 September. Margaret Thatcher then speaks of her wish to visit the country which she has cherished for some time; she announces visa-free travel beginning 1 October; and she stresses the need for European security, touching on the Helsinki process and the Gulf situation.

Questions from the assembled journalists cover topics such as Czechoslovakia's economic reform, the changing shape of Europe and the unification of Germany, and the Gulf crisis.

In answer to a question on whether he thinks Czechoslovakia should take action similar to Britain's and also expel Iraqi diplomats, and on whether he thinks the Soviet soldiers will leave Czechoslovakia in a peaceful way and on schedule, Havel says: "In answer to the first question, whether we will expel some diplomats from Czechoslovakia, I cannot reply at this moment because this does not only depend on me, but I think that the situation appears to be moving in that sort of direction. As far as the second question is concerned, I think that so far the Soviet forces are leaving here without having to be forcefully evicted. We entered into an agreement, a

timetable for their withdrawal was adopted, and so far, apart from some local debates concerning the damage they did and concerning the payment for some properties and so on, apart from such discussions, there are no problems in keeping to this timetable. The timetable is being adhered to by the Soviet side."

A CTK correspondent asks: "One of the things which appears to link Britain and Czechoslovakia is the concern among a certain section of the public about the unification of Germany. Did you discuss this problem during your talks in Prague, and did you arrive at some joint view on future development in Europe following the unification of Germany?"

Havel replies: "We also briefly touched on this subject. I can repeat what I have already said many times. As long as united Germany is a democratic state and remains so, then we have no reason to fear it politically. Naturally the energetic and entrepreneurial spirit of Germany is coming through to us, and we do not wish to be one-sidedly economically dependent on anyone. We have already had bad experience about this. Normal conditions of competition are coming into being in our country, nevertheless it seems to me that when making decisions about partners, the relevant commissions which make these decisions and consider the various offers should also look to the political dimension as one of the aspects of their decisionmaking; that means ensuring that economic relations are balanced in all directions, so that after some time we do not unwittingly find ourselves in yet another one-sided economic dependence on someone else."

Luncheon Speeches Delivered

LD1709163990 Prague CTK in English 1452 GMT 17 Sep 90

[Text] Prague, 17 Sep (CTK)—President Vaclav Havel of Czechoslovakia said today Czechoslovakia [is] aimed at full integration in a new Europe and welcomed British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's vision of a European Magna Carta as a foundation of future united Europe.

At a luncheon he gave for the British prime minister who arrived here on Sunday [16 September], President Havel recalled Czechoslovakia's isolation from Europe for long decades, as well as his visit to Britain in March, which, he said, was a time of newly open possibilities. Now the time has come for concrete deeds. He said the government had presented the so much awaited scenario of economic reform and the parliament would soon consider the key laws on privatization. "The path we have chosen will not be easy but we know it is the only one we can take and we shall not be alone", Havel said, adding that Thatcher's visit was promising in this respect. He expected it to open up new possibilities for cooperation in trade and economy and to make it possible for the Czechoslovak market to gradually open itself to British investments and advanced British industrial products. He said Czechoslovakia regarded Britain's experience with privatization as particularly valuable.

British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher said in her address she had waited with her visit to Czechoslovakia until the rebirth of freedom there.

Referring to the commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the Battle of Britain last weekend, Margaret Thatcher recalled that this battle was fought and won by British as well as Czechoslovak and Polish pilots.

Mrs Thatcher said this century was remarkable as it saw the rise and fall and communism, as well as the rise and fall of Nazism, and Czechoslovakia "was involved in both and helped to defeat both. Both attempted to say that the collective and the government were more important than the individual. Both attempted to impose this theory by force and by internal oppression. Human spirit defeated both and once again liberty and justice will triumph", she said.

Mrs Thatcher said that Czechoslovakia had great decisions ahead and exciting challenges involving attitudes which people thought were no longer there, and added she was convinced that the last decade of the century will show a true triumph of liberty under President Havel's leadership.

Official Talks Begin

LD1709181390 Prague CTK in English 1729 GMT 17 Sep 90

[Text] Prague Sept 17 (CTK)—Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher opened talks here this afternoon, with members of their official delegations taking part.

According to the Czechoslovak president's press spokesman Michael Zantovsky, Margaret Thatcher spoke about four ranges of questions—political and economic reform in Czechoslovakia, European security and NATO. She also mentioned the wish of the British Broadcasting Company (BBC) to gain a frequency for its transmissions in Czechoslovakia and spoke about visa free relations between Britain and Czechoslovakia. President Havel provided more detailed explanation on particular points.

Speaking about Czechoslovakia's economic reform, Mrs Thatcher said the opinion still prevails in the world that Czechoslovakia has the best conditions for realization since part of its infrastructure and legal structures from the period of pre-war prosperity should be still preserved in the country.

Discussing European politics, the British prime minister spoke about NATO's role as the fundamental pillar of free defence on both sides of the Atlantic. In this connection she also mentioned the situation in the Middle East, and stressed that Iraqi president Husayn was stopped in his advance not by U.N. resolutions, but by the permanent readiness of mainly the USA and

Britain to dispatch to the Middle East within 48 hours forces capable of fulfilling the resolutions. This kind of defence must be maintained also in the future since the number of countries having nuclear weapons will be rising and NATO must be preserved as a structure ready to defend the free world, Margaret Thatcher pointed out.

Thatcher Comments on Talks

LD1709191490 London PRESS ASSOCIATION in English 1812 GMT 17 Sep 90

[Report by Chris Moncrieff, PRESS ASSOCIATION chief political correspondent, in Prague; date not given]

[Excerpts] The prime minister today warned the new leaders of Czechoslovakia that investment from abroad would be hard to find unless they removed "the old bureaucracy".

She warned too that the "greater part" of Czechoslovakia's industries would have to be privatised before full membership of the European Community could be assured. [passage omitted]

Her warning that the remnants of the old guard must be removed to ensure the flow of investment from overseas came in an almost impromputo interview given to LIDOVE NOVINY (People's News), whose editors were in prison until the revolution last November.

She said: "I think we have to be certain that when you invest in another country, you have got rid of the bureaucracy, that industry run by government has gone.

"When you have done that, you will get people coming in to invest in your country and we shall be among them."

In the meantime Britain, through its "know-how" fund, was trying to teach as many Czechoslovak people as possible how to manage in a free society where there was much greater freedom for industry, she said.

And her warning on the prospect of European Community membership for Eastern European countries emerging from communist domination was no less specific.

With President Havel beside her, she said: "The European Community is not an exclusive club but should be an outward-looking organisation and always be prepared to have association agreements with countries in Eastern Europe and to hold out the possibility of full membership."

Ec membership would require "major changes in your legal sytem, which takes time, as well as getting the spirit of enterprise working fully".

She added: "Membership of the community would mean that the greater part of your industries will have to be privatised so we get fair competition."

There were "very big decisions" ahead. "I do not believe that people will settle down until the big decisions have been taken."

Calfa, Thatcher Discuss Economy

LD1709203390 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 1930 GMT 17 Sep 90

[Text] Today British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher met Federal Premier Marian Calfa in Prague. According to Zbynek Fiala, the federal government spokesman, the British prime minister was interested in the progress of changes in Czechoslovakia and in the building of a new state structure. The two representatives also focused much attention on Czechoslovak-British economic relations. Marian Calfa noted that opportunities for foreign entrepreneurs are gradually being developed and he pointed to the role of our new laws in this respect. The two premiers also discussed structural changes in the Czechoslovak economy and the tasks faced by our economy, in particular in removing the excessive heavy industry burden and dependence on one market and one raw material source.

Margaret Thatcher went on to stress that the relations between the government and the trade unions must be clearly defined by a law on trade unions.

The British prime minister and the highest Czechoslovak representatives then attended a gala dinner at the British Embassy in Prague given by Laurence O'Keefe, ambassador of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and his wife.

Havel Addresses Federal Assembly 17 Sep

LD1709101490 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 0800 GMT 17 Sep 90

[Speech by President Vaclav Havel at joint session of the Chamber of the People and Chamber of the Nations in Prague—live]

[Text] Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen deputies. The summer meetings of our three governments on further division of responsibilities competence between the republics and the federation have stirred our public life and caused various conjectures, misunderstandings, suspicions, and often even apprehensions as to the future of our federative state. It seems that in this situation it is my duty to speak to you again and to think aloud on this platform about the nature and perspectives of our joint republic. It will not be an expert lecture, rather just a few general observations and thoughts.

The general impression that the main initiator and main motive force of discussions about the new division of responsibilities was the Slovak Government is most likely justified. I think that this initiative of the Slovak Government has deeper causes. Perhaps these causes will be explained by several circumstances which I will attempt to characterize briefly.

First, if we do not count the brief and sad period of Tiso's Slovak state, the Slovak people for many centuries never had the opportunity in any way politically or at a state administration level to implement their national independence and in any way to manifest their existence on the international scene. In the 20th century they had a realistic hope three times to fulfill this natural striving, and three times it was bitterly disappointed. The first time it happened was shortly after the birth of our modern democratic state when, in contradiction to the original agreements between the Czechs and the Slovaks, the unfortunate idea of one Czechoslovak people was gradually forced into existence.

These hopes were thwarted a second time after World War II, when the original ideas on the postwar structure of our state were again rapidly abandoned so that, eventually, the rigid centralism of the communist power with the so-called assymmetric model of state structures took over.

These hopes were quashed a third time after 1968 when although Czechoslovakia, formally changed into a federation of two national republics, this federation soon became only a different administrative form of the same totalitarian centralism which was characteristic of the previous years.

Can anyone wonder, therefore, that the Slovaks after these three disappointments do not want to be disappointed for a fourth time? Can anyone wonder that they are increasingly impatient and that they demand more stridently than the Czechs a faster building of an authentic federation? Can anyone wonder that they are increasingly distrustful about everything that is federal when all that is federal has been marked so conspicuously by their previous bitter experiences? Can anyone wonder that they should act more resolutely and that they are rejecting compromises?

Second, the center of totalitarian power lay naturally in the federal structures. Thanks to this, the high degree of Slovak mistrust in federal institutions, which moreover are rather distant geographically, is more than understandable. Totalitarian centralism merges in the Slovak subconsciousness with the federal system and the endeavor to transfer maximum powers down to the republican levels is in fact also an expression of the endeavor to smash the constraints of centralism.

Third, Prague is the capital of our federation and therefore it is in Prague where all the gigantic federal institutions with their bureacratic apparatuses have their seat. Looking through Slovak eyes, the existing federal system therefore assumed the form of a pure Pragocentrism, and the whole federation could justly appear to a Slovak as more or less a Czech, or even Prague enterprise. This is how it could have also appeared to numerous inhabitants of Brno or Olomouc.

If we take all these circumstances into consideration we shall understand the forcefullness with which the Slovak side demands such a rapid transfer of many powers from the federal to the republican level. I think that most of their demands are justified. Those that could bring about complications for all of us—in the background of what I said a short while ago—are understandable, at least psychologically. If a certain impatience and increased concern lest the Slovak nation's aspirations for sovereignty are not disappointed again is characteristic of the climate in Slovakia, then what is characteristic of the climate in the Czech lands is that people there are not too worried about the redistribution of powers; they are not in a hurry to carry it out and they are rather surprised at the Slovak impatience, which they from time to time are even inclined to perceive or interpret as a subconscious or conscious endeavor to bring about the disintegration of our common state.

This Czech social climate, too, has its own quite understandable reasons. In Bohemia, and especially in Prague, the Czech consciousness merges traditionally with the Czechoslovak one, with these two concepts not sufficiently separated from one another. This is why the Czechs feel far less threatened by Czechoslovak structures. In a certain sense many Czechs perceive Czechoslovak statehood, whether it has a federative form or not, as truly their own to a considerable degree—that is, a Czech matter.

How many of we Czechs speak, for example, quite automatically about Czechoslovak currency as Czech currency? True, we do not mean anything bad by saying this, but it does say something aobut our deformed perception. This paternalistic, often almost scathing relationship toward the Slovak peoples, naturally only pours oil onto the fire of Slovak impatience and lack of trust, if not directly Slovak nationalism. So that there is the danger of some kind of vicious circle. The more and the faster the Slovak side escalates its demands, the more the Czech side is surprised, and the more distinctly it provokes some Slovak circles to escalate their demands which, after a while, cease to be dictated by a practical thought and embody only a somewhat irrational will to gain maximum jurisdiction in their own hands. At the same time, objections are often being raised on behalf of the Czech Government and Czech premier to the effect that they are making too many concessions to the Slovak people, that they are in defensive and that, in fact, they are only helping the Slovak representation to weaken the federal institutions and our federation in general. I think that these objections are unfair. The Czech premier feels very correctly that the main task of the Czech representation is to build the Czech statehood and to separate the Czech consciousness form the Czechoslovak consciousness. He feels correctly that authentic federation and joint awareness of the Czechoslovak statehood can be built only on the basis of two equal states and the Czech acquisition of everything Czechoslovak can only threaten authentic federation. This correct emphasis on Czech statehood and republican powers, at the same time, runs as a parallel, analogical will of the Slovak representation which could result in the impression that the two national republics want jointly to weaken the

federation or that, even, they somehow are plotting against it by direct mutual actions.

If the Slovak Government, for reasons which I mentioned, is somewhat more energetic, then the Czech Government can appear to some people only as its weaker second. Such a point of view, however, demonstrates little understanding of the essence of the matter.

In my view the danger to our federation does not spring from the resolve of the two republics to possess greater powers and from the direct mutual talks between the two republic's institutions, and especially not from the apparent weakness of one partner in comparison to the other. I see the danger in something else, and I shall now attempt to explain where I see it.

The representatives of both our republics stress with justification again and again that a federative association always emerges out of the voluntary will and agreement between those who are part of it and that federal structures are to fulfill only those functions which the associating states surrender to them. This is precisely how the United States came into existence more than 200 years ago—the first federative state in history. Thirteen American colonies at that time agreed to surrender certain state functions to the emerged federation.

Czechoslovakia, too, came into the existence originally out of the agreement between our two nations, although not as yet as a federative state. When we are trying today to build what we call an authentic federation we must truly proceed from the historic agreement between our two nations in 1918 and develop it further by demarcating more precisely the functions which both nations, which today form two national republics, delegated and continued to delegate to the common state. Metaphorically speaking, it could be said that we are today amending and updating the original agreement. So far everything is in order. Direct talks between the two republican governments are a legitimate beginning of this amendment and therefore I, personally, do not see anything dangerous in such talks no matter how dramatic and controversial they may be.

Having said a, however, one must also say b. I see a certain danger in continuously stressing and repeating a, so that b is seriously neglected. What is this b? It is and must be respect for the agreement reached, identification with it, and a clear awareness of its binding nature. Once we have agreed on coexisting with each other in a federative state this means that we must take this federative state as our own and identify ourselves with it as a result of our joint endeavor and commitment. [applause]

Current debates about the redistribution of powers sometime leave me with a bad feeling. This is because both our republics unconciously regard the federation as some kind of a necessary evil, that is as a mere unpleasant umbrella which they have both to hold open above their heads for certain international meteorological reasons to ensure that they do not get wet. [applause]

Sometimes it almost looks as if the federation for them a common enemy, an unpleasant complication on their path toward sovereign development, and sometimes it looks as if there are two authentic republics belonging fully to their nations and nationalities, and somewhere in the vacuum above them floats the federation which does not belong to anyone.

The Czech premier was right when he said that there exists the Czech and the Slovak nations but no federal nation. I would, however, add to this that although there is no federal nation as such, there is no doubt that there are federal people, and 15.5 million citizens of our federative republic who have freely elected as their highest representative: you, that is the Federal Assembly. And that from the same election, one cannot say, the federal government is hanging in the vacuum somewhere and representing no one. [applause]

It is, on the contrary, the highest organ of executive power in our federation.

The identity of every one of us consists of several layers. We feel it in the belonging toward our family, toward our job, toward our community, our nations, our state as a whole, and toward Europe. And if a citizen of California feels he is a Californian, then this does not mean that he does not feel he is an American at the same time.

Delegating certain functions from a lowel to a higher level does not mean only a kind of curtailing of the lower level—that is something negative by its nature. It means an entirely positive participation in the higher unit. Allow me to give you the following example: if a professor of biology is proud of the Faculty of Natural Sciences where he works and at the same time of the university of which this faculty is a part there is no contradiction in this at all. It only reflects the fact that while the work of the faculty contributes to the good name of the university, the university for its part creates a favorable environment for the development of the faculty. If we manage to create the same situation in our state we can quite naturally feel with pride at the same time our national identity—be it the Czech or the Slovak one—and also our state indentity—that is Czechoslovak. [applause]

The meaning of the federation is not that the Czechs want to trick the Slovaks, it is not some kind of a stupid complication which interferes in a happy life of the Czechs and the Slovaks. On the contrary, it is our joint task, our joint work, a piece of our inalienable identity, it is the property of all of us, Czechoslovak citizens, whether we are Czechs, Slovaks, Hungarians, Transcarpathian Ukrainians, Romanies, Poles, or Germans, or whether we feel ourselves to be Moravians or Silesians. [applause]

The slogan that strong republics constitute a strong federation has become popular. Yes, indeed, but only on the premises that they do something for it, namely that they declare as their own also this federative union, that they identify with it, respect it as a joint creation which

must be cultivated, perfected and which, last but not least, must also be loved a little. [applause]

A federation is not putting together two or more fully independent subjects which were glued merely by the pressure of the outside world. A federation is a voluntary abandoning of a part of one's sovereignty for the benefit of the sovereignty of a higher order. Federal institutions are not an obstacle in the life of republican institutions, but instruments of the sovereignty of a higher order, instruments which must be, in our own interest, not only respected, but actively created. I would even like to dare supplement the cited proverb by paraphrasing it: without a strong federation there will not be strong republics. [applause]

Allow me, in this connection, to stress on my own behalf that I intend to fulfill completely the promise that I ceremoniously gave you, namely that I will protect the constitution and integrity of the federative state of our peoples and nationalities. [applause]

It is understandable that at a time when we are bulding a truly democratic state, a truly authentic federation, and when we are striving for extensive decentralization of all the spheres of social life, there are powers coming to the fore which justly want to expropriate the republics, or sometimes lower regional formations from the center. The more, however, this topic of the day finds itself in the forefront, the more it is necessary for us not to forget the need to rebuild also all the organs of our federation, to seek their new role, to delimit anew their contents and identity, and respect them in a similar way as citizens of California or Texas respect the powers of all the federal institutions of the United States. [applause]

In this work we should draw inspiration from experiences gained by firm and functioning federations such as the United States, and we should not be wasting time by inventing what has already been invented by others. It is obvious what I am speaking in support of: an active, creative and, I would dare to say, patriotic attitude not only toward republican structures but also toward federal structures. Our government is both the Pithart government and the Meciar government—and also the Calfa government. Our parliaments are both the national councils and the two chambers of this Federal Assembly. Our interests—be it in a different way—are being defended and implemented by all these institutions.

What is the case here is not any weakening of federal organs or even taking them out of play. We want something else: to build these organs on the principle of complete equality of both republics which in their own interests agree on their necessity and in a most practical and comprehensive way and as productively as possible to divide the powers between them and republican organs.

I do not intend to deal here with details, this is a task for experts, governments, and representative bodies. I would like to touch upon only the basic directions by which all the work on the structure of powers should be taking. I think that besides the defense of the state, its security, foreign policy, currency, protection of frontiers and other undisputed functions of the federal state, federal tasks should include decisive part of legislation, the determination of rights and duties of citizens, strategic decision-taking in politics, the economy, ecology, and power generating, and showed unavoidably be part of the management of unified systems.

On the other hand, the republic level, without doubt entails a maximum of administrative functions, from state administration, issues of territorial division and self-administration, to the necessary level of management of all spheres of the economic life, including the administration of state institutions which jointly create the unified statewide systems.

In appointing powers it is necessary for all central organs, that is not only the federal organs but also republican organs, to be reduced significantly and simplified. In a democratic and decentralized state, which is to have a market economy, the mammoth managerial institutions, including ministries with hundreds of employees who only create more work for each other and make life more difficult for everybody else, have to be replaced by considerably smaller teams of top-quality experts.

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The federal nature of institutions must furthermore be stressed by all possible and purposeful means, including the transfer of some of them to Slovakia or Moravia. The feeling of Pragocentrism should gradually lose its justification. [applause]

I believe that all work on the redistribution of powers ought to be carried out in the spirit of profound mutual understanding and tolerance and that it should be switched completely from the area of prestige and national emotions to the area of concrete and expert considerations about what is in the given case truly functional, purposeful, and beneficial to all. We should not interpret such work as a power struggle between the republics and the federation but as the seeking of the ties which will function best. After all, the issue is not about what ministries, offices, and powers the republics and the federation can boast, but rather to ensure that our federative state and the two republics which form it function as well as possible. [applause]

I have said on many occasions, and I have repeated it also today, that we are in fact rebuilding our state. Nonetheless, I believe that I ought to add one important matter. We are not building this state on a green field but on the field of many given historic, cultural, economic, and other aspects. If we do not take into consideration—at least to the necessary extent—these given aspects, we will be pure utopians who will very soon fail. One of these aspects, which in this context is especially important, is the circumstance that our state from the international law viewpoint has a sole and essentially indivisible political subjectivity. We are recognized and respected by the world community as a sovereign state in the

borders that it has today as a whole, and only thus can we have access to various international institutions and various structures of the integrating Europe. We can conclude all interstate treaties, including those which concern various state credits and stabilization funds, only as such a state which guarantees subjectivity and unproblematic and indivisible responsibility for its obligations, including in the long term. We must naturally take care to a far greater extent to ensure that it is clearly seen in the international arena that this state consists of two equal nations and that members of our national minorities, too, are its equal citizens. At the same time we would however go against our very interests if this endeavor resulted in doubts about the integrity of our state. [applause]

The integrating Europe—where state frontiers are playing a less and less important role, and where the state, nations and countries are giving more and more powers to supranational entities—would hardly open to us if it should have any doubts that we as a state are able to guarantee our integrity and our responsibility proceeding from this. What I am saying here is not speculation for its own sake, in defense of Czechoslovak statehood, but support for the basic pillar of any kind of partnership which dwells in trust in identity and mutual responsiblity.

I am not, by the way, stressing all this accidentally right now. I know very well that bewilderment recently has started to emerge in international political and economic circles regarding our petty disputes, as well as worries concerning our inability to guarantee our state integrity and doubts about our internal political stability—in which the very same circles fully believed until just recently.

Many investors have postponed their investments, many have decided to wait. I think that none of us—Czech or Slovak—should be indifferent to whether we would become a economically prosperous state, comparable with West European states, in seven or 17 years.

Many have been surprised by the fact that our governments, after the initiative of the Slovak Government, have started—only a few days after the Federal Assembly adopted the bill on power-sharing—to discuss a further redistribution of powers. I admit that I was not taken aback by this because I have registered a number of signals, including those contained in policy statements of republican governments that the process of transition of powers have not been closed by the bill completely. I even think that the speed of this process can in fact be good for something. The sooner that what has to ripen anyway does ripen, the sooner we shall jointly apply efforts to solve other major problems—above all in the economic sphere—which we have to solve and for the solution of which our society is waiting with growing impatience.

Our three constitutions, two republican and one federal, will be the foundation stones of the state which we are building.

I had the opportunity to familiarize myself with the preliminary drafts of all these three constitutions, and I admit that I have been rather disappointed. The drafts of the republican constitutions contain long passages which evidently belong to the federal Constitution. They even contain a kind of a list of proposals for it. All three drafts have appeared to me to be rather too detailed. If they were adopted in this form life itself would quite certainly demand shortly afterward for them to be amended by more and more constitutional laws.

The reading of these drafts only confirmed me in the belief that work on our new constitutions ought to be far more coordinated and indeed that all these three constitutions ought to be drafted jointly as a work of a sole, so to speak, tripartite team. Only in such a way can they form a logical tripod which will be a guarantee of the good functioning of all our three state formations and not the principle impediment to it. In the case of our bi-federation I do not regard it as too good to consolidate in the constitutions the right of the republics to leave the federation. Not even in the U.S. Constitution there is anything of this kind. Such an article merely strengthens the sense of a lack of solidity and temporary nature of our common state and deepens doubts about its ability to be a responsible partner in negotiation with anyone. Moreover, every society and every state is not merely an contract amongst those living presently but a contract among those who live at present, those who have already died and those who have not yet been born. We do not know and cannot know whether both the past and future generations would give one or both our nations the right to go it alone and this why I believe it is not right to consolidate such a thing in the constitution. [applause]

Since the present unsuitable constitution is still in operation and since various unavoidable legislative steps find themselves to be continuously in unresolvable conflicts with it, I regard as very good the proposal that you should adopt as early as in November a constitutional document on the rights and duties of citizens, which would create the necessary constitutional and legal scope for all other legislative works which are ahead of our representative bodies. This constitutional document could later become an integral part of the new federal constitution and many of the things which it would already contain should no longer be in the republican constitutions.

Ladies and gentlemen, I spoke about the need to respect the higher, that is supra-national identity of our common state, honor its federal institutions, the result of our joint endeavor, which serve all Czechoslovak citizens. What is however the content of this identity? How to define it in fact? How to define its sources, its essence, and purpose?

I believe that in the subconsciousness of both our nations and all national minorities living in our country there are

certain common traditions shaped by our being closely related to each other and by living together for a long period of time, and that these traditions were revived remarkable and in a remarkably identical way both in the Czech lands and Slovak at the end of last year when we all began to break jointly the shackles in which the totalitarian system held us. Ranking among these traditions is confidence in the human spirit and its ability to triumph over force without the need to resort to force, belief in supra-personal values and better human aspects, the citizen's responsibility for its community, understanding, tolerance, and ability to forgive as well as to repent, aspiration for a democratic order and ability to conduct oneself democratically, profound respect for human rights, longing to live in freedom and dignity in an independent state which subscribes to its European identity, ability to think in a matter-of-fact fashion and not to succumb to fanaticism, ability to take a general overview, humor, imagination, and civic culture. [applause]

I believe that the remarkable similarity of the ethos which characterized the first weeks of the revolutionary events throughout Czechoslovak territory confirms that there exist values and ideals which link us all together and which form a truly solid spiritual foundation of our future common state. Czechoslovak identity is not therefore a mere fiction or an additionally made up virtue of necessity. It is something that can be comparatively clearly defined, that is not an artificial prison of the Czech and Slovak national existence but is their common denominator and which forms a truly perspective basis to building a stable and humane federative state. Thank-you for your attention. [applause]

Calfa Addresses Federal Assembly 17 Sep

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[Speech by Federal Premier Marian Calfa at joint session of the Chamber of the People and Chamber of Nations in Prague—live]

[Text] Estemed Mr, Chairman, esteemed deputies. The Federal Government (?is submitting to you) the economic reform draft, which has been drafted after close coopertion among all three governments. It is a draft, the contents of which are not subject to any significant differences of views between the Federal Government and government of the republics. It is the result of several months of efforts started by the government of national understanding.

In challenging debates, which we have carried out inside and outside the government, the decisive option was confirmed more and more clearly—that without fundamental deep reform, without a complete recreation of our economic mechanism, a long-term successful development, an effective economic growth cannot be achieved. This, therefore, is not a reform merely for the sake of reform—not a one-sided fetishism of the market economy—but it is a creation of the necessary prerequisites for a permanent all-round prosperity of our country.

Esteemed Federal Assembly, the draft which will be discussed at this session should fulfill several important functions. It is, in a certain sense, above all, an explanatory report accompanying bills which we shall be submitting to you in the near future. At the same time it provides informaton on government strategy in the formation of the new economic system in our country; for the government of the new economic system in our country; for the government itself it represents a program according to which it organizes work on measures for its implementation, opening up our path toward a prosperous society. Finally, it characterizes the only mechanism which is able to consistently and permanently solve our specific economic problems.

If we take into consideration all these aspects, the work on the draft was far from useless from both our points of view. The character of our reform is accompanied by the expression radical and fast. I think that both these adjectives have their justification, because the planned changes do not improve the present system or look for any illusory third solution, but are navigating our society toward the path of a modern market economy, with significant social emphasis, and ecological priorities.

In this sense the reform is radical, because both the internal and external conditions demand that we complete the entire process of transition to the new system as soon as possible; thus the reform inevitably must also be quick.

True, whether its results will be both fast and radical will not be decided only by the system of the planned bills and steps of implementing them by all three governments, but above all by the changes which these steps will evoke in the quality and efficiency of our economy. It is, therefore, obvious that if we want to be successful, we have to win society's approval for the program expressed in the draft, to evoke an active reaction in the entire sphere, in managerial structures and in our citizens. In this sense, the discussion of the draft economic reform in the Federal Assembly and its extensive publication is an expression of the government's effort to win the broadest possible support in society.

Allow me now, at least briefly, to describe both the internal and external conditions which force us to act radically and swiftly.

Internal causes lie, above all, in the fact that the present method of management of the economy, which in fact does not represent any integrated system, cannot be further extended effectively. By the collapse of the political system, which was its guarantee and the gradual disappearance of institutions which have been its bearers, a situation has arisen when both the elements of the centralist system and economic instruments

implanted in it are losing their effectiveness, and we are struggling to maintain economic growth and to block any decline in output.

The seriousness of this situation for the system of functioning of our economy is emphasized by the fact that the present model of economic growth is no longer temporary. The extensive resources are exhausted, technological and technical development has fallen critically behind the advanced economies, and the postponing of urgent needs of the infrastructure, ecology, health services, and education cannot be continued any longer.

Not a single one of these serious problems can be overcome successfully without radical changes of the system as incorporated in the submitted draft.

Among the main external causes are, above all, the collapse of economic relations with the CEMA countries and the necessity to renew trade with them on the basis of conditions and prices prevailing on the international market. Above all, this is true about relations with the Soviet Union and the unified German state. They used to account for about half of our foreign trade. We also import most of our materials and export most of our engineering production and the production of other branches of our processing industry from and to those markets. The new situation means not only new, high prices of materials and energy, but also a considerable threat to our marketing possibilities.

The internal and external conditions in which we plan and in which we shall implement our path toward the market economy will be linked with the impact of reform measures so that in the final effect it will be very difficult to distinguish between these two influences. There is even a danger that problems linked with the removal of all shortcomings will be described as consequences of mistakes in the method of implementation of the economic reform.

Esteemed deputies, I shall now touch upon some key questions of the submitted draft as the joint stance of the federal government. The first key sphere is the process of privatization. All, including expert opinion, agree that small privatization should be given the green light but that there are still many obstacles to its implementation, both in the effectiveness of adopted measures and in the absence of some legislative prerequisites. Final work is now being done on an approach which will obviously have to assume legal form, unlike the stand given in the draft. This bill, which in the next few days will be discussed by all three governments, will create scope for privatization in the sphere of services, crafts, trade, and small enterprises.

One needs to agree with all those who have been criticizing the current slow progress made in this area. None of us is, in fact, satisfied, but as soon as the new government was constituted, preparations have begun immediately to eliminate the most serious obstacles.

The process of the privatization of large enterprises will be much more complicated. This is due to the fact that, on the one hand this cannot be carried out immediately, while on the other hand this process is much more demanding both regarding its application as to the most appropriate form of carrying it out, and regarding the creation of the necessary institutional prerequisites. The draft you have at your disposal expects, apart from the use of the method of investment coupons, further traditional methods of privatization. It will, however, be the practical possibilities of carrying it out above all by our inhabitants, organizations, and institutions as well as by our potential foreign partners which will decide the extent and purposefullness of applying these methods.

The draft offers several options for the method of using investment coupons. Investment coupons can have a price which could be to various degrees lower than is the value of the property being privatized and they can concern variously large sections of the existing state property, which will be the subject of a government proposal and which will require the approval of the relevant legislative bodies.

The national property fund continues to remain, as confirmed by expert opinions, the subject of conceptual deliberations. In connection with the finalization of the whole concept and its practical functions two fundamental demands come to the fore. First, the resources which will concentrated in this fund must not form a source of limitless financing. Their utilization must be subordinated to a special regime, whose supervision will be exercised not only by the government but also by elected bodies.

Second, it is also necessary to prevent the fund becoming a new sectoral center of the management of the economy and ensure that the fund does not appropriate to itself the paternalistic function of protecting not only the essential and perspective enterprises, but also all those which are lagging behind and which are conservative. In further work on the transformational and restitutional bill, there will be an opportunity to examine once again all the reasons which have led to our taking this action but also arguments that are expressed in expert opinions.

Liberalization of prices constitutes another key component of the reform. At the beginning of October the government will adopt operational principles as well as a more detailed timetable of the course of action. There has been an overall agreement that the new price parity of raw materials and energy must be projected in the level of our prices. These have been, up to now, distorted from world prices by various prices charged by our suppliers expressed in rubles, but which are coming to a close at the end of the current year. While paying full regard to this factor we must, however, pursue a fundamental course which will lead to the consistent calculation and formation of prices in accordance with market principles.

The draft also lists principles which deal with certain regulatory and braking mechanisms restricting the threat of an inflationary development. I admit that these have been formulated only in general terms so far, but work on them is continuing intensively. They will be submitted to parliament for consideration, along with the bills related to this area, that is the bill on supervision of prices and the bill on economic competition and on protection of the market.

Esteemed deputies, the scenario for liberalizing foreign trade and introducing the internal convertibility of the koruna has for the time being left open two variants to a possible solution for the basic exchange rate. This unquestionably is an extremely serious area for our whole economy because it determines the conditions under which it will adapt to the anticipated changes of energy prices and raw material imputs, and the conditions under which the internal foreign exchange market will be developed and regulated.

Both these variants in the proposed scenario have their advantages and also their risks. When the scenario was being finalized, there were not enough arguments available to us to give our unequivocal preference to either of them. This is certainly not a question of us nurturing any kind of conceptual uncertainty or political indecisiveness. In order for us to recommend one specific variant we need to eliminate some serious unclarities, especially with regard to external conditions, in securing key raw materials. Talks are continuing on this and negotiations have also begun with our partners who will extent us reserve funds to enable us to stablize the internal foreign exchange market in case of possible temporary difficulties initially.

Our effort is aimed at acquiring enough data to enable us to responsibly propose an exchange rate and a regime of internal convertibility which will exert sufficient pressure on ineffective production, provide effective incentives to our exporters, and also give an opportunity to those enterprises that will have to radically change their internal operations and the whole program of their activities.

On this we need to note that, although the expert analyses that have already been worked out provided some viewpoints and findings which we will be able to use in making our future course of action more accurate, none of them contains practical instructions with which we can make an equal substitution of the variant with which we have been working in the scenario.

In this connection I would like to state in more general terms that, although the viewpoints expressed in the expert analyses did not bring a kind of a comprehensive, applicable alternative to the fundamental course of the reform, they contain a number of partial perceptions and proposals which we will consistantly take into account when firming up the individual steps of the reforms.

The section of the plan devoted to social issues was the subject of sharp discussions with our social partners, both with trade union bodies and representatives of business circles.

We need to admit that as the scenario started to develop, its social part gradually narrowed so that many of the materials worked out and published so far, give a better picture of what the government wants to do in this sphere, than the scenario itself managed to express.

The government considers it its duty to build social security and labor market institutions and to form new job opportunities. We are preparing a series of measures to protect citizens' social rights and soften the social impact of the necessary reform steps. We have mostly accepted recommendations on this and when completing the work on the system and legislative measures we will take them into account. We will certainly not accept the demand for guaranteed social certainties and even guaranteed increases in the living standard. These are somewhat from the outside and one-sidedly predetermine the entire acceptable logic of the reform approach. No such variantion is practically possible; therefore, the government has to insist that the only realistic guarantee of social certainties is a prosperous economy and prosperous enterprises in it.

The government, no doubt, faces an exceptionally difficult task to ensure the necessary level of social protection and social rights for those earn low incomes or are no longer able to actively influence the level of their income. It cannot, however, become a protector for badly managed enterprises and their teams.

Esteemed deputies, in the course of examining the submitted plan, several comments have appeared on its seemingly one-sided direction and the insufficiently elaborated specific economic development program. I have to say that the government is fully aware of the links between the system and contents side of the transitional process under way .

It is working intensively on a structural policy, on a system to phase out programs. Partial strategies for the energy policy and the agricultural and food industry and others are being completed.

By mid-November, the government's entire economic and political strategy for 1991-1992 will be prepared. It is necessary, however, to stress above all that only the basic directions and frameworks are being formed in this way—for enterprising activity of economic subjects, and for the selective policy of the state support, carried out in conformity with market mechanisms.

The government's activities in forming specific program aims has nothing in common with the concept which aims—with the help of a reworked complex of detailed solutions—to create in existing conditions the all-round, balanced economic conditions for a follow-up problem-free implementation of the economic reform.

In preparing an integrated economic and political strategy for the next two years the government also does not intend to create a strictly fixed detailed program which will ensure the beforehand the set growth of the economy. Our basic ambition has to be for the drop in the economic dynamics next year to be as small as possible. At the same time we must ensure that what is not effective, backward and slowing down does not die faster, so that on this basis new activities with a future in production, the infrastructure and services can be born.

What we, in the given context, consider important, is to also assess in a more realistic and comprehensive way the changes and processes under way in our economy this year. There is a need to see that some, at first sight, unequivocally negative phenomena—falling production, output, export—include also positive elements, which form an indivisible part of the process of transformation. It is possible to see them, for instance, in the falling of a number of productions, which are demanding on raw materials and energy, and the mining industry, which is ineffective and ecologically damaging, in a more marked concentration of investments in the sphere of the raw material processing industry. These are also seen in a change in the employment structure in favor of the activities of the terciary sphere and private sector, a marked reorientation of external economic relations in the direction of highly developed market economies, as well as in a number of other directions.

What matters now is to strengthen, as much as possible, the rudiments of the emerging positive processes, to direct at them entrepreneurship activities, to effectively support all those who are prepared to be active in the appropriate directions while taking on the corresponding economic risks.

Ladies and gentlemen, we are entering a new period of our history weighed down by a number of deficits. We are lacking in capital, international contacts in the most sensitive sphere of entreprises, fundmental institutions, and many further guarantees of the continuity and success of our embarked upon path.

Nevertheless, there is one thing we undoubtedly have: We have people who are dedicated and prepared to return this country to its former leading position in the world. We must care for these people. Above all, there is a need to use those who already have acquired experiences in the sphere of entrepreneurship, as well as those who are knowledgeable about the ailments we are facing. We have to get used to the fact that in assessing the people working in the state and economic sphere, the principal criterion will be the entrepreneurial success and work effort of these people. Such a criterion is just, is above a personal level, and does not need any screening commissions full of various subjective interests, favoritism, personal envy, and incomplete information.

In order to prepare our state administration, enterprises and cooperatives for entry into hard market conditions, those people who are corrupt, who put selfish personal or group interests before the needs of the institutions of which they are in charge or in which they work, must leave. Other people who should leave are those [applause] who simply cannot cope with the tasks given to them, who cannot adjust themselves to the new situation. Not least, those people who, despite being knowledgeable, do not want to help, also must leave. [applause]

These changes, of course, must be carried out in line with legal norms and ongoing changes in the system. I beg you to take into consideration at the same time that I am not talking about the state administration and the economic sphere. Stricter criteria must understandably apply to the authorities which were the carriers of power. [applause]

Esteemed deputies, the effective course of the economic reform is also linked with the answer to the question about how to arrange a new coexistence among our nations and national minorities in a common state. Historical experiences and current knowledge shows that this is a very sensitive problem. Both nations feel the need to secure their development. This endeavor ought not, however, to assume the form of a conflict; it ought not be accompanied by mistrust brought about by a suspicion about the aims and attitudes of political representation of one or the other nation.

The common requirement of the overwhelming majority of the citizens of our state is a life in an economically prospering democratic country. They gave their votes to this goal in free elections. Our parliamentary mandates and responsibilities arising from them stand and fall with this interest. It is our supreme duty to respect it also in tackling relations between the Czech and Slovak nation. Voters did not vote for the erosion and disintegration of the common state. The elections did not, after all, result in a vote for jeopardizing relations between our two nations. We, therefore, do not regard it as the right thing to do to adopt in these sensitive and complicated questions either categorical or biased standpoints at the level of one republic, without entering into mutual consulations, mutual respect, and regard for constitutional principles. [applause]

In order to fulfil our economic interests we need a consolidated state formation which will be a credible partner of advanced states. Our international obligations and membership in international organizations bind us not only to the outside world, but also in relation to the internal, legal, and organizational structure of the state. The manner in which our nations succeeded in ridding themselves of the undignified legacy of the past system provoked admiration in the outside world. Let us not permit this respect and confidence shown to us by the civilized world to be lost and dissipated as a result of our internal disparity, national intoleration, and lack of reciprocity. [applause]

There cannot be any doubt that the economic disintegration of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic would seriously endanger, if not prevented totally, the implementation of the economic reform. Macroeconomic policies spawning an antiinflationary climate of a dissimilar quality, markedly different ways of carrying out privatization, a different pace of the liberalization of prices and imports, or differently conceived tax systems could hardly function side by side. [applause]

The purpose of our effort is to break down the isolation in which we were so strongly locked, and not to create new barriers. The new qualities of establishing relations within the Federation must not be the result or irrational pressures and passions. The poignancy of some questions concerning the jurisdiction of organs will most probably become less salient in the court of economic reform, at the time when the way of viewing some problems will start to change. I am convinced that such reform steps as privatization and assertion of the principles of local self-administration will promote a qualitative change in our perception of the relations between the federal and republican bodies. Economic interconnection between the Czech and the Slovak republic on the one hand, and the urgent need to allocate the jurisdiction and the division of labor between the Federal and republican governments on the other, were the reason for holding—at the instigation of the Federal Government—a working consultation between the three governments in Trencianske Teplice. Much has already been said and explained about the purpose, conduct, and conclusions of this meeting. I, however, consider it important to stress the following point here in the Federal Assembly: No reasons exist for considering all the views voiced at Trencianske Teplice meeting as final and fixed. The views which were voiced there represent no ultimatums. A little while later, at the meeting in Piestany, on 10-11 September, we arrived at a more integrated view of the structures of executive power, and at the possibility of their constitutional definition in the conditions of a federation. Final solutions will be the subject of further talks, and each of the participating sides has the right to express its own views on the proposals, to discuss them from various aspects, and to adopt a business-like stance on the division of jurisdictions.

Esteemed deputies, as representatives of the supreme body of the state power of the Federation, it will be precisely you who will have a decisive word on these questions when they are submitted to you through constitutional channels. [applause]

Now, allow me to briefly formulate the Federal Government standpoint on the state and legal set-up of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic. All participants of the aforementioned talks repeatedly expressed the will to preserve the federative state setup. We agree with both national representations that in a democratic society, states and communities should be formed from below; this means on the basis of the consensus of organs which justly expressed the will of the citizens and nations to live together, because it is beneficial for all. At the same time it should, however, be considered that a joint sovereign state is already in existence, and that this was the way it was created by the will of our nations in 1918. The plan of its federal set-up, implemented in 1968, was the plan of a joint democratic will and the decision to respect the principles of independence of the two nations. We should not perceive the current process of forming a qualitatively new federation as a process of creation of a brand new joint state, which will receive its shape, jurisdiction, and powers only through republican constitutions. By doing this we would put in doubt the legitimate nature of our own deeds. [applause]

On the other hand, this is not the case of a mechanical return to the situation prevailing in 1968. We look at the situation from the viewpoint of 1990 and subsequent years. Thus, our aim is to create, in a democratic way, a dignified framework of a common state which will respect the inalienable rights of both our nations and their republics, as well as the interest in seeing it functioning in an optimal manner.

In the context of the trends toward integration in Europe, there cannot at the same time be talk about some kind of a minimal federation which would be akin more to a free grouping. We need executive organs of the federation that will be capable, on the basis of having sufficient powers, to utilize economic and foreign political advantages of a larger state formation for the benefit of both republics, for the benefit of all those who live in our republic. A strong federation in this understanding does not mean weak republics. This would run counter to the government's policy and the process of decentralization on which we have embarked in all areas of social life and in all levels of administration.

We have been criticized, unjustly, that under the slogan of a strong federation we want to preserve a government of centralistic and bureaucratic structures. I can assure you that we do not want and cannot return to such attitudes. If we are to reach a reasonable and long-term agreement on the question of our common state, we ought not to rush the matter and place each other with a fait accompli. Both republics have had had experiences with such attitudes in the past. This is why we have asserted from the outset that work on all constitutions should take place simultaneously and in a coordinated manner, and that questions of common interest should be consulted regularly, and concluded by an agreement that will be acceptable to all. I can say that all three prime ministers and all three governments today support this view.

We also take the view that our nation's will to live together in a state based on a federative set-up must be expressed above all in the constitution of that sovereign state, which in turn will also tackle the basic questions of the organization and demarcation of the jurisdiction of the federation as a sovereign state. The federative constitution and the relevant laws must then consolidate the results of the agreement on the relations between the

level of the federation and that of the republics. On the basis of a concensus and cooperation they must be formulated in such a manner so as to define what belongs exclusively to the federation, and in which republican bodies cannot interfere, equally as the definition of what is, on the contrary, in the exclusive jurisdiction of the republics, and in which, naturally, organs of the federation cannot interfere.

This concerns above all to what extent, and in which area, executive power belongs to the federation. The fact is that the federation cannot function effectively without such powers, or be a serious partner in international relations and a member of international organizations. In Piestany we agreed that in future, powers ought not be divided, as far as is possible, between the federation and the republics so that in some areas of activity they would not be under joint jurisdiction. A proposal was adopted to establish an unequivocal border defining the exclusive powers of one or the other structure of state administration. When examining proposals on the new division of jurisdiction and powers we ought to weigh carefully all economic, foreign political, and foreign trade viewpoints.

When proposals concerning new structures of power in such spheres as, for instance, telecommunications or transport are put forward, they should take into account that these are the important elements of infrastructure which secure the development of a market economy in the entire state by creating equal conditions for all users.

Esteemed deputies, regarding the question of the coexistence of the Czechs and Slovaks and national minorities in one common federative state, all of us should aim at the following decisive targets: The Czechs and Slovaks must have the development of their national identity secured in a way which is acceptable to the substantional part of each of the nations. This similarly applies to the national minorities and ethnic groups. The federation, together with the two republics, has to represent such a mechanism of the management of the state, which will be capable of effectively tackling difficulties and problems, above all in the period of transition to market economy, and also represent those linked to the transition.

In the course of tackling all the common questions regarding the reconstruction of the federative system, we should not forget the democratic and human values linked to the new phase of the development of our society. This is why we welcome the initiative which led to a decision to work out and adopt a constitutional document on civic, political, and social rights as the basis for the new future federal constitution. We, therefore, consider the indivisible attributes of the federation, which cannot be doubted—if our efforts to preserve a common federative state are really genuine—to be:

First, a directly elected supreme legislative body representing the only place for decision-making concerning the constitutional form of the state setup, fundamental legislative questions, and also concerning the formulation of the fundamental principles of our foreign and domestic policy. Its legislative powers concerning all the fundamental spheres of the rights and freedoms of our citizens, as well as the legal position of all subjects, should be as wide as possible in order to avoid a legal dualism, which our country unfortunately experienced during the initial period of its existence.

Second, the Federal Government should be constitutionally responsible only to the Federal Assembly, and in the agreed spheres and within the valid constitutional framework, directly exercise its powers over the entire territory of the federation and toward all its subjects. Its powers should include, above all, the questions of the internal security and defense of the country, foreign policy, financial and customs policy, administration of communications and transport networks on a federal level, as well as formulating the concepts of joint care for the environment, employment policy, as well as labor relations—including the concept of social and economic development of the country. Common principles of price, raw materials, and energy policies should be implemented on the same level. They require a united coordination, as do external economic relations. There are no doubts about the necessity to have a uniform currency and currency policy.

Third, we think that an extraordinary role in the newly formulated project of the federation is to be played by the constitutional office of president. It is not only the office of the head of the state, but at the same time a principle tested throughout history, which strengthens the stability of the state and forms a balance between constitutional and executive powers.

Fourth, we cannot, however, talk about a legal state and a functioning federation unless we also possess an independent constitutional, legal, and general judiciary, with its supreme bodies at the level of the federation. Each of the two republics and each citizen, or a group of citizens, would be able to appeal to them, and their verdict would have a direct validity and authority on the whole territory of the state.

Esteemed deputies, we discussed our notions at the meeting of three governments not only in Trencianske Teplice, but above all in Peistany, last week. We regard their concrete formulation and their constitutional implementation and living content to be the common task of the Federal Assembly and the government of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic. With their realization we also link our hopes for success in the realization of the scenario of the radical economic reform. Our economic reform is a strategy, a destiny, and basis of the life of both us and future generations. It is an excercise which requires the dimensions of a federation. Thank you for your attention.

Christian Democrat Chairman Calls for Unity

LD1609183790 Prague CTK in English 1749 GMT 16 Sep 90

[Text] Prague Sept 16 (CTK)—The Czech Christian Democratic Party must concentrate on a constructive policy at present when its positions are not strong, Chairman of the party Vaclav Benda said in an interview for CTK today.

Benda was today re-elected party chairman at the party congress which started Saturday. In the June 8-9 parliamentary elections the Christian Democratic Party, in a union with the Czechoslovak People's Party and the Christian Democratic Movement in Slovakia placed third after the Civic Forum and the Communists in the Czech Republic and second in Slovakia after the Public Against Violence movement.

Benda said the party wanted to expand the concept of the Christian and Democratic union. The very idea of a union was healthy but at present was rather in isolation and therefore it was necessary to unite as quickly as possible a broad front of the right centre, i.e. conservative forces, Benda said.

Regarding the Christian Democratic Party's position before the local elections due in November, Benda said the congress had confirmed the line of an extensive autonomy of the local and regional party organizations in deciding whether they will go to the elections independently or in a coalition with whomever they choose, the only strict directive being a ban on any direct or indirect coalitions with the Communists.

Legal Steps To Be Taken on Gabcikovo Project

AU1309151590 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 8 Sep 90 pp 1, 4

[Tibor Ferko report: "The Situation Is Becoming More Complicated"]

[Text] Budapest—The Hungarian Government office for the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project finds itself in a situation in which it must face ultimatums from all sides. On 31 August, a telex came from the Donaukraftwerke company announcing that if it does not receive an answer before 1600 on 6 September regarding compensation for damages, it will present its case to the International Business Court in Zurich. One day before the expiration of this time limit, the pertinent parliamentary committee held a session and decided that it would not take a stand on this issue, yet a proposal was made to ask the government to invite the Czechoslovak side to renegotiate the 1977 agreement on the hydro-project. According to this proposal, parliament should take the standpoint that it would be proper if both sides were to agree on suspending the validity of the agreement, on sharing damages and losses, and on returning the Danube bed to its original state.

What are the consequences of this, however? According to reports in the Hungarian press, while the Austrian firm wants 3.8 billion Austrian schillings instead of the compromise sum of 3 billion schillings if damages are claimed in court, the proposal presented recommends that the Hungarian side also act in the same manner toward Czechoslovakia. Austria will fleece Hungarians and Hungarians will fleece us. What else can the proposal by the parliamentary committee to equally share the compensation for damages mean? The discussion about the zero variant [nulova varianta] of the agreement brings about at least as many problems from the legal point of view as under the status quo. This means that if we ignore the political criteria, we will have to settle our debts to ecology; ecology is just creating its own legal norms.

In this complicated dispute over whether the giant hydro-project is beneficial or harmful, the decision made by the Hungarian investor Oviber made the situation even more complicated. On 4 September it informed the Ministry of the Environment that as of 31 December 1990, it is withdrawing from the agreement which imposed the role of investor on it. In the past, there were reservations about the suspicious practices and policies of this organization and now it is again becoming the target of criticism that it does not want to bear further responsibility for the fate of the project.

This is a mostly domestic problem, however. What concerns us is that we do not have much time to prepare ourselves for another round of talks which will take place at the government level. It is difficult to predict reversals and compromises. The tolerance required from our side should be compensated on the Hungarian side by a full comprehension of the fact that the decisions about starting or discontinuing this project were politically motivated. This is why the consequences ensuing can appear to be controversial, despite the fact that they pertain to ecology.

GERMAN UNIFICATION

Notice to Readers: *In order to provide information concerning German unification in one location for the benefit of our readers, material on that topic from the FRG, GDR, and other media is now being published in the German Unification Attachment to the West Europe DAILY REPORT.*

Interior Ministry: No Arms Cache at Iraq Embassy

LD1709140290 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1241 GMT 17 Sep 90

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—The GDR central Civil Defense Institute [CID] announced in a statement that no detailed findings are available at the institution about reports published in the daily JUNGE WELT on Saturday [15 September], according to which "large amounts of weapons and explosives are stored, and terrorist units" are forming in the Iraqi Embassy in East Berlin. GDR Interior Ministry spokesman Wolfgang Elstner announced this at the regular press conference in East Berlin today. However, the article prompted the police to take steps. Protection was increased for embassies that could be targets for terrorists, he said.

The CID's request to supply concrete information for an investigation to be launched has not been met by JUNGE WELT for reasons of freedom of the press. This created the impression among CID staff that a saleable story is more valuable to the paper than the protection of innocent people, Elstner said.

Buechner on Problems in Uncovering Stasi Members

AU1809050090 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 17 Sep 90 pp 41-56

[Interview with Matthias Buechner, representative of the special People's Chamber Committee for the dissolution of the State Security Service in Erfurt Bezirk, by Dieter Uentzelmann and Ulrich Bieger; place and date not given: "I Feel Great Fear"]

[Text] [DER SPIEGEL] Mr. Buechner, you are a painter and graphic artist by profession. When did you paint your last painting?

[Buechner] At the beginning of July 1989.

[DER SPIEGEL] What was the topic?

[Buechner] I used an old technique, which was invented by the Chinese, and made a small cycle [Zyklus]. It is called fear.

[DER SPIEGEL] Fear of the then still omnipotent State Security Service [Stasi]?

[Buechner] No, for me, this is fear of a specific threat. I wanted to deal generally with this unspecified, uncanny feeling in the pit of a GDR citizen's stomach—just fear. I am not a political painter, I do not do realistic paintings.

[DER SPIEGEL] Nevertheless, you were persecuted by the Stasi for years. Why did they not like you?

[Buechner] Already at school I could not bear the fact that most of my fellow students spoke differently in private than during civics lessons. I generally said what I thought and I always put my foot into my mouth with that. I was not permitted to take the final exams, I was also refused the opportunity of vocational training with final exams, and I lost my apprenticeship because I asked politicians unpleasant questions. At the time when I earned my living exclusively by painting, there was an order by the Stasi Main Department XX...

[DER SPIEGEL] ...which spied on people who thought differently and on opposition members of all kinds in the GDP and persecuted them....

[Buechner] ...to make sure by all means that I was not accepted into the Graphic Artists' Association and that I was to reach only subsistence level financially. Thus, four years ago I received an order for work for the state trade organization, for instance, but I was simply not paid my fee of 17,500 GDR mark.

[DER SPIEGEL] When the change came, you gave up your fruitless work and since then you have been a full-time dissolver of the Stasi, for 1,700 Deutsche mark per month, and you are hot on the trail of your former torturers. Has the octopus organization finally been destroyed now?

[Buechner] The Stasi as a ministry, as a cohesive organization, ceased to exist in January. However, there are still individual structural units and individual activities. A great number of Stasi officers not only have good technical knowledge but also immense knowledge about other people, which they can use now.

[DER SPIEGEL] Do they use it?

[Buechner] In various ways. We of the New Forum at first assumed that former GDR espionage chief Markus Wolf would try to save the majority of the most capable officers by transferring them to the Soviet secret service, KGB. Slowly but surely, we found out that the interesting and capable Stasi people preferred to orient themselves toward the market economy and that some of them offered themselves, together with their secret networks of unofficial employees, to Western intelligence services and multinational concerns.

[DER SPIEGEL] At the moment, the KGB is intensively expanding its espionage network all over Germany because the Stasi has disappeared as a helper. What do you know about Stasi men in Soviet service?

[Buechner] I am convinced that some have defected to the KGB. However, I can only speculate in line with what we know. There are a number of former Stasi officers who talk to us and give us important information. However, they exclude the topic of the KGB.

[DER SPIEGEL] Why is this topic taboo?

[Buechner] I feel great fear in many of our interlocutors when we broach this subject.

[DER SPIEGEL] In your search for conspiratorial facilities of the Stasi, have you also found KGB facilities?

[Buechner] Twice our search troops acted against KGB facilities by mistake. In both cases, KGB members sat there with machine guns at the ready. Fortunately, there were prudent friends there by coincidence, who called for a retreat.

[DER SPIEGEL] Since then, have you permitted the Russians to go on spying as before?

[Buechner] We have chosen a confidant, who has assured the Russians in negotiations that we will not enter their facilities again. With this, we have acquired the KGB members' loyalty for our actions.

[DER SPIEGEL] Thus, while the KGB is looking on, as far as you know, the most clever Stasi officers are applying to Western intelligence services, which are trying to get their hands on Stasi material. How do you know that?

[Buechner] Every time when Stasi material is transported from other offices to the Erfurt Bezirk headquarters in Andreasstrasse, the vehicles of the U.S. military mission were our constant companions. On those days, we also observed strikingly large numbers of tourists in the district around Andreasstrasse. And there were also further clues. I know from former Stasi officers that a Japanese and a Swedish intelligence service were here and wanted to get material. The European Workers Party (EWP), which, as far as I know, has contacts with the U.S. intelligence service CIA....

[DER SPIEGEL] ...which the EWP denies....

[Buechner] ...is incredibly active here. One of our particularly active members was perhaps hired by the EWP as early as in February, distributed advertising material here, and constantly tried to get access to hot files.

[DER SPIEGEL] What do the multinational concerns, whom you mentioned, gain from the work of former Stasi officers?

[Buechner] We are currently in the process of investigating this issue. We are particularly interested in a potential connection between still active Stasi members and the economic crisis in our country.

[DER SPIEGEL] Should the Stasi also be blamed for the ruin of the GDR economy?

[Buechner] Partly, yes. The most important unofficial members and the officers with special tasks, who sat in the combine leaderships in the past, can be found today usually on the management floors of the new holdings and stock corporations. To put it casually: In his sunny skillfulness, SED [Socialist Unity Party of Germany] Premier Hans Modrow placed former SED and Stasi people in time in such positions that they were taken over in heaps by the Trust Authority and the enterprises it administers.

[DER SPIEGEL] And what damage can the former intelligence service agents do in the companies?

[Buechner] Companies that are still functioning are heading toward financial ruin through sabotage and secret agreements. A service order by Stasi chief Erich Mielke of autumn 1989 on the concentration of unofficial employees and officers with special tasks in key positions of the economy and the administration is available to us; we are currently evaluating it.

One example. Enterprises, which could actually survive in the market economy, are run down so much that they can be sold for practically nothing to mailbox companies in Switzerland. And the interesting thing is that former GDR citizens are always members of the managing bodies.

[DER SPIEGEL] Why should someone still obey such a service order and who would benefit from this?

[Buechner] We have specific clues that members of the Party of Democratic Socialism [PDS], the successor of the SED, together with former Stasi cadres, are in the process of forging an international concern out of 70 of their companies in the GDR and their 100 companies in Western Europe. Furthermore, we know that Western companies are putting pressure on former Stasi officers in GDR enterprises to run down their companies. In our estimates, in which we put together all real estate property of the PDS in the GDR; all companies in Europe, which openly or secretly belong to the party; and add the conspiratorial accounts and companies of the Stasi, we come to a gigantic sum: According to this, every PDS member would be a millionaire, if the property were to be distributed among the about 350,000 PDS members. The property of the SED and Stasi successors in Erfurt Bezirk alone amounts to 3.5 billion marks.

[DER SPIEGEL] What kind of evidence is there that former Stasi members are blackmailed by Western managers?

[Buechner] We know from the files that dossiers were collated on more than 2 million FRG citizens—from Helmut Kohl to Udo Lindenberg. The data was collected by scouts, from monitored telephone conversations, and from bugged hotel rooms. With this knowledge, Western business leaders and politicians were confronted and forced to cooperate. You can assume that quite a number of foreign trade contracts with the GDR was concluded in this way with the help of the Stasi.

[DER SPIEGEL] You said that recently people with a past in the Stasi have also been blackmailed by people from the West. How does this work?

[Buechner] There are clear indications that Western managers, who were blackmailed in the past, are now putting pressure on their former Stasi partners who have not yet been discovered. The goal is running down GDR enterprises and thus getting them very cheaply. A small example from practice: An Erfurt lawyer, who now wants

to open an office, was looking for office premises in vain. An FRG colleague advised her to establish contact with former Stasi people. She did so and promptly she received an offer for premises in the best city location. The condition: She should train two or three Erfurt lawyers in her office and have them work with her.

[DER SPIEGEL] Employees of Mielke's company?

[Buechner] Yes. When the lawyer noticed this, she fired her new colleagues.

[DER SPIEGEL] How did she find out?

[Buechner] The Stasi members have a certain number on their social security cards. When they were asked, the gentlemen openly admitted where they came from. The story is not yet over. The office she had been promised was gone, and three clients whom she had taken over from her Western colleague canceled her retainer.

[DER SPIEGEL] You claim that remnants of the octopus organization are still active. Where, for instance?

[Buechner] There is a group of 60 former high-ranking Stasi officers, who are working daily in a conspiratorial facility in Erfurt Bezirk. We know from former Stasi people that in the facility there are top modern communications instruments, which were obviously brought to this place from other facilities. The only thing we cannot yet say is for whom these people are actually working. In addition, forged Stasi material is continually offered to or foisted on us. I even found forged material in the archives.

[DER SPIEGEL] Was this material intended to make you bark up the wrong tree?

[Buechner] Yes, for instance, there was a diagram of the secret Erfurt government telephone network. It was done well, on paper that was 10 years old. With this, we should have been led astray in our investigations and prevented from cutting these lines off.

[DER SPIEGEL] How do such forgeries get into the archives, practically under your nose?

[Buechner] Seals do not stop the perpetrators at all. For months we have repeatedly seen that seals are broken over night, doors are cracked open, and material from the archives disappear.

[DER SPIEGEL] It is not possible to find those who are doing this?

[Buechner] Rarely. This spring, all the documents of Department 15, the espionage department, were destroyed. These papers contained the key to finding the conspiratorial accounts. Bernhard Schenk, the representative of the Modrow government, made sure that they were destroyed. He allegedly came from the Agricultural Ministry, but he knew surprisingly much about the Stasi structures and continuously undermined our work.

At the end of August, 20 sacks full of important material were taken away for illegal destruction. We were able to save 15 sacks, because an attentive People's Policeman called us.

[DER SPIEGEL] What kind of material was this?

[Buechner] It consisted primarily of spy reports by unofficial employees. However, there were also assessments of the employees by their controllers—everything from the time between September and November 1989.

[DER SPIEGEL] Could this not have been a mistake?

[Buechner] Certainly not. Even though the head of the State Archives tried to make us believe that some inexperienced clerk, who had not been working there for long, had done this by mistake and without any orders. In fact, we had repeatedly told the man how explosive the material was and that it must not be destroyed in any case. He had already tried to destroy it seven times before.

[DER SPIEGEL] What did you do with the man?

[Buechner] We banned him from entering the building.

[DER SPIEGEL] Can you not prevent such incidents? Why do you not simply call the police?

[Buechner] That does not help us much, either. Despite complaints to the public prosecutor, so far the perpetrators of the breaks into the archives and the theft of the files have not been found. A number of mysterious car accidents, in which members of the citizens' committee were injured, have not yet been cleared up by the police. In August, I was being observed again for at least 14 days. When I complained to the criminal police, I was given the name of the person who owned the car and his address and was told to do what is necessary myself.

[DER SPIEGEL] What did you do?

[Buechner] What should I have done? This was an open observation, which I was supposed to notice. This belongs to the chapter of threats and intimidations.

[DER SPIEGEL] You are being threatened?

[Buechner] There are innumerable anonymous calls and letters, which openly threaten: "We will kill you swine. On this or that day your day will come. Croak." I do not take this particularly seriously. However, it does affect me very much when the threats are directed against my wife and my son.

[DER SPIEGEL] How do you protect yourself and your family?

[Buechner] Former Stasi members and soldiers of the National People's Army have offered to act as my body guards. But I rejected this because I believed that I am well protected without them. At an early stage of the affair, I put important information in various places, which will cause an enormous ruckus if I die an unnatural death. The other side knows this.

[DER SPIEGEL] Are there also other threats apart from these vulgar calls and letters?

[Buechner] I add a mixture of offers and warning to this. On the one hand, we are offered horrendous sums for just stopping our investigations. At the same time, we are unambiguously told: We are fed up with you. Our time is over anyway, we will not continue negotiations with you. Tell us how much you want, we will pay. I was told this on the fringe of an event in the New Forum land office by a smart young man in his thirties.

[DER SPIEGEL] Mysterious accidents, break-ins, theft of files, threats, and attempts at blackmail—have you ever discussed this with the responsible minister, Interior Minister Diestel, whom People's Chamber deputies have now blamed for "incompetence" in dealing with the Stasi?

[Buechner] In the beginning, Mr. Diestel was briefed very well by us, but that did not have any effect. Recently, he has even refused to talk to us. We have gotten the impression that Diestel wants to enter GDR history as the last great protector of the Stasi.

[DER SPIEGEL] Guenther Nollau, former head of the FRG Office for the Protection of the Constitution, recommends taking a look at Diestel's file to find the reasons for his strategy of hindering. Have you already looked for that?

[Buechner] I have not seen any incriminating material about Diestel.

[DER SPIEGEL] What do you think are Diestel's reasons for blocking your work?

[Buechner] Someone who deliberately employs thousands of former Stasi employees, who pulls high-ranking ex-officers of the Ministry of State Security into leading positions, and even wanted to make Markus Wolf his personal adviser, lacks at least the moral maturity to fill such an office.

[DER SPIEGEL] Twice you handed lists with the names of politicians, who, according to your knowledge, were employees of the Stasi and are now sitting in the People's Chamber, to Diestel himself. Why have these names not been published so far?

[Buechner] Diestel refused to publish the lists by referring to information protection and, at the same time, he blocked the complete clearing of these cases by various tricks. By the way, this is not a question of information protection. These persons did conspiratorial work and were full-time Stasi employees.

[DER SPIEGEL] Why do the committees for the dissolution of the Stasi not publish the names to make a clean sweep?

[Buechner] We may not do this. But we do not keep our findings to ourselves. We brief the special parliamentary committee of the People's Chamber which supervises the dissolution of the Stasi. If we published individual pieces of information, this might have a spectacular effect, but we would be dismissed immediately.

[DER SPIEGEL] Neither you nor the parliamentary committee give names. Thus, you, too, are making sure that former Stasi officers can live quietly in leading functions in the economy and the administration. In addition, you make it possible for the incriminated politicians to enter the Bundestag, when 144 People's Chamber deputies will become Bundestag deputies in October.

[Buechner] We have to prevent that by, for instance, talks with the persons in question. If this is not effective, if until a certain date these persons have not ceased their conspiratorial work [nicht dekonspiriert sind] and have not left their positions, I will call for publishing their names.

[DER SPIEGEL] Is this date 3 October?

[Buechner] In any case, it cannot be far in the future. We have to hurry up.

[DER SPIEGEL] We assume that you will be out of a job when the GDR comes to an end. What will you do then?

[Buechner] I want to work for having the citizens be protected by a information protection law, and I will run for the Thuringian Diet. In addition, I would like to build a house for myself, and I want to paint again.

[DER SPIEGEL] Mr. Buechner, thank-you for this interview.

Stasi Committee Chairman Considers Legal Action

LD1609183390 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1633 GMT 16 Sep 90

[Excerpt] Bonn (ADN/APA)—The chairman of the GDR People's Chamber committee investigating the Stasi [State Security Service], Joachim Gauck, has accused the former commissioner responsible for the dissolution of the State Security Service, Werner Fischer, of having laid himself open to legal proceedings by naming names. Fischer's public accusations are "impossible" in a state under the rule of law "and possibly even punishable," Gauck said in an interview with the daily DIE WELT (Monday issue). He intends to contact Fischer and examine to what extent his statements represent a punishable offense.

Gauck said it has always been the policy of the committee not to broadcast names "so that no one gets into trouble without justification." [passage omitted]

Former Economics Minister Denies Stasi Links

LD1709093190 Hamburg DPA in German 0913 GMT 17 Sep 90

[Text] Berlin (DPA)—Former GDR Economics Minister Gerhard Pohl (CDU) [Christian Democratic Union] today defended himself against accusations of being a former employee of the State Security Service [Stasi]. He let it be known through the Government Press Office that he strongly refutes accusations of having worked for the Stasi—"regardless of in what form they are made." The Christian Democrat announced legal measures against those who are spreading such rumors.

Jeszenszky Interviewed on Calls for Resignation

LD1709224990 Budapest Domestic Service in 1805 GMT 17 Sep 90

[Report on interview with Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky by Zoltan Sipos on the "Firsthand Information" program, with unidentified announcer; place and date not given—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Announcer] The Jeszenszky affair continues; the opposition is demanding the foreign minister's resignation with the same passion. Zoltan Sipos looked into reports and rumors that the opposition obtained the rough draft of the foreign minister's speech which had been prepared by his staff, and which the foreign minister then rewrote, and did not even deliver. According to the gossip, the opposition deputies who marched out, referred at their press briefing to something which had not even been delivered; moreover, certain newspapers published the undelivered version as being the foreign minister's speech. As you will hear, Geza Jeszenszky, when speaking to Zoltan Sipos, does not deny the gossip, but he does not confirm it verbatim, either.

[Begin recording] [Jeszenszky] In this certain speech I said that values such as Europeanness, national commitment, social sensitivity, free-principled democratism and human-focused morality as represented by the cross, were, in total, represented—in my opinion—by the membership of and voters for the government coalition. Katalin Bossanyi, in her interpellation, said that I was of the opinion that these ideals and values were professed exclusively by the governing parties. Now it is the fashion to call this a slip, and in the quoted letter it was clear that I had only said that they represent these only in totality. Many ideals are represented individually by very many people.

Another thing which is very strange is that some of the press did not carry an authentic version of my reply to the interpellation, they did not carry the text of what was actually said, but a version of it which got into their hands—who knows how? In parliament I said that certain values were represented much more authentically by the government coalition than by many members of the opposition. And the joint press briefing of the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP], the alliance of free democrats [SZDSZ], and the Federation of Young Democrats [FIDESZ], may have used some nonexistent text version, which was not delivered in parliament. Things were attributed to me which I did not say, nor did I think them.

[Sipos] One of the heaviest arguments of the opposition—more precisely, a large proportion of the opposition—in favor of your resignation, is that a foreign minister who represents the entire country, thus the opposition as well, to the outside, must carefully think over what he says. There will be consequences if he yields to his personal feelings.

[Jeszenszky] That does not hold constitutionally. I represent the government of the Republic of Hungary, and I represent its foreign policy. It is our business to shape a foreign policy which is accorded the widest possible range of support, but government also has the right to pursue a foreign policy with which the opposition does not agree. On this basis, there is no weight to the argument that I cannot remain in my position if the opposition does not approve of or support my person or the foreign policy I pursue.

[Sipos] Do you profess that, in domestic policy, it is necessary to be in agreement regarding basic values?

[Jeszenszky] I did not cast any doubt on the right of the opposition to profess the same principles as we do. Properly speaking, I hope that we agree concerning basic principles, because it is much easier, in this manner, not only to govern, but also to enact laws in parliament. This is even more desirable in the sphere of foreign policy.

Since then, too, prominent members of the opposition have emphasized that my statement renders a foreign policy consensus impossible. They conceive the foreign policy consensus only in a biased manner. They expect this of government. I, by the way, as minsiter, have discussed important, specific issues, as well as more general foreign policy issues with several representatives of the opposition who sat in this room on several occasions. Thus, I, in deeds, represented the consensus. At the same time, several members of the opposition, in their statements abroad or here at home, have visibly not supported this consensus.

Here, in front of me, is the newspaper published in Canada, called WESTERN MAGYARDOM NGUGATI MAGYARSAG. It reports on the kind of lecture Balint Magyar, a promiment member of the FIDESZ and parliamentary deputy gave about Hungary in a very influential circle, in Washington. I would not dispute him the right to this—that he criticized the Hungarian Government very toughly and, in my view, without grounds. What is a foreign policy matter, however—and we can rightly broach how incorrect or unfortunate it is—is that he, rather than repeating the much-disputed statement by Jozsef Antall, that in his soul, in his heart, he was premier of 15 million Magyars; rather than pointing out that this was a spiritual community—which by the way the American Magyars naturally feel with Hungary—he also affirmed—I quote on the basis of the article—that Jozsef Antall did not say that he was the father of 15 million Magyars, but that he was the prime minister of 15 million Magyars. Well, in my opinion, with this statement Balint Magyar attributed to the Hungarian prime minister, an endeavor which—and he also ought to know this—does not stand up to the test.

He spoke in a similar tone about the Democratic Association of Magyars in Romania [RMDSZ], and about the Christian Democratic and Coexistence Party, which functions in Czechoslovakia. He emphasized that these have a very close relationship with the MDF, which he

had already thoroughly blackened in his talk, and that they do not dissociate themselves from the demand, the idea of changing the border.

I believe that no special comment is needed to explain how dangerous it is to give the semblance, or to confirm concerns abroad, that here, in Central Europe, there is generally a danger of conflicts—ethnic conflicts—and to cast suspicion, through extremely dangerous accusations on specifically the parties of the Magyar minority—which, in fact, are waging their rightful struggle—and represent their just political endeavors amidst extremely difficult circumstances, against a nationalism which is gaining strength.

[Sipos] When the oppositon unanimously demanded your resignation—I can say this because Peter Tolgyessy, head of the SZDSZ faction, Viktor Orban, head of the FIDESZ faction, and Gyula Horn, chairman of the MSZP, spoke to this effect—did it occur to you that you might resign?

[Jeszenszky] One has given a speech, in reply to an interpellation—either he accepts this or not. I, naturally, accept responsibility for this. I can say what I have said from the outset. It has never been my custom to offend people. Nor would I be able to intentionally insult my fellow men. Interestingly, I, as minister, and the government, too, have been compelled to accustom ourselves to the fact that in truth, incredible insults are flung at us—that it is incapable, unsucessful, a series of failures. By the way, it would be very easy to deny this—it is not as if three months were a long time. Anyway, the opposition very often attacks government or its members in a tone which is not parliamentary; meanwhile, the fact that they can be so offended when someone like me mentions only certain views, but no one personally, suggests a very strange oversensitive character.

The demand was surprising, because in my view the resignation of a minister can arise if he commits a serious mistake in his own field. I take foreign policy—representation of the country's interests—very seriously, and I very much hope that I have not committed any serious mistakes. The entire dispute, which I regard, overall, to be virtually a tempest in a teacup, has given rise to such reaction, and has broken out, because we will soon have local authority elections. [passage omitted] I do not expect the passions to subside during the election campaign, but after 30 September I very much hope that everyone will accept the result, and that in the remaining three and a half years, everyone will concentrate their energies on jointly pulling the country out of the quagmire into which the past nearly half century pushed it. [end recording]

Antall Interviewed on Affair

AU1809113390 Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 13 Sep 90 pp 1, 4

[Interview with Prime Minister Jozsef Antall by MTI correspondent Erzsebet Kun in Budapest on 12 September: "Jozsef Antall Defended Geza Jeszenszky—the President Thinks That the Jeszenszky Affair Is Not a Personnel Issue"]

[Text] "I will not sacrifice any of my ministers," Joszef Antall said, in connection with the big storm that broke out in the parliament and among the public following Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky's statement on 11 September. The opposition demands Jeszenszky's resignation. Jozsef Antall received our correspondent on 12 September and expressed his views in connection with the affair.

[Antall] I think that interpellations and questions automatically contain elements which are later questioned during the replies to these interpellations. The question posed to the foreign minister in parliament was ideological, as opposed to the criticism voiced later. Geza Jeszenszky had to answer and explain the contents of the letter addressed to him. In his reply, he summed up certain political values—national and European values, social sensitivity, and freedom of opinion—which were present in the question submitted by the person who made the interpellation. Geza Jeszenszky thought that the sum total of these values was better represented in the coalition parties than in the other parties. Contrary to the claim of the accusers, Geza Jeszenszky did not formulate any kind of exclusivity here. This was simply his opinion. In a multiparty system, the various parties can speak about their ideological commitment, and probably every party thinks that whatever it represents, it does better than the other parties.

It is even more strange to take offense at this attitude because our various opposition parties—both within the parliament and outside—made statements in which they called the present government coalition "primitive" and stressed, both abroad and at home, that they represented the European and Western orientation and that the present coalition was making this country drift toward the East.

I regard it as extremely strange when one revolts against an answer to previous aggressive questions or statements. In my opinion, strangely enough, the other parties have come up with quite offensive and denigrating statements in the last three and a half months, and we have never reacted to these statements.

I regard it as extremely characteristic the way in which Peter Tolgyessy [Free Democrats' parliamentary deputy] took the liberty of giving a radio statement in which he compared Geza Jeszenszky's statements to Bela Imredy's speeches.

I think that the goal today is different from letting the parliament again carry out political debates reminiscent of the Keri affair.

Peter Tolgyessy already formulated in the fall of 1989 that, in his view, from an ideological point of view, the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] are closer to the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] than to the Hungarian Demoratic Forum [MDF], because both of them are part of the left wing. We have always stated this, and we regard it as a a fortunate development in Hungarian

political life that these two large-scale European political circles of ideas are behind the main Hungarian political forces.

[Kun] What is your opinion about the joint step taken by the opposition to demand Geza Jeszenszky's resignation?

[Antall] This is part of the election campaign. Arriving at the end of the so-called grace period, which they did not observe at all, the opposition parties have tried to employ every means to discredit the government during this period of election campaign; this body is obviously vulnerable because it must govern with an extremely difficult heritage, under difficult circumstances, and by taking unpopular measures. The coalition, therefore, takes a joint position on this issue. It is a very good sign that they joined the MSZP in formulating a common position and held a joint new conference, because, finally, there is a balanced situation in parliament. With this, any discrimination among the parties has ceased to exist.

It is also part of the election campaign—and not for the first time— that the opposition has demanded the resignation of a government member. This is the consistent tactic of some opposition politicians, namely to try to make the coalition parties confront each other.

As for the resignation of our foreign minister, just as I refrained from sacrificing any person in the case of attacks directed against an MDF politician and I rejected the various salami tactics, obviously I will definitely refrain from asking the government members to resign in the wake of such political attacks, even more so because, on the basis of a constructive no-confidence proposal and under the current political balance of forces, the Constitution does not provide a chance for the opposition to topple the government; I will not sacrifice any of my ministers at the request of the opposition.

[Kun] Do you regard as possible a foreign policy consensus among the various parties in the future?

[Antall] In a healthy parliamentary and political life, foreign policy is based on the unity of basic issues. This is particularly true of a crisis situation. We made it clear on behalf of the government that we are trying to achieve consensus in foreign policy. Representatives of some opposition parties, including former Foreign Minister Gyula Horn, declared that they were not willing to maintain this consensus in this way. I am very sorry if this is the case and this is what the opposition wants. I would like to stress, however, that one has to see our foreign policy as a uniform policy. One can agree or disagree with a government's foreign policy, but the opposition cannot dictate that the foreign minister should be a person acceptable to them and not to the government coalition. I would like to remind the people of the various unfounded observations made about this government's foreign policy from the very beginning. However, I am confident that, in the wake of what happened in parliament, people will follow the events more calmly and realistically. I, therefore, refrained from answering or making a statement in parliament yesterday, because I though it was necessary to let things calm down first. Both sides should refrain from personal attacks because these things do not contribute to a real consensus.

SZDSZ Chairman Says Antall Government 'Inept'

AU1809113490 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 13 Sep 90 p 5

[Interview with Janos Kis, chairman of the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ), by Laszlo Muranyi in Kunszentmarton on 12 September: "The Government Is Inept"; first paragraph is NEPSZABADSAG introduction]

[Text] Janos Kis was campaigning in Jasz-Nagykun-Szolnok county on Wednesday afternoon. Prior to the beginning of the Alliance of Free Democrats' [SZDSZ] meeting in Kunszentmarton, Kis held a news conference, where he gave the following answers to our questions:

[Muranyi] In your evaluation of the first 100 days of the Antall government, you also mention various coalition possibilities. In your document, you do not exclude the possibility of a future grand coalition, that is, a Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF]-SZDSZ alliance. How much has your evaluation changed since Foreign Minister Jeszenszky's speech on Tuesday?

[Kis] We do not think that the conditions are appropriate for a grand coalition. Significant political changes would be necessary in order to seriously discuss such a possibility. We are convinced that the current government is inept to govern this country, and we are not saying that merely because of the foreign minister's speech on Tuesday. Mr. Jeszenszky's behavior, however, definitely contributed in a most significant way to the formulation of our opinion.

[Muranyi] When the government came to power, Jozsef Antall promised, on behalf of the MDF, that our foreign policy would be drawn up on the basis of some form of consensus which would include the opposition. How did this consensus work?

[Kis] We cannot really say that it worked at all. In fact, we do not think that the government made mistakes when establishing the major guidelines of our foreign policy; it was more in its diplomatic rhetoric that the government made serious mistakes. Most of all, we reproach the government for substantially contributing to the poisoning of relations between Hungary and her neighbors in a situation which is extremely delicate as it is. The government is acting without due consideration and tact in this area, and not only the nationalists, but

also our potential allies in Hungary's neighboring countries are startled when they hear some of the government's statements.

[Muranyi] Together with the Federation of Young Democrats [FIDESZ] and the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP], you have asked Geza Jeszenszky to resign, and the FIDESZ representative has already excluded any form of future cooperation with the foreign minister. What tactics will the SZDSZ follow in the future?

[Kis] The minister will not resign, and we know that. In any case, we will officially announce to the prime minister that we refuse to cooperate with his current minister in the future. We will not consult him, we will not coordinate our policy with his, and we will no longer claim that the government's foreign policy is based on consensus. We are truly sorry that all this has happened, but we are convinced that Geza Jeszenszky is unfit to represent this country in our international relations.

European Parliament President Addresses Assembly

LD1709183190 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1408 GMT 17 Sep 90

[Address by Enrique Baron Crespo, president of the Bureau of the European Parliament, to the National Assembly in Budapest—live; in English with passage-by-passage translation]

[Excerpts] First of all I would like to thank you for the opportunity you have given me to address you here today. [passage omitted]

I would also like to take this opportunity to give you a firm commitment, on behalf of the European Parliament, that we consider it an absolute priority of the EC to play its full part in contributing to the success of the economic and political reforms which are taking place in your country. This coincides with developments taking place in other countries in Central and Eastern Europe. In spite of the very different circumstances that each of our countries faces, we share a common destiny; therefore, we must work together to ensure economic and social progress. This is not just a matter of providing moral support and encouragement. The European Parliament has also used its power to expand the various programs of practical assistance to your country. These plans, coordinated by the commission, in cooperation with your government, are the first practical fruit of the deep sense of solidarity that binds our people so closely together.

The establishment of democracy, here and in neighboring countries, also means a new era of peace and cooperation in Europe. New threats to peace will undoubtedly arise as old ones are removed, but at least we have removed from Europe the threat of nuclear holocaust which was, itself, one of the central features of the postwar period. We meet at a time of renewed international tension. The invasion of Kuwait reminds us of the necessity of respect for national borders and international law. This is a lesson which Europe has finally learned. Our history has taught us that problems cannot be solved through invasions or through attempts to dominate neighboring countries. That is why, in the years ahead, we must develop new forms of cooperation, including a new common security system, which will serve as a model for other regions in the world.

The European Parliament has, therefore, given its support to the plans to build on the Helsinki process, and, in particular, we welcome the current cooperation between NATO and the members of the Warsaw Pact. The military alliances of the postwar era must both be transformed as a step on the way to a new security system. We know of Hungary's intention to leave the military structure of the Warsaw Pact, but even this decision will not take effect immediately. In the interval, you as Hungarians, and all of us as Europeans, must develop new structures for peace without losing the means to confront new threats to peace in Europe or elsewhere. In doing so, we must build on the concept of common security. This concept will include, in the view of the European Parliament, a security policy for the EC. It will be an essential element of the European union which we are now building. The development of a European political union is, in itself, a revolutionary process, by which countries freely choose to pool their sovereignty in the interest of each and every one of them. The process of building this new political identity is not an easy one, as each step on the road requires careful negotiation and the striking of a reasonable compromise between different national interests. We also have to ensure that measures to expand trade are accompanied by adequate measures for regional development as well as social and environmental protection. At the same time as we build this union, we must ensure that it is an open Europe that we build, and in the first instance we must cooperate with our closest neighbors, whether they be in Central or Eastern Europe, or in the European Free Trade Association, the so-called EFTA. Each country must decide for itself whether it is ready to join the process of building a political union, whether it is more appropriate to seek other relationships.

Whatever structures finally emerge for the Europe of the 21st century, it is clear that we have surely turned our back on those four decades during which we spoke of Eastern and Western Europe, as if they were permanent concepts, and as if ideological confrontations could ignore the realities not just of geography, but also of our common history, common culture, and indeed our common interests. I want you to understand that there is only one Europe, with its own various richnesses of culture, and that Hungary has always been an integral part of our Europe. The fact that your country intends to combine national recovery with a deep commitment to European unity and cooperation is, therefore, particularly welcome.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen: In this house, you are building a parliamentary democracy based on respect

for human rights and the rule of law. In doing so, you will come to realize both the competitive nature of democratic politics, as well as the necessity for all democratic forces to work together in the national interest. In particular I welcome the special arrangements which have been agreed upon, whereby the different national minorities in this country are represented in this house.

My visit to Budapest today coincides with the beginning of a visit of the full European Parliament delegation for relations with Hungary. I have no doubt that this delegation will be well received and that you will all have the opportunity to look in great detail at the implications of developments currently taking place in the EC and, in particular, the new commission proposal for relations with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

In the last months it has already become clear that, following the heroic movement that led to the establishment of democracy, your country is now engaged in a slower—and in some respects more painful—process of economic reconstruction. This phase of your national development will not be an easy one. Many of the member states of the EC have lived through similar experiences and we have learned the need for patience, vision, and national unity. I am, however, convinced that the new international situation—in particular the cooperation between the United States, the Soviet Union, and the EC—offers us all a great opportunity to work together for economic advancement. I believe we all have an interest in each other's success. If we, in the EC, can fulfil our ambitions to expand our economies through the elimination of trade barriers, if we can achieve our aim of economic and monetary union, and, most importantly, if we can build a political union able to contribute actively to economic development and political stability throughout Europe, then we will be able to continue to enhance our efforts in favor of Hungary. Similarly, if in Hungary democracy can be achieved, you will be able to contribute much more effectively to building a new and peaceful Europe. This is all the more necessary, as all the countries in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as the Soviet Union, are also engaged in the process of fundamental economic and political reform.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, as we look to the future and commit ourselves to working together in the new Europe, we must not forget that the struggle against hunger and poverty, and for peace and freedom still goes on in many parts of the world. The Europe we are building must not be a complacent, inward-looking club, but an effective partnership which strengthens our common ability to contribute to peaceful world development. The origins and purposes of the European idea have always been peaceful, and this idea always looked beyond the borders of the EC. New circumstances now provide us with an opportunity to turn our vision into reality. The cold war is over. East-West tension is now a thing of the past. Your country and others, which had such a painful experience in the previous historic era, can now look towards a Europe of peace and security, a Europe stretching in fact from the Atlantic to the Urals. That must be our ambition and the objective of all the work which we do together. Thank-you very much. [applause]

Walesa Confirms Stand for Presidential Candidacy

'Will Not Accept Defeat'

AU1209124390 Gdansk TYGODNIK GDANSKI in Polish 9 Sep 90 pp 1, 10

[Jaroslaw Kurski commentary: "Around the President's Chair"]

[Text] At last Thursday's [6 September] press conference, the "Solidarity" chairman stated that although we had abandoned the communist system, we had not yet succeeded in building a democracy.

"I have the moral duty to continue fighting," he said and blamed the "ruling politicians" for the wasted opportunities that the dissolution of the Polish United Worker's Party had presented. The result of this missed opportunity is a slavish adherence to the obsolete "roundtable" contract that perpetuates an unrepresentative system that is at the root cause of social apathy. "This system is leading us to catastrophe...."

When asked about the Presidency, he replied in his usual manner that although he does not want to, he will have to stand. However, a new element surfaced in his answer: "If anyone from those who have allowed the opportunity to pass stands for president, I will do everything to prevent it." Walesa also set a high electoral hurdle (80 percent of society's support), for the future president. He also announced the beginnings of his campaign in September. He intends to tour the country.

At the same time, we have a growing demand for Jaruzelski to step down. Center Accord and the Citizens Movement Democratic Action are unanimous on this point and "Solidarity's" regional organizations are passing the appropriate resolutions. In his anniversary speech, Walesa reminded those who were responsible for the introduction of martial law to examine their consciences before God, history, and the Polish nation. He was cheered. From today we can already start putting up notices about the political departure of General Jaruzelski. What is his departure date? Certainly before 13 December 1990.

The day on which the press conference was held was also an occasion for a symbolic "public whipping" of the prime minister and his government. Walesa intentionally did not take part. People were no longer saying "our government," but "Mr. Prime Minister, your government."

Does Walesa still support Mazowiecki's government? I do not know what he would say, but logic would seem to indicate that he does not. After 10 years of "Solidarity" and one year since the formation of a "Solidarity" government, it is becoming quite clear that unity in the former victory camp has been eroded to the mere level of joint celebrations of anniversaries. This analysis seems to have been confirmed by Mazowiecki himself when on 31 August 1990 he made an appeal to his political adversaries not to become enemies, but opponents.

Consensus

However, before this happened there was a successive attempt—futile it would appear—at patching things up. After a break of some two months, the prime minister and the chairman met again. Bishop Tadeusz Goclowski was present at their discussion. The meeting awakened faint feeling of hope in the hearts of politicians who would like to see a compromise. In reality it cannot be doubted that a sensible compromise lies in Poland's best interests. An agreed version of a political scenario would have calmed the undecided and anxious foreign investors. A compromise would have stopped the political temperature and social feelings from becoming critical. The election campaign would have been a calmer affair and thanks to this both sides would not have had to vie for the support of such post-communist groupings such as the Democratic Party or the reformed Peasant Party or even the former so-called Catholics, in their campaign for the Presidency. Both squabbling politicians know that the political campaign will become damaging to each other, especially from the time that the slogans in support of their own candidature change to a smear campaign to discredit the opponent.

Circles close to the "Solidarity" leader dismiss Jan Litynski's proposal of "Walesa for prime minister; Mazowiecki for president," as rather unrealistic, because the "Solidarity" leader will not accept it for prestige reasons. Will it be possible—in the name of continuity of executive authority—to effect a compromise: "Walesa for president, provided that Mazowiecki remains prime minister?" I think such an alternative would not be acceptable to Mazowiecki. The prime minister would be subject to the whims of the president. In truth, the powers of the latter have not been precisely defined, but it is unthinkable that Walesa would limit his presidential activity to appointing university professors. Mazowiecki would not be sure whether Walesa would not change his mind after a few months and dismiss the whole government. Additionally, the prime minister who was put forward a year ago by the mustachioed electrician would once again become politically dependent on him.

Mazowiecki's path to political emancipation has been too stony for him to simply give away his hard-won "independence." Psychologically, it is impossible. Apart from this, it appears that Mazowiecki assesses the chairman's chances of success less optimistically than does the chairman. Thus, the prime minister may have thought that the chairman's proposal—assuming one was made, because they must have talked about something—as too far reaching. In any case, is it possible for these two politicians to cooperate with one another without any conflict? Personally, I doubt it.

Thus, we are left with two versions of what might happen.

Walesa Wins

During the period of struggle with communism, the chairman had great extra-constitutional authority. He was the unsworn president of Poland. He formed the coalition, designated the prime minister, and called upon people to participate in the elections. He had immense authority, without any constitutional accountability. The awareness of accountability for the results of his policies might temper Walesa to become more restrained and less passionate. It may lead him to listen more to his advisers, something which is not his strong point.

He realizes that he would have to win with high percentage of the vote. It is said that Walesa's obvious electoral base comes from the following social groups, such as village dwellers, less educated people, workers, and farmers. This leads to the contention that most of the intelligentsia is opposed to him. This is a particularly difficult section of the electorate that will exert pressure on the president to follow a sensible line and frequent adjustments of direction.

Much depends on the future model of the Presidency. It has to be well tailored in order to cut short any longings to authoritarianism in any person. In a nutshell, the institution must be better than Walesa the human being.

The world will not come to an end if Walesa is elected president. If only our young democracy shows itself resistant to the "Walesa virus," (as Rulewski called it), then we can expect that the law of the democratic pendulum will come into effect. Nobody is president for ever and in the meantime other potential candidates would come along. We will no longer have to make a choice on the basis of negative selection. At present, even die-hard Lech Walesa supporters admit that Walesa has many faults, but who else is there?

Mazowiecki Wins

Those who think Walesa would accept defeat gracefully are only deluding themselves. He is too ambitious a politician and coming from the trade union movement would become a natural rallying point for the groups of malcontents that are bound to increase from day to day. Time is on Walesa's side. If he does not win now, in a year's time he will have greater support than Mazowiecki.

It seems highly improbable that Walesa and his supporters would want to wait seven years (it could be less, depending on the constitution). That is why this scenario only appars stable. This reminds one of the GAZETg the whole atom. The campaign of a defeated Walesa would not stop after these elections. I fear that it would just continue on until final victory.

Walesa is often asked the question: "What do you fear most?" His answer is: "Myself."

POLITYKA Views Declaration

PM1409114390 Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish 18 Aug 90 p 3

[Stanislaw Podemski article: "The Truce: After Lech Walesa's Declaration"]

[Text] Lech Walesa's declaration of last week introduces several important factors into our current political situation. These factors are of the past several weeks, this fact could perhaps portend a change for the better. As I understand it, Walesa calls for full justice to be done to the principle of making haste slowly. He himself has abandoned the use of harsh words against his adversaries and he suggests that others do the same; moreover, he is well aware that Polish political forces are being closely and carefully scrutinized not only internally but also by observers abroad. Finally, Walesa knows that the future generations will judge us by the way we pass the approaching grand test of minds, characters, and discipline—a test which will be set up by the forthcoming elections.

All these recommendations are indeed praiseworthy because in another couple of weeks or so, after the brief vacation period, Poland will again become a stage, all set for the bright fireworks of impassioned words, demands, and proposals, as well as fights and duels. During this very period, which will precede the elections by a longer or shorter time, we will need to set up a reliable pact—or compromise—between political culture and democratic struggle for power. This pact will have to see the country through a period that would be a difficult challenge for any society; it will have to see it through that period carefully enough to avoid destabilizing state mechanisms hopelessly or holding up the process of change in the legislation, the staffing of the administrative apparatus, or the transformation of the entire state organization. We need to have a state of "truce of God" declared in Poland (such as used to be declared periodically by the Church centuries ago): a period during which the clangor of arms could abate and consideration could be given to the common, overriding interests of the community.

Lech Walesa says: "It is programs, not individuals that are at issue," and it is curious that this point of his speech, which is, after all, one of its key points, has been overlooked by the many commentators who analyzed this document. I think that if all political rivals were to put as much effort and energy into the presentation of and competition between their programs as they put into keeping their personal animosities alive and burning, we could already be miles ahead with all our public issues. Unfortunately, we do not hear enough fiery arguments over the shape of the new constitution, the position of agriculture in the national economy, or the tenets of the new taxation system. The realm of personal politics has come to dominate all others—and personal politics are an area which is most easily susceptible to emotions, ambitions, and rivalries. We prefer not to remember that the periods of prosperity which we enjoyed in the past always coincided with times of joint effort undertaken in

concert by all citizens and that at the time when Europe was being devastated by religious wars the Polish Sejm enjoyed a joint and peacable rule by Catholics, Lutherans, Calvinists, and representatives of the Orthodox Church.

I believe that, by virtue of offering his support for the idea of electing the president on the strength of general election results (with wide mediation powers in the case of issues of national contention), the Solidarity leader also suggests a certain timetable and order for our future political agenda. First we should have a parliamentary election and the passing of a new constitution by the newly elected National Assembly; only then can we proceed to a presidential election, whose electoral law should be redefined by the new constitution and the general election results. No doubt this will somewhat extend President Jaruzelski's term of office, but there are other arguments in favor of such a solution. It would not be advisable to have the head of state pay important foreign visits (for example, to the United States) and deliver important speeches in the international forum when scheduled to step down from his office only a few weeks later. The dignity and authority of the Polish state do not permit this. A change of the timetable outlined above and an introduction of, say, repeated presidential elections (first this year, by the National Assembly, and then six months later, in a general election) would constitute a political and state-organizational anomaly which could not possibly be to the advantage of the office itself. Similarly, if the present parliament were to draw up and pass the new constitution now, this would only result in its immediate and radical revision by the new National Assembly created by the general election. A national constitution must not be changed every six months, either.

When, a few weeks ago, public opinion was informed of the appointment of Andrzej Micewski as the head of Lech Walesa's advisory group, the news was greeted by universal and highly significant silence. Here was an eminent author of historic works (on Roman Dmowski, Jozef Pilsudski, and Primate Stefan Wyszynski) and political studies (the history of the PAX association and publishing institute; a monograph on Solidarity), a close adviser to successive primates of Poland, an author published both at home and abroad, the press spokesman for the Christian Labor Party—in other words, a thoroughly fascinating individual—entering the closest inner circle surrounding Walesa, and the only response to this development was astonishment and profound silence.

Let me break this silence. Andrzej Micewski is currently away on vacation and I clearly have no authority at all to claim that he should be ascribed the authorship of the latest public statement made by his boss. All the same, I perceive clear traces of Micewski's style and experience in that document. Micewski has carried out a comprehensive study of the grim results of the Polish tendency to engage in political contention; he attained his maturity in the shadow of Church diplomacy, which is famous for being adept at toning down internal quarrels; he knows the value of time, but also the price of hastily and superficially prepared undertakings. He also avoids following the herd instinct in his thinking: He follows his own path (while keeping faith with the Church), which often puts many more enemies than friends in his way. I believe that the qualities which Andrzej Micewski will bring with him to the "cabinet" of Walesa's advisers will be the skill of cool reasoning, the ability to think in historical perspectives, and the diplomatic experience acquired over many years in his service to the Church.

Lech Walesa is a man who is not easily influenced. He usually puts forward his own, highly individual views. It would be a fortunate thing indeed if the views which he has expressed lately were to form a permanent component of his philosophy.

Spokesman Cites Platform

LD1709144190 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 1400 GMT 17 Sep 90

[Excerpts] [Announcer] Lech Walesa is prepared to become president. This is what he said in Gdansk at noon today. [passage omitted] We asked Lech Walesa's press spokesman, Andrzej Drzycimski, to comment on this statement.

[Drzycimski] This decision, submitted by Mr. Chairman, has a political character, since we believe that the era of the roundtable has ended. What is needed is an acceleration of the whole process which was put into effect, quite justifiably, at that time. Our common home must be jointly managed, and not just by politicians, not just by the elite, but by the whole society. This is the main aim of what we have come out with on the eve of the Sejm discussions.

Officials Comment on Candidacy

LD1709164790 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 1400 GMT 17 Sep 90

[Text] [Announcer] The government press spokeswoman's office and the presidential office have refused to comment on Lech Walesa's candidacy for the Presidency. And now, several other opinions. Here is Tadeusz Fiszbach, Social-Democratic Union [as heard].

[Wojciech Borowicz] Our official stance regarding Lech Walesa's announcement that he is prepared to stand for presidential office will not be given until Saturday [22 September], when the Coordinating Commission meets. I will only say this: We are very pleased that Lech Walesa sees the possibility of standing for this office, since he is one of the most likely contenders. We also hope that Tadeusz Mazowiecki, another person considered worthy of holding this office, will also shortly agree to stand.

[Announcer] That was Wojciech Borowicz of the Citizens Movement Democratic Action, and now, we really do have Tadeusz Fiszbach.

[Fiszbach] This is a person who really [word indistinct] within himself considerable worth, which should and ought to be beneficial to Poland.

[Announcer] Here is Ewa Spychalska of the National Trade Union Accord.

[Spychalska] I am amazed that a trade union leader is running for president, added to which, he himself has put himself forward. He is more of a politician than a trade unionist, and this confirms our view that the trade union ground is disappearing from under his feet.

Trade Union Leader Examines Election Prospects

LD1309182290 Warsaw PAP in English 1647 GMT 13 Sep 90

[Text]l Bydgoszcz, Sept. 13—Alfred Miodowicz, the chairman of the OPZZ [All-Poland Trade Union Alliance] visited Bydgoszcz today at the invitation of the trade union federation of the thermal power industry.

The OPZZ chief used the occasion to present his stand on the most important issues of the trade union movement and the country.

On Lech Walesa as Candidate for President

His political aspirations hamper our efforts to come to terms on trade union matters. If I too were to have presidential aspirations, we would most surely meet on TV. So far I have no such aspirations but cannot exclude them in the future. That is why I will not speak out on Walesa's candidacy. I would have to reveal arguments which could come in handy during a possible presidential campaign.

On OPZZ's Participation in Elections

In the coming parliamentary elections only symbols will count not political parties which are still too weak to play a significant role. I see three groups which will count. The first comprises Solidarity-based ROAD [Citizens Movement Democratic Action] and the Centre Agreement. The second are peasant movements and the third comprises candidates running under the logo of the OPZZ.

Skubiszewski, NATO's Woerner Hold News Briefing

LD1409215790 Warsaw Television Service in Polish 1730 GMT 14 Sep 90

[Text] Manfred Woerner continues his visit to Warsaw. The structure of a future Europe and the relations of our alliance with Poland were the main subjects of my talks in Warsaw, Manfred Woerner said at a joint press conference with the head of Polish diplomacy, Krzysztof Skubiszewski. All my meetings with Polish politicians mirrored a common interest in the same humanistic values which constitute the basis of NATO. We are partners in searching for the roads to peace and stability in Europe. We have managed, the NATO secretary general said, to establish definite proposals for cooperation between Poland and our organization. We also discussed future perspectives, possibilities, and challenges. In my view Poland needs supportive aid in connection with its losses brought about by the embargo on Iraq.

[Begin Skubiszewski recording] Relations were established between Poland and NATO as a basis for cooperation with Poland as an independent state with its own foreign policy, and not with Poland as a party to the Warsaw Pact. This is a NATO-Poland relationship. And since Poland attaches so much importance to the new European security, a security devoid of blocs—in my opinion the Eastern bloc no longer exists—the role of the North Atlantic alliance is very important. [end recording]

Democratic Forum Deputy Cited on National Affairs

AU1409200190 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 3 Sep 90 p 3

[Interview with Deputy Michal Chalonski of the Forum of the Democratic Right, by Janina Paradowska; place and date not given: "Taking a Calm Look at Polish Affairs"]

[Text] [Paradowska] The Forum of the Democratic Right [FPD] is a new formation on our political scene, but, like other groupings, it is trying to avoid using the term political party. Why is that?

[Chalonski] It is not a political party, but the normal course of events would suggest that it will become a political party in the future. The forum was established as an organization whose aim is to bring together people who lean toward the right, that is, they hold liberal views on the economy, have a conservative standpoint on morals and, of course, are Christians.

[Paradowska] It was immediately given another name—the right wheel on the left wing automobile, because of FPD's participation in the Alliance for Democracy. It sounds rather more as if it were a fifth wheel.

[Chalonski] I think that the left in Poland is so weak that even an additional wheel would not help it. Besides, we do not intend to support the left. However, I know that that is what we are called. It does not annoy me. Many of our friends are in the Citizens Movement Democratic Action [ROAD]; we were all in "Solidarity," and we naturally have common roots. So, we can differ and we do differ, but why should we break of all the ties between us immediately?

[Paradowska] If only so that the future voter knows who he is voting for. As you belong to an alliance that is considered to be opposed to Walesa, that may prove to be the only thing that the voter sees as being the distinguishing feature of the FPD.

[Chalonski] We know that that is how the alliance is perceived, but we do not identify ourselves completely with all its participants. We are not against Walesa. We are to trying to create a program that is separate from this issue of personalities that is currently occupying the attention of the public.

[Paradowska] In your declaration, you state that you support Tadeusz Mazowiecki government's philosophy. It is difficult to view that kind of statement as avoiding the issue of personalities.

[Chalonski] It is more support for the philosophy of action that the government has adopted than support for concrete persons.

[Paradowska] What exactly do you understand by the term "the philosophy of Prime Minister Mazowiecki's government?" What is usually meant by that; that is, calm, evolutionary change, or something different?

[Chalonski] Something more than that. The government's strength lies in the enormous trust that people have in the prime minister; trust in his honesty above all. What I understand by honesty is doing what one has pledged to do. Dishonesty, failing to do what one has pledged to do, have become so widespread over the past 40 years that they have actually become a way of life at all levels of authority, in the workplace, and even within the family. Now the government is headed by a man who is trying to accomplish what he has pledged to do, he guarantees that he will keep his promises. That introduces an entirely new qualitative element into our public life. That is the philosophy that appeals to us.

[Paradowska] Even if it means discharging such pledges vis-a-vis the communists.

[Chalonski] There are, of course, negative obligations that have been incurred, but they should be treated seriously. Especially, as what we can now consider negative, was actually very positive for society. We are going over to a new system without losses and great upheavals.

[Paradowska] You said that the FPD is not opposed to Walesa, but Walesa has called into question the government's philosophy. He wants rapid changes. There is clear conflict here. It is difficult to support the prime minister and Walesa at the same time.

[Chalonski] Lech Walesa is chairman of "Solidarity," the trade union and what is still a social movement. He cannot escape his union duties, and he must defend employees. So, it does not surprise me that he approaches employees' deteriorating material circumstances in an emotional manner. Walesa defuses certain social frustrations. His recent statements seem to indicate that he understands the way in which the prime minister is proceeding.

[Paradowska] In Poland, can one—here and now—fail to adopt a clear-cut stance on personality issues?

[Chalonski] We are still not a political party that has fully worked out its program and chosen its leaders. We are a grouping that has just begun to form itself, and I think that at this stage we still do not have to make clear-cut personality choices. We believe that issues relating to programs are of crucial importance at the present time. Of course, personality issues cannot be avoided, because we have Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki and "Solidarity" Chairman Lech Walesa, and the office of president is on the verge of being vacated.

[Paradowska] I think that it is less and less on the verge of being vacated.

[Chalonski] Everything will depend on the September parliamentary debate. It seems highly likely that it will determine whether the presidential elections take place this year. After all, President Jaruzelski says that he will adhere to what parliament decides.

[Paradowska] This brings us to a question that all political groupings are debating at the present time: the political timetable. I understand that presidential elections before the end of this year also come first on the FPD's political timetable.

[Chalonski] Yes, we think that there has to be a general presidential election. Parliamentary elections should be held in the spring of next year, and that is why the current parliament must pass the budget and approve the government's financial plans. We also think that a change of president should not be accompanied by a change of government. Only a new parliament could form a new government in a way that would ensure that a change of cabinet (even a purely formal one) would occur smoothly.

[Paradowska] A president who is elected in a general election, but does not have the right to designate a prime minister is something of a curiosity.

[Chalonski] It may turn out to be impossible, and we realize that, but I am talking about intentions. The point is that the government should be able to work calmly on budget matters during the remaining months of this year and the beginning of next year. A change of cabinet at this time would complicate the functioning of the state.

[Paradowska] Would the FPD also like to see the new constitution adopted on 3 May 1991?

[Chalonski] Our position is that it should be passed by a parliament that has been elected in free elections. The date is of lesser importance. What we want is a good constitution, and not one that has to be completed by a certain date, even it is a very laudable date. Besides, I do not think that it is possible to prepare a constitution quickly.

[Paradowska] Whose interests does the FPD want to represent in a future parliament?

[Chalonski] The forum is, above all, being organized by people who were connected with the Polish Politics Movement; the old "Dziekania" Society; the economics societies (some of the activists from these societies currently belong to the Congress of Liberals); the regional and local Citizens Committees; and the academic community. We would like to represent the interests of the middle class in Poland—a class that is just coming into being—small-sale industrialists, the intelligentsia, enterprising people, skilled workers who are employed in large industries and now want to become self-employed.

[Paradowska] How does the FPD differ from other right and center right groupings?

[Chalonski] I would say the following: Our grouping is close to the Christian Democrats, Liberals, Conservatives, and even national parties (we do not reject the national element), but in contrast to these other groupings, we do not accord primacy to any specific ideology. We are are seeking to balance all these elements and, at the same time, to treat them seriously.

[Paradowska] So, would alliances with groupings that are closer to you ideologically not be more natural than an alliance with ROAD?

[Chalonski] We do not exclude the possibility of such alliances? We are in favor of every righ-wing grouping having an identity of its own, but we realize that they cannot act separately on every issue. Goals will emerge—and they will emerge quickly—that require common action, and the right will have to unite. The first of those goals will be the elections.

[Paradowska] I see a certain inconsistency in what you say. You are, along with ROAD, in the Alliance for Democracy, and there are no other right-wing groupings in this alliance. The right wing is in the Center Accord, and there are other groupings that are more to the right or more to the center. So, who does the FPD actually want to align itself with?

[Chalonski] I think that in the next election, whether we like it or not, the citizens committees will continue to have an important role. I know that there is a danger in this that we will be trying to make life too easy for ourselves, but effectiveness will be what matters, and the citizens committees will be effective in the regions. We will undoubtedly enter the election within the citizens committee framework.

[Paradowska] So, are you predicting that the voter will be confused once again and that he will not in fact know who he is voting for?

[Chalonski] I do not think that political groupings that matter will be able to conceal their identity and hide behind someone else. I think that the Citizens Committees will be quite diverse and that many groupings will start off within the committee framework, but will do so with their own slogans and their own programs. We will do so as the Forum of the Democratic Right.

[Paradowska] Economic programs have become particularly fashionable. Every grouping is trying to come up with a program of its own, so as not to lay itself open to the charge that it has nothing to propose to voters.

[Chalonski] We will not create an economic program. We believe that what the government is proposing has to be realized, although we see certain adjustments as being necessary, and it pleases us that such adjustments are already being made. We want to evaluate and modify the Balcerowicz plan. At the FPD's founding congress, Professor Stanislaw Stomma said: "It is easy to create the most wonderful of political and economic programs, but people, individual people will actually be verifying them." I think that it would be a good thing if we were to be a kind of collective person who will verify the program that is currently being implemented, assess the situation, and suggest changes.

[Paradowska] So what is your assessment of what the government has been doing?

[Chalonski] Criticizing is easiest, so I will begin with criticism. We are against the "acceleration" slogan, but we believe that in certain areas, change (including personnel changes) should proceed more rapidly. The administration should act more quickly, both at the central and regional levels, and so should the economic administration. It is acting too slowly, and that gives people the impression that not much is changing around them. It seems to me that the government is unable to "sell" its achievements properly. The personnel changes in the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of National Defense are a typical example. That was a considerable achievement, but it has become overshadowed by setbacks connected with the filling of other posts in the government. That is why the public's assessments of many government activities are not as fair as they should be. To give the government its due (and this is something that FPD stresses) the consistent way in which it has been implementing the economic reform merits respect. What also merits respect is that those who drew up and are implementing the plan are not dogmatic, and they are making necessary adjustments to it. It is this about the way in which the government has been acting that appeals to us.

Workers Unite at Self-Management Meeting

AU1309173190 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 11 Sep 90 pp 1, 2

[Agnieszka Wroblewska commentary: "Factory Proletarians Unite"]

[Text] It was a bad thing that no government representative was present at the meeting of workers self-management activists. An invitation had been sent earlier. From the discussions, it emerged that those present felt that the intentions of the authors who had drafted

the privatization program were muddled and the whole program itself was arousing a good deal of suspicion. A deep rift is emerging between the government's goals and the mood of those people who are destined to play the main roles in this process.

I do not share the view that workers should also be proprietors. Past experience shows that workers' ownership does not guarantee the best results for the enterprise, namely, quick development and prosperity. One must not, however, simply dismiss the increasing pressure of suspicion that these people have about the government's plans, because this pressure could yet prove to be explosive. If "Solidarity" activists are suspicious of a government that was elected from their ranks and are now saying that "the government is pulling the wool over people's eyes" and "it wants to sell off Poland," or "it wants to get rich on the proceeds of privatization" then this might imply that the Polish vernacular is too inadequate to be used to try and reach agreement.

The frequent accusations that "our people" quickly began to collude with the communists may contain some grains of truth, but it is difficult to call a convergence of views as amounting to a betrayal. More enlightened communists know what an absurdity the system they supported actually was and, like the more enlightened enemies of communism, they know that only capitalism with a developed market economy, however painful it may be to implement, can make Poland a country to which one returns rather than a country from which one flees.

Undaunted, the self-management activists—one has to admire them for their achievements in the 1980's—want to continue living in a socialist world. Whatever they may do to distance themselves from the word socialism, they are doing precisely the reverse by building up a powerful lobby which intends to fight for workers' interests regardless of the fact that the labor of these workers may be completely pointless and produce no returns whatsoever. They want to keep enterprises in their former socialized or self-management forms, blind to the fact that these enterprises are our greatest post-socialist disaster.

The bitterness they feel is great. During the discussions somebody said that after a year of our government we should all take to the forests with our weapons, like the former wartime Home Army. But what would they be fighting for? Socialism? Or some third alternative that has not shown itself capable of surviving anywhere in the world?

Country's Continued CEMA Membership Questioned

AU1809073290 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 12 Sep 90 p 1

[Ernest Skalski untitled editorial]

[Text] Increasing numbers of people are demanding that Poland leave the Warsaw Pact. Our current problems with oil and gas supplies should incline us to seriously consider our continuing membership of CEMA. This body has never had anything to do with promoting mutual, or for that matter, any other kind of cooperation. It was a mechanism of unilateral edict used by the Soviet Union in its relations with its satellites. Moscow is still trying to use the same mechanism. An economic monopoly built on earlier edicts will be quite sufficient without having to resort to any political pressure. Poland had to bankrupt itself in order to construct the gas and oil pipeline and now it is to be left without oil and gas. We could have used our resources in a more sensible way.

Given that our future trading relations are to be on tough commercial terms, then we should stop pretending that there is any "mutual cooperation" involved and at least put a stop to the continuing subsidizing of the building works on Kalinin Prospect in Moscow.

We realize that our Eastern neighbor finds himself in a far worse situation than we are, but we are not responsible for this. We did not think up that system, that bloc, or CEMA, and we were not all that desperate to join it.

New Soviet Border Crossing Points To Open

LD1409131490 Warsaw PAP in English 1231 GMT 14 Sep 90

[Text] Warsaw, Sept. 14—New crossing points will be opened on the Polish-Soviet border on September 30 in Kuznica-Grodno, and Dorohusk-Yagodin. After October 15 another checkpoint will open at Belzec-Rawa Ruska and one more in Bobrowniki-Berestowice on February 1, 1991. The crossing point will be available first of all to Polish and Soviet citizens and then to people from other countries.

Gorbachev Adviser on Balcerowicz's Program

LD1409130990 Warsaw PAP in English 1110 GMT 14 Sep 90

[Text] Warsaw, Sept. 14—The RZECZPOSPOLITA daily printed today the answer given by economic advisor to the USSR president Nikolay Petrakov to the question what Gorbachev thinks about Balcerowicz. Excerpts:

"The road of Mazowiecki and Balcerowicz leads through a sharp decrease of money in circulation and sharp price hikes. This is a very interesting programme and I hope an effective one. But this is a programme just for Poland.

"I will explain why it cannot be implemented by us, firstly, the psyche of a Pole is much more adjusted to thinking in the market categories than that of a Soviet man. For 70 years the Soviet man has been accustomed to a non-market way of thinking. Therefore, it is easier for a Pole to bear high prices than empty shelves, while our citizen prefers to queue up, especially in office hours.

"Secondly, there are numerous other reasons. You have always had a vast private sector, especially in agriculture. We do not have that.

"Moreover, (Polish) society had time to get used to growing prices before introduction of the Balcerowicz plan.

"Gorbachev wants to avoid inflation, he does not want to repeat Rakowski's error, that is, price rises compensated with issuing uncovered money. But at the same time, the USSR president rejects Balcerowicz's road," Petrakov said.

Skubiszewski Sends USSR Troop Withdrawal Note

LD1409200790 Warsaw Television Service in Polish 1730 GMT 14 Sep 90

[Text] Foreign Affairs Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski has handed Ambassador Yuriy Kashlev a second note from the Polish Government to the Soviet Government, concerning the withdrawal of Soviet forces stationed in Poland. The note, addressed to Eduard Shevardnadze, the minister of foreign affairs, formulates more specific proposals.

Limited Agreement in Trade Talks With CSFR

LD1509170290 Prague CTK in English 1436 GMT 15 Sep 90

[Text] Warsaw Sept 15 (CTK correspondent)—Polish State Secretary in the Finance Ministry Marek Dabrowski has said that Poland and Czechoslovakia reached accord only on the future of trade between the two countries at talks in Prague this week.

In an interview on talks conducted by a Polish delegation with Czechoslovak representatives led by Finance Minister Vaclav Klaus, carried by the Polish daily RZECZPOSPOLITA today, Dabrowski said both countries agreed on transition to payments in convertible currencies from next year. Czechoslovakia promised to consider Poland's proposal to form a bilateral free trade zone with reduced customs tariffs and without quantitative restrictions.

No agreement has been achieved in the sphere of environmental protection, including compensation for the contamination of the Oder and the construction of a coking plant at Stonava, North Moravia, Dabrowski said. Czechoslovakia is just now waiting for a study by foreign experts and for a long-term power industry program.

Dabrowski said not much had been achieved on the question of restoring normal tourist traffic between the two countries. Though Czechoslovakia lifts visas for Western tourists it is imposing certain restrictions on tourists from former socialist countries. The argument that Poles will buy up Czechoslovak shops is used but Dabrowski felt it was rather a question of differences in the pace of reform in the two countries.

Dabrowski said as regards market reform Czechoslovakia was a year late behind Poland which already now has liberal prices, a balanced market, curbed inflation, a private sector, a de-monopolized economy and liberalized foreign trade. All this is awaiting Czechoslovakia and the result is a different attitude to the influx of tourists, the Polish official said.

Foreign Ministry Receives Luxembourg Officials

LD1309170490 Warsaw PAP in English 1459 GMT 13 Sep 90

[Text] Warsaw, Sept. 13—Delegations of the Polish and the Luxembourg foreign ministries held political consultations here today.

On behalf of the Polish side the talks were led by secretary of state at the Polish Foreign Ministry, Jerzy Makarczyk. On behalf of the Luxembourg side—by head of the political and cultural department of the Luxembourg Foreign Ministry Jean Jacques Kasel.

Also today Jean Jacques Kasel was received by Polish Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski.

During today's consultations the two sides exchanged views on bilateral issues, the European integrity, disarmament and the CSCE process.

The two sides expressed their readiness to intensify contacts and cooperation in all fields.

Palestinian Envoy Interviewed on Iraqi Issue

AU1709155290 Bucharest TINERETUL LIBER in Romanian 13 Sep 90 p 4

["Exclusive" interview with Palestinian ambassador Fu'ad al-Bitar, by TINERETUL LIBER reporter Aurel Perva; place and date not given: "Fu'ad al-Bitar, ambassador of the State of Palestine Answers the Question: Why Are the Palestinians on Iraq's Side?"]

[Text] [Perva] Mr. ambassador, the whole world is currently focusing its attention on the Gulf region. The situation created there as a result of the annexation of Kuwait by Iraq, the embargo, and the Western military presence led to a split in the position of various Arab states. Palestine placed itself on the side of the Iraqi President Saddam Husayn. Why?

[al-Bitar] First of all, I would like to tell you that from the moment that a strong concentration of foreign forces—particularly American—was created on Arab soil, its withdrawal has become the primary task for the whole Arab nation. The Palestinian position must also be viewed from this angle. In principle, the PLO refuses to accept a foreign presence in Arab countries, no matter under what form it would be manifested. On the other hand, the Palestinians cannot place themselves on the same side of the barricade as the United States, a country which is against the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people.

[Perva] Within the current context, can one talk about a certain "dimming" of the international public's interest in the number-one problem of the Middle East, that is, the Palestinian people?

[al-Bitar] Certainly, the events which took place and which continue to occur in the Gulf region turned the attention of the world from what is going on in the occupied territories. The Intifada continues, however and it is still reflected in the international mass media.

[Perva] Let us return to the hot region of the Gulf. What could be the effects of the current state of near open conflict, on the situation in the region or even in the world?

[al-Bitar] We believe that the current crisis is the result of the actions taken by the United States, which tries to threaten Iraq. Because the events are taking place and the tension is increasing in an oil region of important strategic value, however, the situation is turning into a serious threat to the interests of Europe and Japan, which depend on the oil from the Gulf. I find the position taken by Europeans bewildering, a position which, as a matter of fact, is against their own interests. The Europeans let themselves be influenced by the Americans. They should, however, be aware of the fact that the United States has its own strategic reserves of oil and their own ore reserves. In the past months, they have bought enormous quantities of oil from the Gulf—at reduced prices—while the Europeans could stay uncovered for a certain period and I believe that they should revise their positions.

[Perva] Mr. ambassador, the UN member states and many other Arab states even sanctioned the invasion and the annexation of Kuwait.

[al-Bitar] The problem that cropped up between Iraq and Kuwait is an Arab problem which can be settled at an Arab level, without any foreign interference. I have said that, at the moment, there is another primary problem: the military presence of the Americans and of other six countries in that region. There are 12 Arab countries altogether which placed themselves on the American side in connection with Kuwait's annexation. We cannot help but admire the courageous position taken by Iraq and the Iraqi people, which enjoys the support of all the Arab people in their heroical resistance against the embargo. As one can notice, there are great mass demonstrations in favor of Iraq in all Arab countries, no matter what the position of their governments that are currently in power. The near future will demonstrate clearly that some Arab leaders are far from the true aspirations of their own people. These differences will increase in the future because the Arab nation rejects the new colonialism and the foreign domination. As is known, the Arabs have had much to suffer throughout history because of the foreign invasion and domination.

[Perva] Can a state of war be reached?

[al-Bitar] Certainly we do not want war; nevertheless, if it breaks out, it will not have a limited area of action and will be so extensive that it can directly affect the interests of the United States.

[Perva] What chances would you give peace?

[al-Bitar] The latest developments in the Arab world and President Saddam Husayn's initiatives regarding the application of all UN Security Council resolutions on Middle East issues are premises to make a step forward on the path of finding just solutions. As a matter of fact, many Western officials have asked themselves why is an attempt not made to observe all UN resolutions, both those which regard the Palestinian people and those which regard the Gulf. Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze also spoke along the same lines.

[Perva] Mr. Ambassador, lately the Romanian press has often mentioned the involvement of certain Arab and even Palestinian terrorists in the events of December 1989. Would you like to comment on that?

[al-Bitar] I believe that such statements are an attempt to spoil friendly Arab-Romanian relations. I call on Mr. Brucan —who made these statements—to give us proof, a name, a wounded person, a body, or an identity card, that is material proof in order to demonstrate that what he says is true. What seems strange to me is that at the end of December, during a news conference, Mr. Brucan had a totally different position and denied all foreign

participation in the events. All these are not surprising to us. We know who Mr. Brucan is, what are his interests and what are his connections. I want to emphasize, however, that such assertions do not have any real basis.

[Perva] How do you view Romanian-Palestinian relations in the current international context?

[al-Bitar] As a nation which is fighting for freedom and independence, we find that the public opinion in your country is greatly understanding. We have very good relations at all levels of the state as well as with the political movements and political forces in Romania. There are exchanges of opinions between the Palestinian and the Romanian parliaments and leaderships. All these mean that our relations are—I repeat it—good, and they are based on understanding and mutual respect.

EEC Plans To Sign Trade Accord With Nation

AU1709202490 Bucharest Domestic Service in Romanian 1900 GMT 17 Sep 90

[Text] Esteemed listeners, before the presentation of domestic news, here is a telegram from Brussels:

The Common Market today decided to sign an economic and trade cooperation agreement with Romania, which was frozen in June; this was announced by Italian Foreign Minister Gianni de Michelis, who is participating in the meeting of the EEC Ministerial Council.

According to AFP, the foreign ministers of the 12 EEC countries considered that the political situation and the observance of human rights in Romania had sufficiently improved to sign this accord, which will facilitate the liberalization of trade relations between the two sides.

Eastern European Reform Ministers Plan To Meet

AU1509190290 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1441 GMT 15 Sep 90

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 15/9/1990—The first meeting of the Eastern European ministers for the reform, organized by the Romanian Government, will take place at Snagov, in the close vicinity of Bucharest, over 17-19 September.

Moldavian SSR Students Attend Police Academy

AU1509190690 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1445 GMT 15 Sep 90

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 15/9/1990—A festivity that marked the beginning of a new school year took place at the Police Academy. The class that starts courses this autumn is the first after the December revolution. It is for the first time that a group of military from the SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] of Moldavia have come to the Police Academy to continue their studies in Romania. At the end of four years they will return home as police officers.

The school's commander, Colonel Vasile Dabinoiu stressed that the opening of the new academic year has a particular significance for the Ministry of the Interior and its institutions owing to the close relationship between the changes occurred in the Romanian society and the training of police officers. He also announced that under a government resolution the school has been reintegrated into the higher learning education system.

Mr. Viorel Ursu, minister of the interior, who attended the festivity, said: The future police officers have the duty to contribute to the entrenchment and firm observance of legality, to the building of democratic Romania.

Marian Munteanu Addresses Timisoara Rally

AU1709205490 Bucharest Domestic Service in Romanian 1900 GMT 17 Sep 90

[Text] The consecration of the place where the monument for the Timisoara heroes of the revolution will be displayed and a religious sermon for their commemoration were held today in Timisoara. The 17 December Association of Timisoara laid a wreath.

After the ceremony, a march was organized with the final destination Union Square, where, as of 1700 hours [1400 GMT], a rally was held against slanders recently disseminated by some domestic publications about the December 1989 events in Timisoara, beginning with 16 December.

More than 10,000 citizens participated in the rally, which was organized by the 17 December Association, the All-Banat [word indistinct], the Former Political Detainees Association, the Timisoara Society, the Anti-totalitarian Front of Arad, and a delegation of Sapinta village inhabitants.

At the end of the rally, Marian Munteanu, leader of the Students' League of Bucharest University, took the floor. He called for unity and reconciliation, which should be based solely on truth.

The rally proceeded without incidents.

RMDSZ Members Assess Current Situation

AU1809104590 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 13 Sep 90 p 2

[Unattributed MTI report: "Democratic Association of Hungarians in Romania [RMDSZ] Statement on Current Romanian Situation—Sober Situation Analysis Is Gaining Ground Amidst General Uncertainty"]

[Text] At a meeting held in Bucharest, the Presidium of the Democratic Association of Hungarians in Romania [RMDSZ] concluded that the political guidelines of the Romanian Government continue to be uncertain and the government has not yet succeeded in neutralizing the centralized management inherited from the former totalitarian regime or in easing the shortage of raw materials. The government does not dare to openly formulate an

opinion and oppose the forces of restoration which are confronting the processes of democratization more and more blatantly.

The RMDSZ—which is the largest opposition group in Romania—thinks that the political uncertainty in Romania is accompanied by an economic uncertainty, and this is felt in all strata of Romanian society. The RMDSZ is concerned that the distinguishing feature of Romanian domestic political life is that the diversion, increasingly created by the regular attacks on the Hungarian minority, is not diminishing.

At the same time, the RMDSZ Presidium concluded with satisfaction that a sober evaluation of the situation in Romania is gaining ground in Romanian society, and many people who have been deceived are slowly becoming aware of the reality, namely that the enemies of democratization are trying to assert a policy opposing Romania's laws and interests, and also that the leadership's apathy toward the actions carried out by extremist and chauvinistic forces is one of the sources of the current problems.

Taking all these factors into consideration, the RMDSZ Presidium decided to draw up a package deal in order to demonstrate its goals and endeavors and its commitment toward democratization in Romania to political partners and to domestic and international public opinion alike. In addition, the RMDSZ is making efforts to strengthen its organizational life and to help its district organizations to carry out their activities more efficiently. The RMDSZ Presidium also proposes a democratic election of new officials at its district, county, town, and village organizations. The RMDSZ Presidium also decided to convene a general meeting in Kolozsvar [Cluj] on 5 October.

Communique on First 'Romanian Resistance' Meeting

AU1809113890 Bucharest DREPTATEA in Romanian 11 Sep 90 p 3

["Communique" issued by the "Romanian Resistance" following a meeting in Brasov on 7 and 8 September]

[Text] At the initiative of the "15 November 1987 Movement," the Romanian Resistance held its first meeting in Brasov on 7-8 September 1990. The meeting was attended by representatives of the Timisoara Society, Group for Social Dialogue, Association of Former Political Detainees of Romania, G.I.D. [expansion unknown], Action Committee for the Democratization of the Army, Cluj Antitotalitarian Democratic Forum, Students' League of Bucharest University, Students' League of Bucharest Polytechnic Institute, Pro-Europe League (Tirgu Mures), delegations of miners from Jiu Valley, who participated in the 1977 strikes, 21 December Association of Bucharest, Liberty Association, Solidarity Federation, 22 December Trade Union—Zarnesti, 15 November Association—Brasov, and independent press representatives of ROMANIA LIBERA, 22, EXPRES, ATLAS, NU, OPINION, BARICADA, VIITORUL, TIMPUL CAPITALEI, CATAVENCU, ALUTUS, GAZETA DE TRANSYLVANIA, ASTRA, 15 NOVEMBER, as well as by representatives of Bucharest, Cluj, Timisoara, and Brasov television stations.

The participants in this dialogue noted that the violation of basic human rights did not cease after the revolution. This serious situation is damaging Romania's image throughout the world, preventing us from joining the ranks of civilized nations, and is hampering the democratization process. The government has to deal carefully with the question of human rights and ensure conditions as soon as possible so that these rights can be fully observed. This would be a first step toward overcoming former communist practices. The participants believe that it is necessary to modify the penal code with a view to adapting it to international laws.

We note with concern an unprecedented increase in emigration. Hundreds of thousands of Romanians are seeking shelter outside the country. The reasons for people leaving their homes, families, and native areas in dramatic conditions are to be sought in the inability of the current regime to ensure the democratization process and in the increasing poverty of the population, a fact which gives us no hope of achieving a decent way of life in the not-too-distant future. The government is the only body to take the necessary measures and decisions to stop this tendency toward mass emigration and to make those who left before this communique was issued return.

Romania has never been through such a serious economic situation. The complete disorganizion of industry, an agricultural policy lacking clarity and determination, the rapid increase in prices, the inefficient and incomplete utilization of the work force, the discrimination in the wages policy, and food shortages are symptoms of the economic crisis our country is going through.

Despite this situation, the government is even delaying the application of the economic reforms promised in its program. This chaos is decisively compounded by the contradictory measures adopted in connection with free initiative and privatization. The only way out of this situation is a firm program for transition to market economics.

Recently, people have been talking more and more frequently about the fact that the Romanians are no longer working. We firmly reject the machination of such erroneous assessments. The explanation for inefficient work has to be sought in the economic chaos created by the government. To achieve results, we need a legal framework which will motivate people to work, create conditions for the application of the principles of the market economy, and guarantee that the fruits of work will reaped by those active in the production of goods and ensuring public services.

Apart from the points on the meeting agenda, the participants also discussed other issues of major interest:

—The need to establish the truth about the events in Bucharest on 13-15 June 1990 and the need for prompt and accurate information for the public. The participants stressed the responsibility borne by the Parliamentary Investigation Commission. Only the identification and proper punishment of those who are really guilty in accordance with the law will restore Romania's prestige.

—In connection with the critical situation in Maramures—Sapinta Commune—the signatories of this communique declare that they are closely following events and clearly support the peasants against abuse on behalf of the administration. At the same time, it is emphasized that the holding of this trial in Brasov—apart from the fact that it is not justified—may create additional tension in a city already confronted with particular social tension.

—Taking account of the Appeal of the Popular Front of the Moldavian Republic, we support this request as being historically founded.

—We view just as positively the principled attitude of the Action Committee for the Democratization of the Army, according to which the Army must not in any way be involved in political activities. We agree with the view that the Army has to defend the integrity of the national territory and not serve the interests of any party, group, or person. The participants support the continuation of the activity of the Action Committee for the Democratization of the Army.

—We note the harmful nature of the press campaign conducted by some newspapers and by numerous programs of the Romanian Television. Misinformation, incomplete, tardy, and tendentious information, instigation to violence, and the slandering of prsons or organizations only deepen the crisis.

The country is destabilized by lies, not by truth.

—We want to draw attention to a process of guided ethnic, social, professional, and confessional splits and to the splits within each strata separately in order to divert attention from the serious problems we are facing.

Given this negative situation, the participants emphasized the need for solidarity among all those who support the democratization of Romanian society. We view this meeting as the beginning of active solidarity and as the recognition of the joint interests of workers, intellectuals, students, farmers, and the military.

There is only one way out of this political, economic, social, and moral disaster: Our solidarity in protecting the universal rights of man, the only guarantee for freedom.

Issued in Brasov today, 8 September 1990.

'Vatra Romaneasca' Adopts 'Declaration-Appeal'

AU1609172590 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1536 GMT 16 Sep 90

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 16/9/1990—On 14 and 15 September Deva and Tebea hosted a number of commemorative events that marked 118 years since the death of the national hero Avram Iancu. On the occasion the Steering Committee of the "Vatra Romaneasca" Union adopted a declaration-appeal which reads inter alia:

On 22 December 1989 the Romanian people demolished totalitarianism starting the irreversible process of destruction of the communist system in Romania, of entrenchment of democracy and resurrection of national spirituality.

Nine months after that historic event the country is still seeking its normal rhythm. But the seekings are rendered difficult by forces hostile to national interests which are backed by anti-Romanian forces. The Romanian society is further marked by economic, social, political upheavals. On an external plane it faces mistrust and tendencies to isolate it, chauvinistic and revisionist ideological trends fostered to the end of destabilizing this country.

"Vatra Romaneasca" Union is of the opinion that, although after the December revolution it was confronted with particularly grave events on both an internal and external plane, Romania has not been and will never be subdued. Conditions are in place for the hotbeds of discontent real or artificial to be extinguished. The antisocial acts and some's avoiding work will be diminished by the ever firmer action of the law and the economic transformations that are taking place.

The time has come that opposition assume firmly the constructive role is has to play in any civilized state of the world.

We must believe that in Miorita's land all those whom history has settled here can find a dignified place under the sun, sooner or later.

"Vatra Romaneasca" Union states today at Tebea where we commemorate 118 years since the death of Avram Iancu that it wishes to live in good understanding and relations of sincerity with all the inhabitants of the Romanian soil. It states that each citizen of the country is free to believe in whatever he wants but that he cannot assume the right to neglect or defile his fellow man's belief or to use it to swear at his country.

The commandment of the national and world history, now, a little before the beginning of the third millennium, is to face reality in all its dramatism and rally all the scattered forces of this nation, all the creative energies of the country to build new democratic structures.

Let us believe in the horizons opened on 22 December 1989.

Let us believe in a Europe of peace, cooperation and good neighbourliness.

Let us swear before Avram Iancu's grave that we detest, from the bottom of our hearts, all hidden, destabilizing acts, that we contest them and that we will oppose them wherever they come from.

Let as speak up here at Tebea that, united in our feelings, we will prove with deeds that we live, think and work in a free country, in a free Europe the borders of which we have many times defended enriching its beauties.

Let us fulfill Iancu's demands in one of his proclamations: Nature has decided that we toil together and together taste the sweetness of the fruits of our joint work.

Former Communist Leaders' Trial Adjourned

AU1709192290 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1748 GMT 17 Sep 90

[Excerpts] Bucharest ROMPRES, 17/9/1990—On Monday, September 17, the Bucharest Territorial Military Tribunal resumed the trial against former members of the Romanian Communist Party leadership. [passage omitted]

Deliberating on the motions and exceptions advanced by the parties in the first part of the session, the court, presided over by Lieutenant Colonel Gheorghe Ciobotaru ruled:

The motion for suspending the trial of defendants Constantin Dascalescu and Gheorghe Radulescu not granted, the letting out from jail, for 90 days, for medical reasons, of defendants Constantin Dascalescu, Miu Dobrescu, Suzana Gadea and Gheorghe Radulescu, who however must stay in Bucharest City for the period, the motion for calling off the preventive detention of defendants Stefan Andrei, Nicolae Constantin, Gheorghe David, Mihai Gere, Ana Muresanu, Paul Niculescu-Mizil and Ioan Toma not granted, the motion for a new medical examination of Nicolae Constantin, Constantin Dascalescu, Suzana Gadea, Paul Niculescu-Mizil, Constantin Olteanu, Gheorghe Pana, Ion Stoian and Gheorghe Radulescu not granted.

In keeping with the penal code, all persons mentioned in the minutes and in the lists appended to the record, whose legitimate interests were harmed as a result of the genocide, are to be subpoenaed as damaged parties or civil parties.

The court adjourned until September 19, 1990, nine o'clock, when the defendants will be examined.

Police Uncover 'Abusive' Land Appropriations

AU1709174990 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1528 GMT 17 Sep 90

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 17/9/1990—In compliance with the decision of the government, officials of the economic police department and representatives of the Ministry of Agriculture and Food, of the Bank for Agriculture and Food Industry operated inspections at state and cooperative farms which have recorded losses as a consequence of violations of the Decree-Law No. 42/1990.

The minute check-up carried out in 579 agricultural units revealed numerous cases of abuse and fraud in the allotment of agricultural land, distribution of livestock and agricultural produce, depreciation and destruction of assets, the total damage amounting to over 400 million lei.

The inspection detected 93,000 hectares abusively appropriated by 800 persons, especially in the hilly and mountaneous counties, of which 43,000 hectares were arable land, 45,000 hectares pastures lands and 5 hectares orchards and vineyards.

494 persons involved in such infringements are being investigated, while 588 were warned by the representatives of prefectures, mayoralties and agricultural authorities to comply with the law.

A number of 176 units, illegally distributed 31,717 cattle, 175,639 sheep, 498 horses and 35 pigs estimated at 280 million lei, of which 20 million has been recuperated.

The legal authorities have 245 cases under investigation, while 480 persons who have benefited from illegal allotment of livestock were summoned to pay for the equivalent value.

Preferential distribution of land caused dissatisfaction among cooperative farmers who came in conflict with other social categories. This sometimes resulted in the abusive, and, in places, violent, requisition of part of the wheat, barley or fodder crops, of other agricultural produce.

Inquiries are being conducted in 196 such cases, while 6,285 persons have been summoned by the competent bodies to return the misappropriated goods, in order to reinstate a law-abiding conduct and recuperate the loss.

Some animal farmers destroyed or depreciated grain and fodder crops,thus causing great damage to certain agricultural units.

The inspection also revealed that, after the issuance of the Decree-Law No. 42/1990, the managerial staff of certain cooperative farms permitted abusive occupation of plots of land belonging to state farms, which they then distributed to their own members.

Based on the reports of the special commissions set up in compliance with Governmental Decision No. 918/1990 on preventing and combating abuse of fraud perpetrated in the process of implementation of Decree-Law No. 42/1990, the authorities will further investigate and hold responsible the culprits.

Constanta Port Strike Halts Commercial Traffic

Strike Continues 17 Sep

AU1709152790 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1453 GMT 17 Sep 90

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 17/9/1990—The strike staged in Constanta by navigators, stevedores, port workers and drivers continues. Nothing goes in or out of Constanta. The trade unions of the port exploitation enterprises of the metallurgical and machine-building industries, the Ministry of Agriculture and Food, Petromar and Port Railways are not on strike. Sirens are sounded every hour. As for the ships abroad they are to make a decision after 14:00 hours [1100 GMT]. The representatives of the Naval Transport Directorate and of the administration boards of the three navigation companies—Navrom, Petromin and Romline—are expected for negotiations.

Some Unions Not Participating

AU1809121890 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1121 GMT 18 Sep 90

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 18/9/1990—The strike called on 17 September by the Trade Unions of the Port of Constanta, the Free Union of Navigators of the Seagoing Merchant Fleet and the Driver's Union of the "Fratia" Confederation entered its second day.

Unions representing several enterprises have still not joined the strike.

Government Approves Private Commercial Societies

AU1709124590 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1050 GMT 17 Sep 90

["Economy—Autonomous Commercial Societies Based on the July 31 Balance Sheet"—ROMPRES headline]

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 17/9/1990—Romania's Government announces in a communique that, in answer to many enterprises' requests to become decision-making autonomous commercial societies, it decided to approve the setting up of autonomous commercial societies in keeping with law No. 15/1990 based on the results on July 31, 1990 and the patrimony existing at that time, the patrimony continuing to be re-evaluated in all economic units over the period established by law no.15/1990 and the government resolution No. 945/1990.

National Bank Governor on Monetary Policies

AU1709155490 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1457 GMT 17 Sep 90

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 17/9/1990—Financial and banking restructuring in Romania will follow three lines institutional, psycho-professional and operational—said Mr. Mugur Isarescu, the new governor of the National Bank of Romania. Internationally, we will start with the banking system, which will be build on two levels—the National Bank, the bank of banks, on the first level, and commercial banks, the investment bank, on the second level, to work directly with enterprises, cooperative units and the private sector.

On a psycho-professional level in view is the training of bankers to work for profit, all while taking risks as well. They will have to turn from "parasites," as the dictatorship considered them, into national-income creators, the governor also said.

Operational restructuring, Mr. Isarescu said, refers to the application of a new outlook on money and the bank and to the efficient operations of banks.

In an interview with the Romanian Television, Mr. Isarescu informed that Romania had already started the process of financial and banking restructuring, adding that the question was not of making a money reform but of creating banking and financial institutions typical of the market economy.

As for money circulation, the governor also said, in view is its sanitation, in the sense of improving the quality of banknotes, and, secondly, the modernization of money circulation.

Mr. Isarescu also said draft laws had been worked out to be submitted to parliament in the days ahead and early in October. There are a single draft of the banking law, a bill on the status of the National Bank as a central bank, as well as a draft law on the status of the new Romanian Commercial Bank.

Iliescu Attends University Rectors' Conference

AU1509202290 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1634 GMT 15 Sep 90

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 15/9/1990—Saturday [15 September], President Ion Iliescu met at the Controceni Palace with members of the Rectors' Conference of Romania, in Bucharest to attend the proceedings of that organism.

Present were Dan Martian, speaker of the Assembly of Deputies, and Petre Roman, Romania's prime minister.

The dialogue highlighted the concern over the general problems of higher learning in Romania and those related to the beginning of the new academic year.

Stress was laid on the need and wish to adapt higher learning to the new conditions in Romania, on its dynamizing role in the transformations initiated in all areas of the social, economic and spiritual life.

Most of the rectors set forth the major problems confronting them, from the insufficient material base of the respective institutions to the need to solve fast the students' social and professional problems hostels, canteens, sports grounds and cultural facilities.

Mr. Petre Roman warned on the fact that some problems were notified too late, that there was little time left to solve them, but assured those present of the government's support in settling the problems confronting higher learning, the Romanian education in general. The prime minister also highlighted the role of university autonomy and the importance of assuming the responsibilities devolving from it in solving problems.

Welcoming the creation of the Rectors' Conference of Romania, Mr. Ion Iliescu outlined the significance of that forum in orienting higher learning and involving it in cooperation forms practiced on an European plane. In consideration of a number of aspects emphasized during the talks he highlighted the need for a realistic approach to the development of higher learning, for a correct appraising of the university centres to provide normal conditions for the education process. Emphasis was also placed on the need to adapt the economic, law and managerial education to the requirements of the market economy which needs experts in these fields. The country's president mentioned that the university autonomy would have to be backed and developed all while ensuring a high-quality training of students, and maintaining a permanent contact with the professional-scientific community in this country and abroad.

Professional Journalists Hold Joint Meeting

AU1609174790 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1600 GMT 16 Sep 90

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 16/9/1990—A meeting took place on Saturday at the headquarters of the Journalists' Society of Romania [JSR]—Federation of Trade Union Organizations of the Entire Press—between representatives of the JSR leadership and of the Steering Council of the Journalists' Association of Romania [JAR]. Attending were for the JSR: Sergiu Andon, Grigore Marian, Emil Stanciu, Rodica Serbanescu and Val Voiculescu, and for the JAR: Petre Mihai Bacanu, Sorin Rosca Stanescu and Stelian Tanase.

The JAR representatives made known their readiness to support the activity of Press Trade Union Organizations in keeping with the principle of union unity, irrespective of the journalists' membership of professional organizations of various orientations.

The representatives of the JSR Federation of Trade Union Organizations of the Entire Press, set forth the society's stand on the setting up of the JAR considering as normal that in state based on pluripartitism, with various publications, there should be two or more professional and creative organizations of journalists function of their affinities. In that context, the Union of Professional Journalists continues to consolidate its structures as it was covenanted at the congress held in Poiana Brasov on 3-5 May by forming county branches, a stage to be followed by the all-country conference to be held over 25 October-10 November.

The next meeting between JSR and JAR representatives is to take place no later than Thursday, 20 September, to exchange opinions on the opportuneness and content of a law of the press.

New Marketing Magazine Published in Braila

AU1509184890 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1437 GMT 15 Sep 90

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 15/9/1990—The first issue of a new publication of marketing and information, "MESAGERUL ROMAN" ["ROMANIAN MESSENGER"] has been put out in Braila City, Romania, edited by the local Romanian-American Brotherhood Society. The new periodical intends to back the efforts for the development of the collaboration between the two countries. It covers questions regarding the process of transition to the market economy and will be circulated also abroad, in large communities of Romanians.

Political Exiles' Publication Distributed

AU1409220390 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1851 GMT 14 Sep 90

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 14/9/1990—An editorial event took place in Bucharest on Friday, September 14: A magazine of the political exile and of the emigration was put out in an Eastern European Country, Romania, that is the "UNIVERSUL" periodical published for the first time in New York in 1985 and now in Los Angeles.

Besides the printing in Bucharest of the "UNIVERSUL" periodical, preparations are being made for it to be put out in Kishinev.

According to a document signed by the prime minister of the Moldova SSR, Mircea Druc, "UNIVERSUL" was authorized to be printed and distributed in that republic, too.

Child Protection Committee Established

Roman Heads Committee

AU1709192190 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1725 GMT 17 Sep 90

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 17/9/1990—The Committee for Backing Child Protection Institutions was set up in Bucharest, on Monday, September, 17. A government body headed by the Prime Minister Petre Roman and counting prominent figures of Romania's public life among its members the committee has the task to promote coordinated programs for improving the protection and education of children in orphanages or other such institutions, for developing the cooperation with the bodies and organisms created in Romania and abroad.

Roman Addresses Committee

AU1809095990 Bucharest Domestic Service in Romanian 1930 GMT 17 Sep 90

[Address by Prime Minister Petre Roman at the founding meeting of the Committee for Supporting Child Protection Institutions held in Bucharest on 17 September—live or recorded]

[Text] Ladies and gentlemen: I extend to you my warmest, most respectful, and friendly thanks for making possible this initiative in order to support actions in connection with the children of our country.

There is great need for such an action because the heritage in this area is terrible. If we had to use only one argument in order to denounce and repudiate the aberrant and totalitarian system through which we had to live, probably the most suitable would be the situation of children—primarily the situation of abandoned and handicapped children. Guaranteeing children's rights requires various actions and the participation, full of affection, of all people of good faith in this country and throughout the world to improve the serious and dramatic situation of the abandoned and handicapped children in our country. The initiative, however, that is taking shape in this country is very important and, I believe, that one day the moment will come when people can say that it meant something and that it marked a certain moment in the area of improving the living conditions of these children.

There are several things to be done to improve the situation of these children. Since the Romanian revolution, the government has done—I believe—quite a bit, in accordance with the opportunities available to our society. The allocation of food for children has been doubled, the number of personnel in the field of child care has been doubled, and other measures have also been taken to improve mother and child care. Our heritage, however, is so terrible that it is very difficult to believe that through the sole effort of the Romanian state, which is not yet in the best of positions as far as possibilities for Romanian society and its material means are concerned, this situation will radically improve.

Likewise, I allowed myself to begin this initiative also as a task of the government, to which you have responded so generously. Furthermore, on behalf of the government, I extend to you most affectionate thanks because it is affection which all of us owe to these children.

We plan to do many things: to promote the adequate legal framework for this most sensitive area, to take actions, first through cooperation with democratic, Western countries, which expressed their wonderful wish to help us in this area and to train specialized personnel who can carry out the education and care of these children. We also plan to draw the attention of personalities, international bodies, and countries which have an evidently better standard than ours—countries where they have a great deal of experience of taking care of these handicapped children—and ask them to come to our assistance, as they have already expressed their intentions to do so.

We will distribute the help of the state evenly, as well as what the state receives from countries which are willing to help us; we will distribute them to be used in concrete actions which can truly change the fate, the homes, and the future of these children.

Before I read the Romanian Government decision on setting up this Committee for Supporting Child Protection Institutions, allow me to read the name of the individuals—or better said, the personalities—who agreed to establish this Committee. The name of these personalities are: Mr. Academician Mihai Draganescu, Mr. Andrei Serban, Mr. Ion Ratiu, Mrs. Lia Manoliu, Mr. Darie (?Cetateanu), Mr. Ion Tiriac, Mr. Virgil Radulian, Mr. Petre Mircea Maiorescu, Mr. Gabriel Vasiliu, [word indistinct], the partriarch of the Romanian Orthodox Church, Augustin Budura, Mr. Andrei Plesu, Mrs. (?Lira) Cirje, Mr. Cristian Topescu, Mr. Mircea Dinescu, Mrs. Daniela Crascinaru, Mrs. Aura Urziceanu, Mr. Razvan Theodorescu, Mr. Emil Tomescu, Mr. Marian (?Patahagie), Mr. Silviu (Nistru), Mr. Ion Olteanu, Mrs. Munteanu, and Mrs. Livratescu.

Now, with your permission I will continue by reading to you the Romanian Government decision on the setting up of the Committee for Supporting the Child Protection Institutions:

The Romanian Government has decided to establish the Committee for Supporting the Child Care Protection Institutions, a governmental body meant to contribute to the evaluation and coordination of the programs aimed at improving conditions for child care and the education of handicapped children, and at increasing cooperation with bodies and foundations created in this field in Romania and throughout the world.

The committee includes important personalities from public life in Romania and it is lead by [word indistinct] and its operational structure and its current activity are led by a secretariat which is appointed by the committee.

* Parties on University Square Demonstrations

90P20116A Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 28 Aug 90 p 2

[Corina Dragotescu, S.P. Achim article: "University Square as Seen by the Political Parties"]

[Text] Last week University Square in Bucharest was, once again, the object of attention in the country (and not only here). The mass media have been reporting extensively about the events in the center of the capital and there have been many communiques and statements from the Ministry of Interior and the police. Less has been heard from the political parties. This is why, in accordance with the opinions expressed by some of our

readers, we have asked some political leaders to state the positions of their parties in regard to the events which have taken place in the middle of our old city. Today we are publishing some of the responses received.

National Democratic Party

Serghei Mesaros, chairman: "Our party is adopting the following position in regard to the events in University Square: 1) The demonstrations, in the form in which they have been occurring, can only lead to social and political destabilization; 2) they have an obviously violent nature, flagrantly violating the laws in force and law and order, going so far as to endanger the individual security of citizens; 3) by their timing and execution, the demonstrations show that they were organized ahead of time although no political or apolitical group has owned up to them and no leader has assumed responsibility for organizing them. Even though the socioeconomic situation in the country is difficult and causes dissatisfaction we believe that, nevertheless, there is a legal framework vhich, despite its limits, permits demands of all types to be brought to the attention of the executive branch. In accordance with the principles of the National Democratic Party which is consistently working for the consolidation of our young democracy, for the purpose of building a law-governed state in Romania, we condemn any attempt to act outside the law, as well as to tolerate such situations which create confusion and could degenerate into unforseeable events which might lead to the compromising of the process of democratization in the country. We call upon the Ministry of Interior, in a strictly legal framework, but firmly and immediately, to put an end to the illegal actions in University Square and, to seek to prevent the repetition of such situations, regardless of their site and organizers. In conclusion, we believe that, at this time, all political parties and all associations should clearly state their position on illegal demonstrations and abandon the 'ostrich policy.'"

National Peasant Christian Democratic Party

"The National Peasant Christian Democratic Party firmly states that it has no connection with the University Square demonstration, which began on 22 August and it protests any allusions which involve the name of the party with this demonstration." Editor's Note: As the spokesman for the party, Mr.Turcanu informed us that more extensive statements on the position of the National Peasant Christian Democratic Party vill be included in a communique which will be published in the next fev days in the semiofficial organ of the party.

Free Democratic Party

Dumitru Stepanov, vice chairman: "We do not know who these demonstrators are and we do not support their actions. It is probably a machination intended to distort the image of Romania in the international sphere. We support the government but, nevertheless, we believe that the solution is not force but dialog. Our party would like representatives of the government and of the opposition to form a commission which would try to establish a dialog with the people in the square. Everbody has the impression that the opposition is involved in the actions in University Square and therefore, at this time, the appearance of representatives of the opposition parties in the square would only be detrimental to the opposition on the whole. Therefore, we are offering to try to establish a dialog with the market but only if the government is informed of this action ahead of time, so as not to give the impression that we might have had something to do with the organization of these demonstrations."

National Christian Democratic Party

Ioan Puiu, member of the initiative committee: "I do not know anything about the events in the square."

Romanian Social Democratic Party

Mircea Stanescu, secretary: "I would like to say that, as of this moment, it is very unclear who the demonstrators in the square are and what their aims are. It seems that the population is unhappy about the fact that recently the children of the dictators were released from prison so that they could be judged in freedom, while the youths, headed by Dinca, who were involved in the events of 13-15 June continue to be kept under arrest while being investigated. It is very possible that this, along with dissatisfaction with the economic situation, is one of the reasons for the demonstrations by the youth in recent days. What is evident, however, is the fact that the police are present every day, in a very large number. This has resulted, not in peaceful demonstrations, as the youth probably would like, but in violent acts resulting in injuries and arrests. It is a situation from which no correct conclusions can be drawn, to determine whether, among the peaceful demonstrators, there are not also some troublemakers, perhaps from among those people whom the prime minister called 'the securitate which was banished after the 17-22 December 1989 events.' All the things which have happened bring Romania and its leaders only negative evaluations (both from within the country and from abroad) and lack of confidence. The country needs a consensus but the initiative should comes from the current leadership itself."

Further Reportage on Situation in Kosovo Province

Academicians Protest SFRY Presidency

AU1709122690 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 12 Sep 90 p 4

["M.A."-signed report: "Act Against Repression"]

[Text] Pristina—A letter from the Presidium of the Kosovo Academy of Sciences and Arts sent to the SFRY Presidency, entitled "An End to State Repression, Discrimination, and Anti-constitutionality in Kosovo and Toward Kosovo," was distributed to journalists in Kosovo yesterday. The immediate reason for this reaction, the letter itself states, was "the forced detention of three regular members of this academy for so-called informative discussions with the internal affairs organs of the Socialist Republic of Serbia in Pristina." These were the academicians Mark Krasniqi, Rexhep Qosja, and Gazmend Zajmi. The Pristina academicians' lengthy letter goes on to express shock and surprise at this "uncivilized conduct, harassing and frightening the academicians' families," and goes on to state that the event was also used at a session of the Presidium of the Academy to consider other repressions in the chain of anti-constitutional measures visited by Serbia on Kosovo.

The letter goes on to list all these measures, and in its second part demands that the SFRY Presidency should "examine the case of the forced detention of the academicians and certain university professors and deans and initiate measures to call to account the appropriate individuals in the internal affairs service over the illegal police harassment of citizens." It asks that the SFRY Presidency should, at a special session, "urgently consider all forms of state repression in Kosovo and anti-constitutional measures and usurpation of powers in the parliamentary system, in the field of employment, health, education, and elsewhere."

The academicians ask the Presidency to "ensure the quick return to work, without political conditions, of all citizens who have summarily lost their jobs." They ask the state Presidency for "urgent measures to prevent any further duration of the unconstitutional ban on the work of the Kosovo Assembly." They appeal to the Presidency to undertake urgent constitutional and state measures "to establish and protect media and newspapers in the Albanian language, to protect the autonomy of health, educational, and academic institutions in Kosovo, and to take steps against pressure, discrimination, and segregation in these institutions." It also asks that the Presidency, on the basis of its constitutional authority, "should take urgent steps" to release from prison the leaders of the free trade unions of Kosovo, Dr. Hajrullah Gorani and Dr. Ilir Tolaj, as well as all citizens imprisoned because of publicly stated political beliefs.

With the warning that this is the demand of all the citizens of Kosovo "expressed in the Constitutional Declaration," the letter is signed by the academician, Musa A. Haxhiu, president of the Kosovo Academy of Arts and Sciences.

Constitution of Republic Summarized

AU1809080890 Skopje FLAKA E VELLAZERIMIT in Albanian 14 Sep 90 p 4

[Unattributed report: "Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo Proclaimed"]

[Text] The reports spreading for some time throughout the province and further afield that the delegates of the Kosovo Assembly proclaimed the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo "somewhere in Kosovo" on 7 September have turned out to be true. The text of the "Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo" was distributed yesterday to Yugoslav and world media correspondents who report from Kosovo.

This constitution, as its preamble states, "is based on the declaration of independence of 2 July 1990," and has 140 articles. Article 1 states: "The Republic of Kosovo is a democratic state of the Albanian people, of the members of other peoples and national minorities, and of its own citizens, Serbs, Muslims, Montenegrins, Croats, Turks, Romany Gypsies, and others who live in Kosovo." Article 2 states that "The Republic of Kosovo as a state is part of the Yugoslav community." Article 8 of this constitution states that "The territory of the Republic of Kosovo is an inalienable and indivisible whole, and can only be changed on the basis of a decision of the Kosovo Assembly."

"Citizens of the Republic of Kosovo enjoy the rights of citizenship of the Republic" (Article 9). "A citizen of the Republic of Kosovo abroad enjoys the protection of his own republic, and cannot be stripped of citizenship, deported, or extradited" (Article 73).

"The Albanian language and its script are in official use in the Republic of Kosovo," while in areas where members of other nationalities also live, "the Serbo-Croatian and Turkish languages and scripts are equally in official use" (Article 11). Articles 13, 14, and 15 prescribe that "Constitutional and legislative power belongs to the Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo," that "The Presidency of the Republic of Kosovo is the collective head of state," and that "the Government is the highest organ of executive power."

"The Republic has its own coat of arms (Article 19), flag (Article 20), and anthem (Article 21)," while "Pristina is the capital of the Republic of Kosovo" (Article 23).

Under Article 26, "All forms of property are guaranteed," while "foreign persons may acquire property rights under conditions laid down by law" (Article 31). Meanwhile, "All cultural and historical treasures are the property of the people" (Article 33).

The third chapter of the constitution lays down human and citizens' freedoms and rights, while its introductory

article, Article 42, states: "Human and citizens' rights and freedoms are limited only by the equal rights and freedoms of others." "Citizens are equal in their rights and obligations and enjoy the same protection before the organs of the state" (Article 43).

The constitution also includes dispositions on the inviolability of human life (Article 44), the inviolability of human freedom (Article 45), and a disposition which states: "Illegal deprivation of freedom is punishable" (Article 48, Paragraph Three). "Human dignity and privacy are inviolable" (Article 48); "Citizens are guaranteed the freedom to work, and forced labor is forbidden" (Article 49). "Citizens are guaranteed freedom of association and assembly and the freedom to gather in public, as well as freedom of political and trade union organization and activity" (Article 56). "Freedom of thought and the public expression of opinion" (Article 69) and "freedom of the press" (Article 70) are guaranteed, as is "freedom of academic, professional, and artistic creativity and publication" (Article 69). "The right of citizens to publicly criticize the work of a state organ, political party, etc." (Article 72) is also established.

"It is an individual's right to decide freely over the birth of children" (Article 65). "Each person is guaranteed the right to defense before the courts" (Article 62). In Article 75, "A Citizen is also guaranteed the freedom to express his national identity, freedom to express his national culture, and freedom to use his own language and script," while "freedom of religious belief" (Article 76) is also guaranteed.

The constitution lays down that "The Republican Assembly has a single chamber with 130 deputies" (Article 96), while Article 135 lays down the procedure for changing the constitution. "A proposal to introduce changes in the Constitution may be submitted by a minimum of 50 voters, 30 deputies to the Republican Assembly, the Presidency of the Republic, and the Government of the Republic, while the proposal is decided by a majority of votes of all the deputies of the Republican Assembly." Article 137 of the constitution states: "An act to change the Constitution may be approved by a referendum, if it is supported by more than one-half of the total number of electors, and the Kosovo Assembly proclaims the approval of any change in the Constitution."

It is understood that the present government of Kosovo will function as the Government of Kosovo until free elections, planned for the end of November, are held.

Assembly Passes Constitutional Laws

AU1709192090 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 14 Sep 90 p 3

[Milos Antic report: "Getting to the Phantom 'Seventh Republic' on Paper"]

[Excerpts] Pristina—What was "an unconfirmed" piece of news yesterday is truth today. The delegates of Albanian nationality met on 7 September. Although they are not saying where they met, we have learned that this happened in Kacanik. They held a secret meeting at which they promulgated "the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo."

At this session, the participants also adopted the constitutional laws concerning the implementation of "the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo"; extended the mandate of the Kosovo Assembly and its Executive Council, the bodies that have been suspended by the Serbian Assembly, until next elections; passed the law allowing citizens to organize themselves into political parties; passed the law on elections; adopted a resolution with regard to the new constitution so that they "appear" as the republican assembly on this very first session; and approved amendments to the SFRY Constitution.

According to the constitutional law adopted on that session, "the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo" takes effect on the day of its adoption. So, on 7 September Yugoslavia got its "seventh republic" without knowing it.

What is interesting is that neither "the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo" nor any of the accompanying documents were signed personally, but bear the signature of the "vice president of the assembly." It was not said who that might be, but judging by the pictures from the session, the leading person in the working presidium appears to be Iljaz Ramailji, who until recently held the post of vice president of the Kosovo Assembly. [passage omitted]

They Are Hoping To Be Recognized

On the occasion of adopting "the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo," the delegates of Albanian nationality also adopted a "resolution." The resolution states, among other things, the following:

"At the joint session of all of its three chambers held in Kosovo on 7 September, the Assembly of Kosovo, proceeding from the right to self-determination and respecting the sovereign will of the Albanian people expressed through a plebiscite throughout Kosovo, adopted and promulgated 'the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo' with all the accompanying documents.

"The decisions of the legitimate representatives of the sovereign people of Kosovo are in line with the publicly adopted stances of the SFRY presidency on the talks about the future structure of Yugoslavia that were conducted in the republics. However, the unconstitutional measures of the Assembly of Socialist Republic of Serbia not only excluded the people of Kosovo, particularly the Albanian population, from the talk on the future structure of Yugoslavia—in which Albanians would, together with other peoples and nationalities, decide on their status on equal footing as the precondition for living

together—but also, in the way not known to the civilized world, subjected Albanians to unprecedented terror, national, political, economic, and human inequality, and even to a physical threat.

"Therefore, we see the solution to Kosovo's status within the Yugoslav community only in Kosovo, together with the sections of other peoples and minorities who live in it, becoming a sovereign state—in becoming the Republic of Kosovo as an equal member of the Yugoslav peoples' community.

"In addition to the freedoms and the rights of man and citizen known to the civilized world, the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo also guarantees—from the definition of the State of Kosovo within the Yugoslav peoples' community to its other provisions—equality to all national groupings in all domains.

"In this way, we, the legitimate representatives of the people of Kosovo, are making our contribution to the incipient democratic processes in some parts of Yugoslavia and to the integration of Yugoslavia into the democratic European community. Therefore, we expect from the federal units of the SFRY to recognize the sovereign Republic of Kosovo as an equal member of the Yugoslav peoples' community. We also expect the sovereign states of Europe and the world to support our sovereign state, the Republic of Kosovo within the Yugoslav peoples' community, that has been set up in this way."

The resolution was signed by the Albanian delegates of all three chambers of the former Kosovo Assembly.

Disbanded Assembly Official Arrested

LD1709213190 Zagreb Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 17 Sep 90

[Text] Ilijaz Ramajli, vice president of the now disbanded Kosovo Assembly, was arrested in Kacanik today. Before the arrest, about 50 policemen surrounded and then proceeded to search his apartment. Ramajli is the fourth delegate to be arrested. The other three are Raif Ramabaj, Nazif Matosi, and Ismail Sadiki. According to their lawyers criminal charges have been brought against all four delegates, who have adopted silence as their form of defense.

Skopje Paper on 'Siege' in Villages

AU1809083690 Skopje FLAKA E VELLAZERIMIT in Albanian 14 Sep 90 pp 1, 4-5

[Blerim Reka report: "New Victims"]

[Excerpts] Pristina, 13 Sep—Today again, the area of Podujevo awoke surrounded by strong police forces. As on previous days, when the villages of Ternave, Bellopoje, and Halabak were totally encircled, the upper Llap valley was subjected to a total siege from the early hours of the morning. Nobody could pass from Kerpimeh in the direction of Pollate because the strong police forces had blocked all traffic. Despite strenuous efforts, by 1300 not even the team of RILINDJA journalists had succeeded in reaching the scene—except for Srecko Ladicek, correspondent of the Zagreb paper VECERNJI LIST, who told us that between 70 and 100 police Pinzgauers [type of armored vehicle], about 20 armored vehicles, and many tanks accompanied by militia helicopters had blockaded all the local villages. We heard from the villagers of Doberdol after the militia withdrawal that a militia vehicle had passed through on the way to Kerpimeh after midnight on the previous night, and had fired weapons into the air 15 times, while about 50 militia vehicles passed through in the same direction at about 0300.

On the basis of continuing reports from the area, it is understood that many villagers have been not only arrested, beaten, and mistreated, but there have been injuries and even deaths. Fadil Latifi told us that by 1300 Enver and Halil Hoxha and their sons had been imprisoned, followed by Nazmi Hoxha, Sahit Latifi and his son, Hamdi Latifi and his two sons, Skender Mulolli, Behram Behrami, Emin Behrami, Hakif Hyseni, and the 15-year-old girl Azize Mulolli.

According to a report transmitted by Pristina Radio in Serbo-Croatian, two journalists from Novi Sad who were at the scene during the Serbian militia's action asserted that two people were killed and a militiaman was wounded. A similar report of two deaths reached us from the Pristina Medical Faculty. Precise details can still not be obtained officially, because the militia men are refusing to allow journalists access to the morgue.

It is expected that the special units of the Serbian Secretariat for Internal Affairs in Pristina will issue an official statement this afternoon about this action of the Serbian militia.

The Presidium of the Kosovo Democratic Alliance, in a report sent to the SFRY Presidency and the Federal Executive Council, informed these two federal bodies again today, as it had done in the case of the Ternave incident, about the dramatic and tragic events in the Podujevo area, demanding that they take urgent measures within their authority to put an end to this violence.

Admission of Incompetence on the Part of the Imposed Authorities?

A strike by the workers of the Kosovo Post Office and Telecommunications is also expected to start today following a statement to the media by the organization's independent trade union, stating that "The 1,196 signatories of this petition, Albanians, Turks, Muslims, Croats, and Romanies, will go on strike unless 106 Kosovo post office workers are not allowed back to work tomorrow."

This week also saw the first signs of admissions of incompetence on the part of the imposed administrative councils of some working collectives in Kosovo, which are continuing production exclusively with Serbian and Montenegrin workers. After the "admission of defeat" by the temporary management of the Balkan works in Suva Reka—which, a few days ago, invited 600 workers to return to work—the temporary management of the Stari Trg Flotation Mine yesterday reported that it would publish a list on Friday, 14 September, of the names of 900 miners who should report for work. It has been understood that, as in the case of the Balkan works in Suva Reka, this has not happened out of any kind of "mercy" for the large army of dismissed Albanian workers, but because the production level at these two giants of the Kosovo economy has been so low in the last two months (in the case of Stari Trg, only one-tenth of normal ore production has been achieved) that the further work of these two collectives is in doubt. However, the imposed managements at the shock absorber factory, which is "maintaining production" (though to what extent is not known) even without 500 dismissed Albanian workers, and the Belacevac open cast mine, which is under lock and key, have no such intentions. [passage omitted]

Meanwhile in Pristina, citizens' signatures have been collected in recent days under the slogan, "We want the return of the Karadjordjevic dynasty and the king to Yugoslavia." What level of "response" this campaign has aroused is perhaps best seen by the fact that even seven- and eight-year-old children have been signing this petition! This is another example of the misuse of children for political ends, which is forbidden not only under international conventions but by Serbia's law on political parties itself!

At Pristina Communal Court yesterday, a three-man bench led by Tome Gashi acquitted RILINDJA journalist Zenun Celaj because of lack of evidence. As is well known, Zenun Celaj was detained after the strike of Albanian miners in Stari Trg in February on the charge of "causing public concern with false information about the Stari Trg strike." After two hearings and the testimony of many witnesses who unanimously confirmed his reports and said that they were objective and were not at all disinformation, the court's president, Tome Gashi, acquitted Zenun Celaj because of lack of evidence, in the face of objections by Deputy Prosecutor Medzid Saziman, who wished the trial to continue.

Another Kosovo association also registered yesterday with the Federal Secretariat for Justice and Administration. As representatives of the Mother Theresa Humanitarian Association have told us, the association received a telegram yesterday from the Secretariat, confirming that the association has been added to the Secretariat's register of parties and citizens' associations.

Croatian Foreign Minister for Independent State

AU1809094090 Vienna DER STANDARD in German 18 Sep 90 p 6

[Interview with Croatian Foreign Minister Zdravko Mrsic by Brigitte Voykowitsch in Bratislava; date not given: "Croatia's Foreign Minister Mrsic Advocates an Independent State"; first paragraph is DER STANDARD introduction]

[Text] Bratislava—If one talks about a "peaceful revolution" in connection with the other countries in Eastern Europe, one has to use the term "revolution in stages" for Yugoslavia, Croatian Foreign Minister Zdravko Mrsic says. He was interviewed by DER STANDARD journalist Brigitte Voykowitsch.

[Voykowitsch] How great is the support for the independence of Croatia?

[Mrsic] I think 98 percent of all deputies are in favor of Croatia becoming an independent state.

[Voykowitsch] You are striving for international recognition of this independence?

[Mrsic] Exactly.... Also for the recognition by the other states in Yugoslavia.

[Voykowitsch] What about the efforts for independence in the other republics?

[Mrsic] So far free elections have taken place only in two states—in Slovenia and in Croatia. Soon elections will also be held in Bosnia, and we do not doubt that the democratic forces will win the elections, will assume power, and will declare their own sovereignty. In economic terms, Bosnia will continue to be oriented toward Croatia, because Croatia geographically surrounds almost all of Bosnia.

[Voykowitsch] Is it possible that the declarations of independence may also lead to corrections of the borders?

[Mrsic] The republics should declare their sovereignty within the current borders. We will defend the current borders and insist on their being preserved.

[Voykowitsch] Are you optimistic regarding the results of the elections?

[Mrsic] I am optimistic regarding the results in five states, but even in Serbia there are certain indications that the current government is ready for a more conciliatory attitude, because it is completely isolated in Europe. In order to break out of this isolation, other forces will probably form and will show the way out of this isolation, because Serbia—that is, the Serbian Government—is currently the only problematic factor in Europe.

[Voykowitsch] What kind of confederation do you foresee?

[Mrsic] An economic and political confederation. I am not sure concerning a joint foreign policy. It is our desire for Yugoslavia to reestablish diplomatic relations with Israel, but some other republics refuse to do so. In my view, this is an anachronism in today's Europe.

[Voykowitsch] But all democratic forces in Yugoslavia are for a confederation within Yugoslavia's current borders?

[Mrsic] Yes.

[Voykowitsch] Other options, such as an Adriatic confederation, would only be a second choice?

[Mrsic] This would only be an alternative if other republics, particularly Serbia, were not willing to join a confederation; furthermore, a new federation is out of the question for us. This would just mean that income would always be taken away from one region and would be passed on to another region. First of all, however, we want economic sovereignty.

[Voykowitsch] Which structures of a confederation are you striving for?

[Mrsic] The model is the EC of 1992; our attitude exactly corresponds to the British attitude: Full respect for sovereignty and integration as soon as there is complete agreement.

HSLS Calls for Charter on Croat Independence

AU1709135690 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 11 Sep 90 p 5

[M. Sevcik report: "Charter for an Independent Croatia"]

[Excerpt] Zagreb—The Croatian Social-Liberal Party [HSLS] held a news conference yesterday in the "J. Engel" Community Center. The main reason for the conference was the party's proposal for a charter to be adopted on the independence of the Republic of Croatia and a European solution to the Yugoslav crisis.

After an introductory speech by Drazen Budisa, the party's president, in which he particularly welcomed Dr. Slobodan Lang and his action for the rights of the citizens of Kosovo, the reasons were revealed for the proposed adoption of the charter on the independence of Croatia. Mentioning that, with the present dramatic situation in the country, which threatened to have tragic consequences, the HSLS had radicalized some of its political stands, Budisa stated that present day Yugoslavia, as defined and established by the 1974 Constitution, had actually ceased to exist. This was particularly confirmed by the suspension of the Assembly of Kosovo which suspended the province of Kosovo both inside Serbia and as a constituent element of the federation. Apart from that, the constant threat of the aggressive political aims of a greater Serbia—which have escalated in aspirations for borders to be shifted among republics and in changes to their constitutional order—represents a constant threat of civil war. For these and other reasons, the HSLS maintains that it is necessary to embark as soon as possible on equitable negotiations on future agreed relations between the republics, proceeding from the existing borders between the republics and with the desire for these talks to be conducted by the democratically elected representatives of every republic and every people.

Since such a legally acceptable agreement on a confederation or some other form of association can only be adopted by sovereign and independent states, the HSLS calls on the Assembly of the Republic of Croatia to immediately adopt a charter on the independence of the Republic of Croatia as a sovereign, legal, democratic, and social state; to proclaim republican laws to have precedence over federal ones and to set a limit of a maximum of one year until which time it will participate in the existing procedure of the federal organs; to present this to the assemblies of all republics in Yugoslavia, as well as the proposal that, after free multiparty elections, the legitimate representatives of the people will proclaim the independence of the republics; to ask the Council of Europe and the European Parliament to choose a statesman or body to mediate in negotiations between the legitimate representatives of the sovereign republics; and to ask the European Community to help achieve through diplomatic and other measures a European solution to the present Yugoslav crisis. The Presidency of the Republic of Croatia is asked to call an international conference in Zagreb to gather together representatives of all the multinational states which, after the collapse of so-called real socialism, have found themselves in a similar position to Croatia. [passage omitted]

First 100 Days of Croat Democracy Assessed

AU1709085690

[Editorial Report] Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian on 10 September on page 5 carries the statements by the leaders of various political parties in Croatia on how they see the first "100 days of democracy in Croatia."

Expressing his views Dr. Zarko Domljan, president of the Croatian Assembly, said:

"The picture of Croatia has changed considerably over the last 100 days. There is a new atmosphere of trust, cordiality, and joy and this can be seen in on the smiling face, people's kindness in various situations, in restaurants, shops, and streets. Even the usually stern and suspicious looking policemen are kind. There is no more fear or suspicion. There are no more the sullen and anxious faces (or at least there are fewer of them now) that used to characterize the countries under the communist dictatorship. Fear deforms people, paralyzes their creativity, and destroys their ability. Freedom on the other hand stimulates people spiritually and this is evident on people's faces, in their talk, and their laugh. I always wondered how I was able to almost unmistakably distinguish between people from the West and those who come from the communist East. It is clear to me today

that the difference in their faces is not the result of using more superior cosmetics or having better hygiene, but it was the difference between the gleam of freedom and the convulsions of fear.

"The most positive achievement of the new democratic Croatia is that there are no more political prisoners and political emigration."

Speaking about the less satisfactory events in Croatia, Domljan said: "The saddest event in the last 100 days was the refusal of one section, of a smaller section of the Serbian people to accept the democratic Croatia. They are, as they have been, hoping that democratic processes will be prevented by the intervention of the "big brother." This concept has already been tried in Hungary in 1956, in Czechoslovakia in 1968, and in Croatia in 1971."

Drazen Budisa, president of the Croatian Social Liberal Party, takes a different approach:

"In my view the most important political fact and the unquestionable political success of the new authorities in Croatia are the establishment of links with the Fifth Army District and the military-navy district and the clear opposition of the representatives of the Yugoslav People's Army [JNA] to the creation of autonomies in Croatia. I believe that a balance of power has been established in Yugoslavia today in the most important element of that power, that is, in the Army. I also think that the new resoluteness of the Ministry for Internal Affairs of Croatia has something to do with this. The danger of intervention by the JNA as a unified organization against the new democracies in Slovenia and Croatia has been reduced to a minimum."

Budisa also comments on some negative phenomena in the first 100 days of the new authorities' power:

"There are many things, however, that do not deserve a positive assessment. These are above all too pronounced cooperation between the authority and only two other parties in Croatia, the Serbian Democratic Party (at least until recently), and the League of Communists of Croatia-Party of Democratic Change; the political escapade in the Knin region which revealed the immaturity of those in charge of some departments and a lack of basic knowledge about social psychology; excessive involvement in various religious and civilian celebrations, manifestations, ceremonies, and parades to the extent that one becomes tasteless and forgets the meaning of religion and the purpose of politics."

Antun Vujic from the Croatian Social Democratic Party takes a more general view:

"We have established the basic prerequisites for democracy, but democracy is yet to be developed. Democracy does not only lie in a democratically elected Assembly, but also in the democratic control of all institutions of authority and social power, in ensuring and continuously promoting people's existential and social rights. Certain regress has been noticed, particularly with regard to the latter. This is to some extent the consequence of the system that we inherited. What seems to worry people are mass layoffs but not so much the fact that the workers are being deprived of their rights (which are highly developed in other countries in Europe).

"The most positive moment in these first 100 days was the advent of democracy which culminated with the very act of democratic, though not yet just, elections. The saddest aspect, which is still apparent, are the attempts to undermine Croatia and the democratization through the great Serbian strategy of the Knin rebels."

Ivan Gabelica from the Croatian Democratic Party is very brief:

"The last few months, particularly the period since the elections, have witnessed great changes in Croatia. People can talk freely without worrying that somebody is listening to them, they can freely meet.

"However, everything else needs to be developed, although without what has been done this would not be possible.

"The most positive element in these 100 days is that people have gotten rid of fear. People cannot be creative until they rid themselves of fear.

"The most negative moment is the abuse of democracy, which is best illustrated by the rebellion in Knin aimed at the destabilization of Croatia."

Silvije Degen from the Socialist Party of Croatia, commented:

"The democratization of society is a long process. It is a fact that the development of a multiparty system is the very beginning of real, genuine democracy."

According to Degen "democracy is a social process in which the organization of authority is of the secondary importance and the expansion of production of primary importance. Therefore, in the first 100 days the current authority could have only noted down the existing state of affairs."

Degen is also critical of a lack of substantial changes: "In the past period we saw the change in the incumbents of various offices but not changes in the law on property relations and the criminal law.

"Therefore, the principal task is to change legal norms in order legally resolve the problems that have accumulated through the rule-of-law state."

Vito Cesmadjiski, president of the Radical Association for the United States of Europe, expresses less enthusiastic view:

"Generally speaking, the first 100 days of democracy were nothing special, not much different from the general picture of Eastern Europe. One can hear the same themes with the same drama and pathos everywhere:

sovereignty, nationalism, confederation—people examine their heroic past with great enthusiasm, live in the deteriorating present, and fear the total uncertainty of the future. Too much emphasis is placed on superficial changes, symbols, the return to tradition, religion—on everything that does not cost much and pleases the people, but does not essentially change anything. There are too many theoretical discussions about fundamental changes in the sphere of ownership, but people somehow lack resolve in jumping over this abyss. There is a general economic chaos everywhere, including in our republic. People live in hope, waiting for those in positions of power and might to sit down and untangle our future, to tell us what to do, as if we did not have enough strength and self-confidence.

"Our picture fits perfectly in this frame, I do not see any specific deviations from this picture. I do not see anything very positive in these first 100 days. Perhaps it is too early for such an assessment (let me be a little less harsh in my judgment)."

Confederation Document Said Still 'State Secret'

AU1709143690 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 11 Sep 90 p 3

[Seada Vranic report: "'The Knin Affair'—By Fair Means or Foul"]

[Excerpts] Zagreb—The "Knin crisis" will be resolved in a few days. This was promised yesterday by Josip Boljkovac, minister of internal affairs, to numerous journalists at a news conference organized in the Presidency of the Republic of Croatia. He presented the latest information according to which arms have been returned to the organs of law and order in all communes caught up in the recent revolt, except in the Knin commune. This problem will also be resolved, Boljkovac stated categorically, and if this depends only on the republic's authorities, it will be done in a calm, tolerant, and civilized fashion, which includes a compromise which the republican leadership is willing to make to establish a normal life in the whole republic. If, however, a solution is not possible in a calm and civilized way, the authorities will use all legally permitted means. [passage omitted]

Yesterday's news conference was the occasion for representatives of the Croatian Government (academician Dusan Bilandzic and Antun Vrdoljak, vice presidents of the republic, Dr. Milan Ramljak, vice premier, and Dr. Slaven Letica, Mr. Tudjman's personal adviser) to satisfy the curiosity of the media regarding preparations for the new republican constitution and the confederal agreement for Yugoslavia, whose first working version is still a "state secret" at the moment.

Slaven Letica explained that the basic tenet of this document was for the relations between the future members of a Yugoslav confederation to be formulated according to the pattern of the European Community—as he said—so that after the "Bolshevik federation," Yugoslavia will return to European tendencies. Otherwise, regarding the actual document, that is to say the confederal agreement, an alternative name is offered for Yugoslavia: federation of Yugoslav states or federation of the states of Southeast Europe. According to this proposal, a confederation would have an advisory parliament, a council of ministers, an executive commission, and a confederal court. Within the powers of the confederation, there would be mutual agreement on the common issues of defense, foreign affairs, and the financing of joint affairs. [passage omitted]

Vrdoljak was asked at the end to explain why the decision to replace Dr. Davor Perinovic, head of the Croatian Democratic Community of Bosnia-Hercegovina, was taken at a meeting in Zagreb, that is to say why such a meeting was not held in Bosnia-Hercegovina. According to Vrdoljak, Dr. Perinovic "had lied about his origins and the Croatian Democratic Community does not agree to lies." The meeting was held in Zagreb "because the arrival of leaders from Zagreb in Bosnia-Hercegovina could have been interpreted wrongly."

There was no response to the comment by the BORBA journalist that the replacement of Dr. Perinovic (however much it was also motivated by party, that is to say, "family" reasons, and despite the fact that there have been earlier cases of people fraudulently presenting themselves in the Croatian Democratic Community without any consequences) has wider implications because of his insistence on the sovereignty of Bosnia-Hercegovina and the independence of the Croatian Democratic Community of Bosnia-Hercegovina. With Vrdoljak's endorsement, adviser Darko Begic refused to speak any further on this "because this is not the business of the Presidency but of the Croatian Democratic Community."

[The following passage appears boxed within the body of the item]

Delivery Point for Arms

Josip Boljkovac was asked to say something more about his visit to Slovenia with Martin Spegelj, minister of defense. He replied that this involved a normal working visit and an agreement on cooperation of the sort which is also being offered to Serbia and was offered to Bosnia-Hercegovina a month ago. No response has been received yet from the latter, although one is expected. That is to say, as he put it, Bosnia, or rather Bosansko Grahovo, was serving as a delivery point for arms intended for the Knin rebels.

In reply to a question on whether the Bosnian authorities and the militia organs in Grahovo had participated in this or whether this involved illegal and unofficial arms suppliers, the answer was received that they could and should be getting this answer soon.

Zagreb Communists Protest Renaming of Square

LD1809151890 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1411 GMT 17 Sep 90

[Text] Zagreb, 17 Sep (TANJUG)—The Zagreb City Communist Party on Monday [17 September] condemned the new Zagreb city authorities's decision to rename the city's central square from the Square of Victims of Fascism to Square of Croatian Rulers. The decision is a shameful one for Zagreb and Croatia before the eyes of Europe and the civilized world, since fascism and anti-fascism are unambiguously weighed in the European tradition, it was set out in a strong reaction of the Zagreb organization of the League of Communists of Croatia-Party of Democratic Changes, which in April moved from a ruling to an opposition party.

The proposal of the new city authorities, as set out by the communists, has "crossed the thin but decisive border between the right of the winner and elementary respect for history, general historical achievements and good taste."

Croat Party Condemns 'Repression' of Albanians

LD1709194390 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1537 GMT 17 Sep 90

[Text] Zagreb, 17 Sep (TANJUG)—Proceeding from the principle of democracy and the fact that Albanians are the third largest ethnic group in Yugoslavia, we hold that they must have equal civil and national rights with other nations. This has been stressed in a statement of the Initiative Committee for Setting-Up the Croat People's Party [Hrvatska Narodna Stranka].

Albanians must take an equal part with our all other nations in drawing up a new historical agreement on a joint life in Yugoslavia. This is the only way to resolve the Kosovo crisis permanently, peacefully, and democratically. Otherwise, the crisis could escalate into clashes with unforeseeable consequences, the statement notes.

"The proclamation of the constitution of the Republic of Kosovo is an inevitable consequence of the intensified state repression against the Albanian people by the current regime in Serbia," the statement of the Initiative Committee for Setting-Up the Croat People's Party claims.

"Kosovo is not just a dangerous hotbed of crisis in the Balkans, but represents a moral blemish for all nations in Yugoslavia," the statement stresses and goes on to say: "The policy of repression against Albanians in Kosovo by the Serbian authorities has no prospect of succeeding, because modern national problems cannot be resolved by force."

Croatian Government on Military Service

LD1709210190 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1751 GMT 17 Sep 90

[Text] Zagreb, 17 Sep (TANYUG)—About 320,000 citizens from about a dozen municipalities in Croatia have signed a petition demanding that in the future recruits from Croatia be allowed to serve their military service in Croatia. This was said this evening at a session of the Croat Government.

According to Josip Manolic, president of the Croat Government, Croatia has made it clear that it will not bargain over the number or the percentage of young men who would do their military service in Croatia. Only in exceptional circumstances—for instance, to serve in special units—would new recruits do their military service outside their own republic.

According to the Croat Government, no changes in the federal law are needed to provide for the above initiative. Figures for the last few months indicate that the percentage of recruits from Croatia who stayed to do their military service in their own republic increased from between five and 10 percent to between 15 to 20 percent. According to Martin Spegelj, Croatia's minister for national defense, by the end of the year 50 percent of new recruits in Croatia will be allowed to do their military service in their own republic.

Slovenia has already put forward a proposal to amend the federal law to provide for the right for recruits to do their military service in their own republic. The Croat government's support for the Slovene proposal is fully in line with the initiative of Croat municipalities and citizens, it was said at the session.

Bosnian Parties Request Electoral Law Change

LD1709180290 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1548 GMT 17 Sep 90

[Text] Sarajevo, 17 Sep (TANJUG)—The leaders of most political parties in Yugoslavia's Bosnia-Herzegovina requested an immediate change of the republic's electoral law at today's meeting with Republic Assembly President Zlatan Karavdic.

The party leaders asked for the application of the one man - one vote principle and that the electorate does not vote for lists of party candidates. The opposition parties said they would boycott the elections if their demand was not met.

The leaders of national parties, which are among the largest in the republic, asked that the future Presidency of the Republic consist of two Muslims, two Serbs, two Croats and one representative of other nationalities.

Bosnia-Herzegovina's 4.1 million population includes 1.63 million Muslims, 1.32 million Serbs and 750.000 Croats, according to a 1981 census.

Presidency Views Changes in Internal Relations

AU1809085890 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 14 Sep 90 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Voting on the Fate of the Country"]

[Text] Belgrade—The SFRY Presidency held a session yesterday—chaired by Dr. Borisav Jovic, its president—which was also attended by the presidents of the Presidencies of the republics and provinces.

The SFRY Presidency discussed and established the concept of future work on changing constitutional relations in the SFRY in order to resolve the constitutional crisis, as well as a report on the course of the work on and preparation of documentation on the new structure of Yugoslavia.

In line with this, it will also prepare and submit to the SFRY Assembly a proposal for adopting a special legal document for the constitutional reconstruction of the country and the possible concepts of future solutions, on which the peoples and citizens in republics will decide in a referendum.

Political activity aimed at preparing the necessary solutions will proceed in such a way that the SFRY Presidency will continue the incipient work with the Presidencies of the republics and autonomous provinces on formulating the concepts of the models of the future structure of Yugoslavia on the federative and confederative principle. The SFRY Presidency will discuss both these two concepts together with the presidents of the Presidencies of the republics and autonomous provinces at the beginning of this October.

In accordance with activity on investigating a solution to the constitutional crisis, the SFRY Presidency points out that it is quite necessary to ensure that the existing constitutional order is adhered to because the SFRY Constitution applies until a new one is adopted for everyone equally.

The SFRY Presidency also discussed and adopted a report on the recent visit to our country by Ion Iliescu, president of the Republic of Romania.

It was assessed that this visit and the talks which Dr. Borisav Jovic had with the president of the Republic of Romania confirmed the significance of and gave new impetus to the development of traditionally good-neighborly relations and cooperation in all fields.

Central Bank: Successful Reforms Key to Aid

LD1709124390 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1007 GMT 17 Sep 90

[Text] Belgrade, 17 Sep (TANJUG)—In the next several years, the World Bank's assistance to Yugoslavia might rise to one billion dollars annually, on condition that the political and economic reform in Yugoslavia whould be fully implemented, Vice-Governor of the Yugoslav Central Bank Zarko Trbojevic has told TANJUG.

Yugoslavia's cooperation with most financial institutions in 1989 and 1990 has been better than before, Trbojevic said. In the past 12 months, the World Bank has granted Yugoslavia 700 million dollars in credits, and talks are to be held on fresh loans, including a credit of from 300 million to 500 million dollars for restructuring the financial sector.

Trbojevic recalled that, approving the anti-inflationary programme of the government of Prime Minister Ante Markovic, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) also granted Yugoslavia an 18-month stand-by arrangement to the amount of 600 million dollars.

He further said that, at the annual meeting of the World Bank and the IMF in Washington later this month, the Yugoslav delegation and IMF representatives would discuss convertibility of the Yugoslav currency, dinar.

"The conditions have been created for the IMF shortly to recognize the dinar's external convertibility. This might be jeopardized only by a failure to implement the federal government's economic programme", Trbojevic said.

Vice-Governor of the Yugoslav Central Bank Zarko Trbojevic believes that the Yugoslav reform has not ground to a halt, despite the political situation in the country.

"However, we have come upon some unexpected obstacles: harm done by the drought, estimated at 2.5 billion dollars, and the consequences of the crisis in the Persian Gulf, which have cost Yugoslavia 3 billion dollars", Trbojevic said.

He announced further talks with the Paris Club on rescheduling the Yugoslav debt. Yugoslavia will ask for a deferred payment of the credits with a grace period by July 1989, to the tune of some 600 million dollars, he said.

Yugoslavia is not an over-indebted country, Trbojevic recalled.

In the early nineteen-eighties, Yugoslavia had a foreign debt in excess of 22 billion dollars, which has now been reduced to only 14.3 billion dollars, in view of the fact that Yugoslavia's claims on other countries amount to 3.2 billion dollars, Trbojevic said.

Today, Yugoslavia sets aside 15.8 percent of its hard-currency earnings for debt repayment, whereas three years ago, it was 45 percent.

This fact, together with the fact that Yugoslavia has high hard-currency reserves (10.2 billion dollars), are obstacles to talks with the Paris Club, which grants facilities in debt repayment only to countries which have a problem with their balance of payments.

The Yugoslav Government, however, has every reason to ask that the Paris Club alter this traditional approach and grant a deferment, Trbojevic said.

Secretary Outlines Plans for New Tax System

LD1709181690 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1628 GMT 17 Sep 90

[Text] Belgrade, Sept 17 (TANJUG)—Yugoslavia will need at least five years to create a new tax system which will be adjusted to the fiscal systems of developed market economy countries, Assistant Federal Secretary for Finance Vladimir Pintar told a press conference in Belgrade today.

In talks before tomrorow's session of the Commission for the Reform of the Yugoslav Fiscal System, Pintar pointed out the assessment of experts that the tax system is at this moment the weak point of Yugoslavia's economic reform.

The reintegration of parts of the fiscal system into a unified system and the introduction of a tax on overall personal incomes should be ensured in the second stage of the reform of the tax system, which has been postponed for next year, Pintar said.

The third stage will not be possible before 1995 and in it, the sales tax is to be replaced with the value-added tax, Pintar said.

Funds Lacking for New 'Investment Cycle'

LD1709172590 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1639 GMT 17 Sep 90

[Text] Belgrade, 17 Sep (TANJUG)—Yugoslavia will not undertake a new investment cycle this year because of a lack of funds due to excessive expenditures, development secretary Bozo Marendic told a session of the Federal Assembly plans committee today.

Excessive expenses, this year's drought which inflicted 2.7 billion dollars in damages and the Gulf crisis caused changes in Yugoslavia's current economic policy but Marendic said there would be no significant deviations from the goals of the economic reform initiatied by the Markovic government.

He said the total mass for workers' salaries in the country should be lowered by 15 percent as one of the conditions to keep inflation at planned levels. The federal government planned an annual inflation rate of 13-15 percent this year.

The Federal Assembly's credit and monetary policy committee rejected the federal government's proposal on implementing a restrictive monetary policy in the country to the end of the year.

The measure was proposed by National Bank Governor Dusan Vlatkovic becuase of a "money exploision" this summer, an unplanned high increase in salaries and overall social expenditures.

Slovenia's Federal Assembly delegates refused to vote on the government proposals today as long as Serbia's decision on dissolving the Kosovo Assembly remains in force. Kosovo's Provincial Assembly was dissolved by the Assembly of its parent republic over an attempt to seccede Kosovo from Serbia.

National Assembly's Voting Timetable Extended

LD1709195490 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1751 GMT 17 Sep 90

[Text] Belgrade, 17 Sep (TANJUG)—The Yugoslav parliament will not be able to vote on the draft amendments to the federal Constitution as scheduled, which can place in question the timely carrying out of the tasks for which the term of the current federal legislature (which was to expire in May) has been extended until the end of the year, as set out in a statement issued here today.

The statement said that the next regular session of the federal parliament could be held only sometime "around October 10."

The federal legislature will not be able to vote on the constitutional amendments because the assemblies of the republic of Slovenia and Croatia, themselves, will not vote on the draft document by September 20, as scheduled, since they will not meet before late September and early October, respectively.

At its next session in mid-October, the federal parliament will proclaim a new member of the Yugoslav State Presidency, since the Croatian Assembly decided that Croatia's representative in the presidency Stipe Suvar be replaced by Stjepav Mesic.